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Image reprinted from the illustrated book “Deep Dark Fears” by Fran Krause, 
with permission from the author. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the face of danger, mammals show an adaptive behavior pattern, called 
the ‘fight-or-flight’ response, that mobilizes the organism to take appropriate 
action. These behavior patterns are accompanied by physiological arousal and 
subjective feelings of anxiety and stress. Together, the action tendencies (attack 
or flight), physiological arousal, and negative subjective apprehension are 
summarized with the term fear (Frijda, 1986; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998).  
It is conceivable that what we fear has been shaped by our evolutionary 
history (Seligman, 1971). Some fears, such as fear for heights, open spaces and 
snakes, are far more common than other fears, such as for cars and guns, even 
though the latter probably pose a greater threat for physical harm for modern 
humans. Nevertheless, what we fear is not limited to a fixed set of innately 
fearful stimuli. Humans and other mammals possess the adaptive ability to learn 
to fear stimuli that are predictive of harmful or unpleasant events. This has been 
famously demonstrated with an experiment by Watson and Rayner (1920). In 
their study, Watson and Rayner (1920) showed that a young boy could learn to 
fear a rat when experience with the rat was repeatedly paired with a loud and 
aversive sound. Many subsequent experiments have provided further evidence 
that all three components of fear (behavior tendencies, physiological arousal and 
negative subjective apprehensions) can be installed through learning experiences 
(for an extensive overview of laboratory fear conditioning studies, see Öhman & 
Mineka, 2001).  
Many instances of fear acquisition can be conceptualized in terms of 
classical conditioning (Field, 2006; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). For instance, in the 
study of Watson and Rayner (1920), the rat can be seen as a conditioned 
stimulus (CS) that was repeatedly paired with an aversive unconditioned stimulus 
(US) (the loud noise), the latter of which tends to automatically elicit fearful 
unconditioned reactions (URs). After repeated pairings of the CS and the US, the 
CS started to elicit a conditioned reaction (CRs) (fear of the rat). Note that this 
conceptualization provides a functional explanation of the fear for the rat. It 
refers to the effects of observable events (e.g., stimulus pairings) on a specific 
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behavior (e.g., expressions of fear) but does not make any claims about 
mediating mental processes (De Houwer, 2011).  
Whereas the conditioning approach to fear has been highly successful in 
generating a better understanding of fear and, importantly, in developing 
successful interventions to remedy pathological fear (McNally, 2007; Mineka & 
Zinbarg, 2006), it has been strongly criticized as well (e.g., Menzies & Clarke, 
1995; Rachman, 1977). One important criticism is that stimulus pairings are not 
sufficient nor necessary for the acquisition of fear. That is, on the one hand, 
stimulus pairings are not sufficient because many people that have experienced 
some sort of trauma (e.g., being in a car accident) will not go on to develop an 
anxiety disorder (e.g., not all people that have been in a car accident will go on to 
develop fear for being in a car) (Beckers, Krypotos, Boddez, Effting, & Kindt, 
2013; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). On the other hand, stimulus pairings are not 
necessary because people may develop a fear for a certain stimulus without 
having experienced a pairing of this stimulus with a highly unpleasant or 
traumatic event (e.g., someone who develops fear for snakes in a Northern 
European country) (King, Eleonora, & Ollendick, 1998). Such observations have 
led theorists to propose that fear could also be acquired through other 
pathways, besides stimulus pairings, such as through verbal instructions and 
social observation (Field, 2006; Rachman, 1977, 1991).  
Against this background, the aim of this PhD thesis was to investigate how 
fear is acquired via verbal instructions. As the opening cartoon of this chapter 
nicely demonstrates, verbal threat instructions can install intense fear that 
impacts on behavior (e.g., avoiding nose picking), cognitions (e.g., negative 
feelings about nose picking) and psychophysiological reactions (not in this 
illustration, but, see Cook & Harris, 1937; Grillon, Ameli, Woods, Merikangas, & 
Davis, 1991), that can persist for many years. Furthermore, in retrospective 
reports from phobic patients, verbal information is often reported as a cause for 
the onset of pathological fear (King et al., 1998; Merckelbach, de Jong, Muris, & 
van den Hout, 1996). However, despite these reports, fear acquisition via verbal 
instructions remains poorly understood (Muris & Field, 2010; Olsson & Phelps, 
2007). So far, few research programs have been initiated to systematically study 
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the properties of fear acquisition via verbal instructions, probably because 
research on fear acquisition has been largely dominated by a focus on the effects 
of stimulus pairings (Field, 2006; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009; 
Rachman, 1991). Therefore, the aim of the research in this PhD project was to 
come to a better understanding of the properties of fear acquisition via verbal 
instructions. Specifically, we wanted to test a number of predictions that can be 
derived from mental process models of fear learning that allowed to come to a 
better understanding of how fear can be learned via verbal instructions. 
Furthermore, we wanted to investigate several functional properties of fear 
learning via verbal instructions that may explain how intense and persistent fears 
can be installed via verbal instructions. 
To introduce the research in this PhD thesis, I will first present three 
mental process models that try to explain how fear learning takes place for both 
learning through the pairing of stimuli and learning via verbal instructions. After 
describing these models, I will introduce the different chapters of the thesis and 
clarify how they tried to increase the functional knowledge of fear learning via 
verbal instructions and how they attempted to test some of the hypotheses that 
can be raised on the basis of mental process models of fear learning. 
 
MENTAL PROCESS MODELS OF FEAR LEARNING VIA VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Fear learning is the result of the formation and strengthening of mental 
associations 
An important idea in psychology is that associative learning (i.e., learning 
through the pairing of stimuli) is the result of the formation and strengthening of 
associative connections in memory. An association can be thought of as an 
unqualified connection between representations that allows for the spreading of 
activation. That is, when one of the representations is activated, it will 
(automatically) tend to activate the other representation. According to this 
model, repeated pairings of a CS and an aversive US will result in the formation 
of a strong association between the representation of these two stimuli. Due to 
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this association, subsequent presentations of the CS will tend to activate the 
representation of the US, which in turn will tend to elicit a fearful CR. 
According to Field (2006), the same mechanism also supports fear learning 
via verbal instructions (see also: Muris & Field, 2010). That is, the verbal 
information “stay away from this dog because it might bite” will allow for a 
strengthening of a mental association between the representation of the dog 
(the CS) and the representation of being bitten (the US). Thus, with this model, 
Field proposes that the process that allows for fear learning through verbal 
instructions is exactly the same as the process that allows for fear learning 
through the pairing of stimuli (and fear learning through social observation). 
However, it should be noted that many different models of association formation 
exists that differ in their predictions about when associations can be formed and 
expressed (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), as we will see later 
in this section. 
Fear learning is the result of the formation of propositions 
A second model of (fear) learning is the single-process propositional 
learning model of Mitchell et al. (2009; see also De Houwer, 2009; Lovibond, 
2011). According to this model, associative learning, and thus also fear 
conditioning, is the result of the non-automatic formation of propositions. 
Propositions are qualified beliefs about the relationship between events. These 
beliefs can be formed through stimulus pairings, verbal instructions, observation 
and reasoning alike. Importantly, these propositions or beliefs are formed 
through effortful reasoning processes (Mitchell et al., 2009, pp. 184). Hence, 
their formation requires time, attention, awareness and motivation. 
Nevertheless, once a belief or proposition is formed, it can later be automatically 
retrieved. Furthermore, such propositions can allow for the automatic elicitation 
of preparatory or anticipatory behavior such as (autonomic) fear reactions.  
According to this model, fear learning via pairings of stimuli and fear 
learning via verbal instructions should strongly interact because they are both 
mediated by the same mental mechanism (Lovibond, 2003). Furthermore, on the 
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basis of this model, we can also predict that these two pathways of fear learning 
should have very similar properties.  
It can be noted that the propositional account of fear learning is closely 
related to expectancy models of fear (Davey, 1997; Reiss, 1980), according to 
which fear is the result of the expectancy of encountering an aversive or harmful 
event in the presence of certain antecedent stimuli. However, the propositional 
account makes explicit that these expectancies are the result of the non-
automatic formation of propositions (Lovibond, 2011), whereas other 
researchers could claim that these expectancies reflect the formation  and 
activation of associations (e.g., Mineka & Öhman, 2002). 
Fear learning is the result of both the formation of propositions and the 
formation and strengthening of associations 
A third model of fear leaning is the social fear learning model of Olsson and 
Phelps (2007). This model partly distinguishes between learning via the pairings 
of stimuli and learning through observation on the one hand, and learning 
through verbal instructions on the other hand. That is, all pathways of learning 
result in the formation of conscious propositional knowledge about the 
contingencies between events (in a similar fashion as described in the single-
process propositional model). However, specifically learning through the pairing 
of stimuli and learning through social observation also allow for the formation of 
implicit associative memories in the amygdala (Olsson & Phelps, 2007, 2004) that 
are formed according to Hebbian learning principles (Blair, Schafe, Bauer, 
Rodrigues, & LeDoux, 2001). This latter associative learning process can be 
viewed as a relatively automatic and reflex-like process, as it can take place 
outside of conscious awareness, it is goal-independent and it cannot be 
controlled (LeDoux, 2014; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). Learning via verbal 
instructions, on the other hand, only results in the acquisition of conscious 
knowledge of the contingency between events, but does not allow for the 
formation of such associative fear memories in the amygdala (Olsson & Phelps, 
2007, pp. 1100). Hence, according to this model, learning via the different 
pathways do not necessarily have to share similar properties. Other restricting 
14  CHAPTER 1  
conditions may apply for the different pathways for when learning can take place 
and under which conditions learned information can be expressed. For instance, 
awareness of the CSs may be required to express learned fear that has been 
acquired via verbal instructions, but not for learned fear acquired through 
stimulus pairings or social observation (Olsson & Phelps, 2004). 
Evaluation of the different models 
Simple single-process association formation models in which stimulus co-
occurrence is a sufficient condition for associative learning have long been 
abandoned. For instance, demonstrations of the blocking effect (Kamin, 1969) 
have shown that the mere pairing of stimuli is not sufficient to support learning. 
More complex association formation models have been put forward, including 
models according to which association formation is affected by surprise (Rescorla 
& Wagner, 1972) and attention (Mackintosh, 1975). But even these models have 
difficulties accounting for the fact that associative learning is strongly affected by 
awareness (Dawson & Furedy, 1976) and reasoning (De Houwer, Vandorpe, & 
Beckers, 2005). Likewise, associative models are unlikely to hold for fear learning 
via verbal instructions as well. For instance, the instruction “this picture will be 
followed by an electric shock” does result in the establishment of autonomic fear 
reactions to the picture (e.g., Cook & Harris, 1937), whereas the instruction “this 
picture will NOT be followed by an electric shock” does not result in autonomic 
fear reactions (e.g., Sevenster, Beckers, & Kindt, 2012), even though the 
representations of the picture and the shock are probably being activated 
together while reading both sentences. Such a result is difficult to explain with a 
simple association formation account. 
For these and other reasons, most contemporary learning researchers 
agree that controlled reasoning processes are involved in associative (fear) 
learning. A central question in contemporary learning research is whether there 
is a need to assume also other (i.e., associative) learning processes (McLaren et 
al., 2014; Shanks, 2010).  As noted above, the social fear learning model of 
Olsson and Phelps (2007) argues that learning through controlled reasoning 
processes is supplemented with learning via simple association formation, 
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specifically for learning via stimulus pairings and learning through social 
observation (see also: LeDoux, 2014; Öhman & Mineka, 2001), but not for fear 
learning via verbal instructions. A key question for understanding fear learning 
via verbal instructions becomes then: Are there certain properties of fear 
learning through stimulus pairings and social observation that do not apply for 
fear learning through verbal instructions, and the other way around? And if so, 
when and how do the properties of fear learning from the different pathways 
diff er? The answer to these questions will inform us whether the learning 
processes of the different pathways of fear learning are indeed partly 
independent and under which conditions the learning processes of the different 
pathways contribute to the acquisition of fear.   
INTRODUCTION OF THE CHAPTERS 
Chapter 2: Fear expression and return of fear with or without actual 
contingency experience 
In this chapter, we investigated whether fear learning via verbal 
instructions and via stimulus pairings can have additive effects. Every model of 
fear learning would predict that the effects of verbal instructions and of stimulus 
pairings can be additive under certain conditions. That is, a single-process 
propositional model could predict that stimulus pairings can add to the effects of 
verbal instructions because it might add to the truth validity of the proposition 
that was installed through verbal instructions. Similarly, an associative model 
could predict that a verbal instruction installs a CS-US association that is further 
strengthened by subsequent CS-US pairings (see Raes, De Houwer, De Schryver, 
Brass, & Kalisch, 2014, for an extensive discussion). However, some measures, 
such as the startle reflex, are believed to reflect primarily the implicit fear 
memory represented in the amygdala (Hamm & Weike, 2005; Sevenster et al., 
2012). According to the social fear learning model of Olsson and Phelps (2007), 
additive effects of CS-US pairings should therefore be primarily pronounced for 
these measures because only stimulus pairings are believed to install such 
16  CHAPTER 1  
implicit fear memories. This hypothesis was investigated in this chapter using a 
paradigm developed by Raes et al. (2014). 
Chapter 3: Does confirmation of verbal threat modulate early visual 
processing? 
In Chapter 3, we investigated whether fear learning via verbal instructions 
and via stimulus pairings can have additive effects on early sensory processing as 
measured by Event-Related Potentials (ERPs). Previous studies have shown that 
both threat information and fear conditioning through stimulus pairings can 
enhance components related to early sensory processing. So far, to our 
knowledge, no study had investigated whether the combination of these two 
pathways of fear acquisition can have an additive effects on the enhancement of 
early sensory processing. Because this enhanced sensory processing for fearful 
stimuli is believed to be due attention gain mechanisms afforded by the 
amygdala (Pourtois, Schettino, & Vuilleumier, 2013), dual process models of fear 
learning would predict that such enhancement of components related to early 
sensory processing should be particularly pronounced when threat information is 
combined with stimulus pairings. 
Chapter 4: Can prepared fear conditioning result from verbal instructions? 
In this fourth chapter, we investigated whether verbal threat instructions 
can produce prepared learning effects. That is, for fear learning via stimulus 
pairings, previous research has demonstrated that fear acquisition is facilitated 
and extinction of conditioned fear is delayed for fear-relevant CSs (such as 
pictures of snakes and spiders) as compared to fear-irrelevant CSs (such as 
pictures of birds or butterflies) (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). These prepared 
learning effects are believed to be the result of the operation of a specifically 
evolved fear learning module centered on the amygdala (Mineka & Öhman, 
2002; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). Because verbal instructions do not allow for the 
formation of fear memories in the amygdala according to dual process models of 
fear learning, we would predict that such prepared learning effects cannot be 
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obtained through verbal threat instructions. This prediction was tested in this 
Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5: Potentiation of the startle reflex is in line with contingency reversal 
instructions rather than the conditioning history 
In Chapter 5 we investigated whether verbal instructions can overturn fear 
reactions installed through stimulus pairings and through verbal instructions. If 
stimulus pairings install an implicit fear memory, verbal instructions might not be 
sufficient to overturn this fear memory (Hugdahl, 1978). Furthermore, this 
should be particularly be pronounced for measures that reflect this implicit fear 
memory such as the startle reflex (Hamm & Weike, 2005; Sevenster et al., 2012). 
In contrast, verbal instructions are not assumed to install such an implicit fear 
memory. Rather, if verbal instructions install a conscious accessible proposition 
about the contingencies between events, convincing instructions could probably 
easily overturn these propositions and install new propositions of how events are 
related. These hypotheses were tested in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6: The impact of a context switch and context instructions on the 
return of verbally conditioned fear 
Finally, in Chapter 6 we investigated whether renewal of fear memories 
can be found when fear is established through verbal instructions. That is, it is 
well known that extinction (i.e., the presentation of a CS without reinforcement) 
does not result in the erasure of fear memory, but rather creates a competing 
inhibitory memory that suppresses the fear memory within a specific context. 
This has been demonstrated by fear renewal studies, in which fear is acquired 
within a certain context A and extinguished in another context B. When 
participants are subsequently tested in the acquisition context A, or a new 
context C, fear tends to return compared to when the context is not switched 
after the extinction phase. However, so far no study has investigated whether 
extinction of verbally established fear memories is equally context-dependent. If 
a single underlying process is responsible for both fear learning through stimulus 
pairings and through verbal instructions, we would expect that context 
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dependent extinction applies to both pathways of learning. This was investigated 
in this final chapter. Furthermore, we investigated whether verbal information 
about the relevance of the context for the presence of the electrical shock could 
strengthen the contextual control of fear memories. If the renewal effect is due 
to propositions participants form about when it is likely to expect a shock, such 
contextual information should be able to strengthen the renewal effect. This 
prediction was also investigated in this final empirical chapter. 
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FEAR EXPRESSION AND RETURN OF FEAR 
FOLLOWING THREAT INSTRUCTION WITH OR 
WITHOUT DIRECT CONTINGENCY EXPERIENCE 
1 
Prior research showed that mere instructions about the contingency 
between a Conditioned Stimulus (CS) and an Unconditioned Stimulus (US) can 
generate fear reactions to the CS. Little is known, however, about the extent to 
which actual CS-US contingency experience adds anything beyond the effect of 
contingency instructions. Our results extend previous studies on this topic in that 
it included fear potentiated startle as an additional dependent variable and 
examined return of fear following reinstatement. We observed that CS-US 
pairings can enhance fear reactions beyond the effect of contingency instructions. 
Moreover, for all measures of fear, instructions elicited immediate fear reactions 
that could not be completely overridden by subsequent situational safety 
information. Finally, return of fear following reinstatement for instructed CS+s 
was unaffected by actual experience. In sum, our results demonstrate the power 
of contingency instructions and reveal the additional impact of actual experience 
of CS-US pairings. 
                                                     
1
Based on Mertens, G., Kuhn, M., Raes, A. K., Kalisch, R., De Houwer, J., & Lonsdorf, T. B. 
(2015). Fear expression and return of fear following threat instruction with or without direct 
contingency experience. Cognition and Emotion, (ahead-of-print), 1–17. doi: 
10.1080/02699931.2015.1038219 
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INTRODUCTION 
Adaptive behavior in changing environments critically relies on learning to 
predict potentially harmful events. However, fear learning can also be 
maladaptive and pathological when too pronounced or situational inappropriate. 
Fear conditioning, extinction and return of fear are used as laboratory analogues 
for the acquisition, exposure-based treatment and subsequent relapse in 
patients suffering from phobic fears (Beckers, Krypotos, Boddez, Effting, & Kindt, 
2013; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). In fear conditioning, an initially neutral stimulus 
(conditioned stimulus, CS) is repeatedly paired with an aversive stimulus 
(unconditioned stimulus, US) and thereby the CS gains the capacity to elicit a fear 
response (conditioned response, CR). Repeated presentation of the CS without 
the US during extinction typically leads to a gradual weakening of the CR. 
However, the return of (conditioned) fear  (ROF) can be facilitated by various 
conditions such as re-presentation of the US (reinstatement) (Bouton & Bolles, 
1979; Haaker, Golkar, Hermans, & Lonsdorf, 2014; Rescorla & Heth, 1975).  
The prediction of aversive events can be based on information acquired in 
different ways. With respect to the acquisition of fear, direct experience of CS-US 
pairings as well as observational and instructed fear have been identified as 
possible routes (e.g. Rachman, 1977). The role of actual CS-US contingency 
experience as laboratory model for the development of phobias has been a 
subject of debate because the etiology of fear and phobias can often be traced 
back to observational learning or verbal instructions (Field, 2006; Rachman, 
1977). In addition, propositional theories of human associative learning highlight 
that observation, reasoning and verbal instructions are equally valid sources for 
learning as directly experiencing contingencies (De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell, De 
Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009; Olsson & Phelps, 2007). Therefore, studying 
instructions as a source of fear acquisition in the lab can be important to gain a 
better understanding of the etiology of fear and phobias and to spur theoretical 
development in our understanding of associative learning.  
26  CHAPTER 2  
Numerous laboratory studies have demonstrated that verbal instructions 
are a potent means to generate or change fear reactions. For instance, verbal 
instructions and vicarious observations regarding CS-US contingencies are known 
to be sufficient to immediately establish (Cook & Harris, 1937; Grillon, Ameli, 
Woods, Merikangas, & Davis, 1991; Olsson & Phelps, 2004), alter (Lovibond, 
2003; McNally, 1981) or extinguish fear reactions (Golkar, Selbing, Flygare, 
Ohman, & Olsson, 2013; Lipp & Edwards, 2002; Sevenster, Beckers, & Kindt, 
2012a). Recently, it was also shown that extinction via instructions or 
observation attenuates the ROF through reinstatement (Golkar et al., 2013; 
Sevenster et al., 2012a).  
To date, however, few studies have looked at the joint effects of the actual 
experience of and instructions about CS-US contingencies on fear expression and 
ROF. This could not only shed light on the unique contribution of both pathways 
to fear but also on their interaction. An additive effect of experience and 
instruction is expected on the basis of conditioning theories for phobic fear. For 
instance, Mineka and Zinbarg (2006) proposed that a trauma (e.g. being bitten by 
a dog) should lead to stronger fear reactions when it matches with previous 
beliefs on the trauma inducing stimulus (e.g. dangerous dog vs. non-dangerous 
dog). Similarly, it is known for decades that fear conditioning is more 
pronounced and extinction is attenuated when “biologically prepared” stimuli 
(e.g. snakes) are used as CSs (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). In line with this, it has 
been shown that the combination of threat information about an animal and an 
actual negative encounter indeed produced more fear in children than either 
threat information or a negative encounter alone (Field & Storksen-Coulson, 
2007). Such an additive effect was, however, not observed in a similar study in 
adults (Ugland, Dyson, & Field, 2013). In these two studies however, participants 
were provided with general threat information rather than specific contingency 
instructions. Moreover, possible differences in US expectancy between the 
threat and no-threat groups were not controlled for.  
These issues were addressed in a recent study by Raes, De Houwer, De 
Schryver, Brass, and Kalisch (2014) that compared reactions to two CSs, both of 
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which were instructed to be followed by an electro-tactile US during a second 
(“Test”) phase. In a cover story, participants were told that, in order to 
familiarize themselves with the procedure, the test phase would be preceded by 
a training phase that was identical to the test phase, except that the USs that 
would follow one of the CSs (CS instructed or CS-I) would be replaced by a 
placeholder (a drawing of a lightening bold). They were told that the placeholder 
was used simply to reduce the number of actual USs during the training phase. 
After these instructions, participants experienced the training phase in which the 
first CS (CS instructed + experienced or CSI+E) was followed by the US on some 
trials whereas the other CS (CS-I) was never followed by the actual US but only 
by the placeholder. During the later test phase, contrary to instructions, neither 
of the CSs was followed by the US, allowing for a test of conditioned responding 
under extinction. The results showed that the actual experience of CS-US 
contingency can enhance fear reactions beyond the effect of contingency 
instructions. In particular, Fear ratings during test were heightened for the CSI+E 
as compared to the CS-I while US expectancy ratings and skin conductance 
responses (SCR) did not differ significantly between both CSs. One possible 
explanation of this finding is that SCR and US expectancy may tap into more 
cognitive components of fear such as explicit CS-US contingency knowledge  
(Dawson, Schell, & Banis, 1986; Grings, 1973; Hamm & Weike, 2005; Reiss, 1980; 
Sevenster, Beckers, & Kindt, 2012b) whereas Fear ratings might reflect a more 
emotional component of fear (Hamm & Weike, 2005). From this perspective, 
instructions might primarily affect the cognitive components of fear whereas 
actual CS-US contingency experience might have an impact on the affective 
components.  
If this post-hoc explanation of the results of Raes et al. (2014) is correct, 
also other indices that tap primarily into affective components of fear should 
reveal an impact of actual CS-US pairings beyond the impact of contingency 
instructions. Fear potentiated startle (FPS) is a prime candidate for such an 
affective index of fear. The startle response is a defensive reflex, measured at the 
orbicularis oculi muscle that can be elicited by a sudden high intensity noise 
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(Davis, 2006). The amplitude of the startle reflex is modulated by valence. It is 
potentiated in aversive emotional states (such as fear) and attenuated in positive 
emotional states (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990) and is often used to tap the 
affective component of fear learning (e.g., Hamm & Weike, 2005). In fact, it has 
been shown that FPS is less affected by verbal safety instructions (Sevenster et 
al., 2012a) and contingency awareness (Hamm & Weike, 2005; Sevenster, 
Beckers, & Kindt, 2014) during uninstructed conditioning than SCR. Thus, FPS 
represents a suitable measure to capture the emotional component of fear 
conditioning which we expect to be strongly affected by actual CS-US pairings. In 
addition, including FPS as an additional measure promises to be informative with 
respect to a striking finding of Raes et al. (2014), who report enhanced Fear and 
US expectancy ratings, but not SCRs, towards the CS-I (as compared to the CS-) 
already during training. Because participants were explicitly informed that the 
CS-I would only be followed by the US during a later test but not during the initial 
training, this finding shows that the effects of the threat instructions could not 
be completely overridden by subsequent situational safety instructions. As FPS 
has been shown to be especially insensitive to verbal safety instructions 
(Sevenster et al., 2012a), we predict that fear reactions to the CS-I during training 
will be specifically outspoken for FPS. 
Finally, in a second extension of the design of Raes et al. (2014), we 
implemented a reinstatement procedure to complement the previous studies on 
the return of fear following reinstatement. The majority of studies on 
reinstatement in humans have used instructed acquisition (i.e., CS-US 
contingency instructions in combination with actual CS-US pairings) while 
extinction was with few exceptions uninstructed (Haaker et al., 2014). In these 
studies, instructed extinction as compared to uninstructed extinction leads to 
resistance to return of fear for SCRs and US expectancy ratings but not FPS 
(Sevenster et al., 2012a). Similarly, observational extinction (i.e., observing a 
third person being exposed to unreinforced post-acquisition CS trials) following 
regular fear conditioning also attenuated ROF following reinstatement (Golkar et 
al., 2013). While instructed and observational extinction seems to prevent the 
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ROF, explicit tests of the effect of instructed vs. uninstructed fear acquisition are 
still awaited (Haaker et al., 2014). In an attempt to shed light on this question, 
our study for the first time directly compares the return of fear following 
reinstatement between two instructed CSs that differ in the presence or absence 
of a history of direct CS-US contingency experience. Given the assumption that 
both contingency instructions and CS-US pairings can contribute to the 
development of (pathological) fear, information about the impact of both 
pathways on ROF could shed new light on the long-term outcome of treatment 
of (pathological) fear. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Forty-four right-handed volunteers were recruited through an online 
platform. Eight participants were excluded because of technical issues (N = 3), 
insufficient belief in the instructions (N = 4) or a failure to induce a fearful US (N 
= 1), leaving 36 participants for analyses (15 males, mean age = 26.89, SD = 4.87; 
mean STAI-S score = 32.67, SD = 5.67, range = 21 – 44). The sample size was 
based on the original study of Raes et al. (2014) (N = 32). The study was 
approved by the local ethics committee Hamburg (General Medical Council 
Hamburg) and volunteers were paid 20 Euro. 
Materials 
The Materials and Procedure used are largely identical to the previous 
experiment of Raes et al. (2014) and will thus be described briefly.  
Experimental stimuli 
 Stimulus presentation was controlled with Presentation software 
(NeuroBehavioral Systems, Albany California, USA). Three blue snow fractals (200 
by 200 pixels) in a white square presented in the center of a black background 
served as CSs (duration 8 s, see Figure 1) and a white fixation cross on a black 
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background served as the ITI (duration 13, 15 or 17 s). The US was an electro-
tactile stimulus administered to the back of the right hand with a 1 cm diameter 
surface electrode with a platinum pin (Specialty Developments, Bexley, UK). It 
consisted of three 2 ms rectangular pulses with an inter pulse interval of 40 ms. 
US administration was controlled via a Digitimer DS7A constant current 
stimulator (Hertfordshire, UK). In the training phase a picture of a lightning bolt 
(approximately 200 by 200 pixels) presented for 500 ms was used as the 
placeholder for the US.  
Subjective ratings  
US expectancy and Fear ratings referring to the most recent encounter 
for each CS were provided on 9-point Likert scales in blocks (i.e., 6 ratings per 
block). Before the rating block, participants were asked to think back to their last 
encounter with the stimuli and were reminded that the questions referred to the 
actual stimulation and not the picture of the lightning bolt. The Likert scales were 
accompanied by the caption “To what extent did you expect an electro-tactile 
stimulation while seeing this figure?” for US expectancy ratings and by “How 
much fear did you experience while looking at this figure?” for Fear ratings. 
Anchors for US expectancy ratings were (1) certainly not, (3) rather not, (5) 
uncertain, (7) rather certain and (9) certain. For Fear ratings anchors were (1) 
none at all, (3) very little, (5) uncertain, (7) to some extent and (9) very much. 
There were no time constraints for providing ratings. The sequence of trials was 
interrupted every nine trials for a rating block.  
Manipulation checks 
After the experiment, pleasantness and pain ratings were collected for 
both the acquisition US and the reinstatement USs on 9-point Likert scales. 
Pleasantness ratings were accompanied by the caption “How 
pleasant/unpleasant did you find the electrical (unexpected/unsignaled) 
stimulation?” and the anchors were: (1) very unpleasant, (5) uncertain, (9) very 
pleasant. Pain ratings were accompanied by the caption “How painful did you 
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find the (unexpected/unsignaled) stimulation?” together with anchors: (1) totally 
not, (3) rather not, (5) uncertain, (7) rather much, (9) very much. 
Questionnaires 
Prior to the experiment, participants completed a German version of the 
State version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S; Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) and a general demographic questionnaire. After 
the experiment, participants completed an English custom-made questionnaire1 
about the credibility of the experimental instructions. In this questionnaire, 
participants had to indicate the clarity and believability of the instructions on a 
scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much so) and could additionally 
provide general remarks about the experiment. 
 
Figure 1. Overview of the different CSs during the training phase. The CSI+E was 
paired with an electro-tactile stimulation (the Unconditioned Stimulus or US) and 
the CS-I was paired with a picture of a lightning bolt (the placeholder US). 
                                                     
1
 There was no specific reason why the credibility questionnaire was prepared in English. 
However, participants were recruited to be comfortable with an English speaking experimenter 
and none of the participants reported difficulties completing this questionnaire. 
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Procedure 
Start-up 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, measurement and stimulation electrodes 
were attached. Participants then filled in the questionnaires and went through a 
work-up procedure to individually adjust US intensity to a level experienced as 
“unpleasant but not painful”. Ratings of the final intensity were verbally provided 
on a 10-point scale (mean intensity = 8.02 mA, SD = 6.80; mean painfulness 
rating = 8.53, SD = 0.71). Subsequently, participants were administered an initial 
announced electro-tactile stimulation to test their physiological reactions. 
Instructions about the experimental procedure were provided as described 
before (Raes et al., 2014). Briefly, participants were informed about the two 
experimental phases (referred to as training and test phase). They were explicitly 
informed that in the training phase one stimulus (CSI+E) would be followed by 
the US while another stimulus (CS-I) would be followed by a picture of a lightning 
bolt as a placeholder for the US. As a cover story, the placeholder was said to be 
used to avoid the experience of a large number of USs before the actual test 
phase starts. A third fractal (CS-) was introduced as safe (never followed by the 
US, see Figure 1). Furthermore, participants were told that both the CSI+E and 
CS-I would be equally predictive of the US during the subsequent test phase. 
Explicit information about which two of these snow fractals may sometimes be 
followed by an US and which one would never be followed by the US (CS-) were 
provided. Assignment of the three fractals to the three CS types was 
counterbalanced across participants.   
Training phase 
After a brief startle habituation with five startle probes (ISI of 3 s), the 
training phase started which consisted of 27 trials organized in three blocks of 
nine CSs (three per CS type). Stimulus presentation was randomized with the 
restriction of no more than two repetitions of the same CS type. The first 
presentation of both CSI+E and CS-I was always reinforced by the US or 
placeholder respectively, coinciding with CS offset. The second and third 
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presentation was reinforced either for the CSI+E or CS-I in a counterbalanced 
fashion. Thus, in total two presentations of each CS type (CSI+E and CS-I) were 
reinforced. 
Test phase 
The test phase started with explicit instructions that both the CSI+E and the 
CS-I would be followed by the US from now while the CS- would remain 
unreinforced. In fact, this phase served as an extinction session as no US was 
administered following any CS. Apart from these instructions and US omission, 
stimulus timing and organization were identical to the training phase. 
Reinstatement and reinstatement test 
Following the last rating block of the test phase, three unannounced 
reinstatement USs were delivered (ISI of 5 s) to the participants while they saw a 
black background. The black background was identical to the background the 
fractals were superimposed on to maintain the experimental context (see Haaker 
et al., 2014 for a discussion of the role of the context in reinstatement). 17 s after 
the last reinstatement US, the first of nine (three of each CS type) additional 
unreinforced CS presentations started.  
Psychophysiological recordings 
Skin conductance responses (SCR) 
SCRs were measured using two disposable Ag/AgCl electrodes (2 cm 
diameter) attached to the distal and proximal hypothenar of the left hand. The 
signal was recorded using a BIOPAC MP-100 amplifier and Acqknowledge 3.9 
software (BIOPAC Systems Inc, Goleta, California, USA). Data were manually 
scored offline using a custom-made program according to published 
recommendations (Boucsein et al., 2012): The first response initiating within a 
0.9-4.0 s post stimulus onset (US or CS) and an amplitude >0.02 µS  was 
considered. Reactions showing recording artifacts were treated as missing data 
points. Prior to analysis, skin conductance values were log-transformed to 
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normalize the data and range-corrected to account for individual differences in 
skin conductivity. 
Fear potentiated startle 
 Orbicularis oculi muscular activation was measured through two 5 mm 
Ag/AgCl electrodes attached to the lower eyelid of the right eye (Blumenthal et 
al., 2005). A ground electrode was placed on the forehead approximately two 
centimeters below the hairline. Startle responding was elicited using a 95 dB 
white noise burst presented binaurally through Sennheiser headphones 
(Wedemark, Germany). The raw signal was collected at 1000 Hz, amplified and 
filtered (28-500 Hz) with a BIOPAC MP-100 amplifier and recorded, rectified and 
integrated with Acqknowledge 3.9 software (BIOPAC Systems Inc, Goleta, 
California, USA). 
During CS presentations in each block of the training and test phase, a 
startle probe was administered twice for each CS type - once after 5.5s and once 
after 6.5s. The first CS after the reinstatement USs was always startled to make 
sure that the rather transient effect of the reinstatement manipulation would be 
captured in the FPS data. 
During the ITI, startle probes were administered in two thirds of the cases 
at either an early or a late time point while the remaining ITIs were not startled. 
For the 13 s ITI, the startle probe could be either administered after 5 or 6 s 
(early startle probe) or 8 and 9 s (late startle probe). For the 15 s ITI, these values 
were 5 and 6.5 s (early) and 9.5 and 11 s (late). Finally, for the 17 s ITI, these 
values were 5 and 7.5 s (early) and 11 and 13 s (late). Finally, for the 
reinstatement phase, one of the two versions was randomly selected.  
Acquired data were scored offline with a custom-made program. Startle 
responses 20 - 120 ms post startle probe onset were scored (Blumenthal et al., 
2005). Responses were treated as missing when confounded by recording 
artifacts or when spontaneous blinks occurred right before, during or right after 
the startle probe onset. Prior to analysis, FPS data were T-transformed. One 
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participant was excluded from FPS analyses because he had a large proportion of 
unusable trials for this measure (85.39 %). 
Statistical analyses 
 Before analysis, data from the physiological measures were averaged by 
three (SCR) or by two (FPS) trials per CS in order to reduce variance and to obtain 
an equal amount of data points as for the ratings (i.e., three per phase and one 
after reinstatement). The training and test phase were analyzed separately with 
mixed models ANOVAs with the within-subject factor CS type (SCR, US 
expectancy, Fear ratings: CSI+E, CS-I, CS-; FPS: CSI+E, CS-I, CS-, ITI). In addition, a 
second factor block (first, second or third) was added to the analysis of the test 
phase in order to assess extinction. Two additional ANOVA’s were carried out to 
assess changes from the training to the test phase and from the test to the 
reinstatement phase respectively. First, the CSI+E/CS-I difference score for the 
training phase and the test phase was analyzed with a mixed model ANOVA with 
the factor phase (training, test). Second, responses from the last block of the test 
phase and the block after the reinstatement manipulation were compared with a 
phase (2) x CS type (for SCR: 3; for FPS: 4) mixed model ANOVA. For the 
reinstatement analysis, by trial results from the physiological measures were 
used because the reinstatement effect is transient (Haaker et al., 2014). 
 Greenhouse-Geisser corrections are reported when appropriate and the 
alpha level was set to .05. 
RESULTS 
Manipulation checks 
Four participants who rated believability as assessed by the custom-made 
questionnaire as 5 or less and one participant who consistently rated the US as 
pleasant and not painful in the post-experiment manipulation check ratings were 
excluded from the analyses (see the Materials and Participants sections). The 
36  CHAPTER 2  
remaining participants reported the instructions to be both clear (mean = 9.54, 
SD = 0.74) and believable (mean = 9.18, SD = 0.90). Furthermore, participants 
generally reported the US to be both rather unpleasant (mean pleasantness 
rating = 3.22, SD = 2.00) and moderately painful (mean pain rating = 6.33, SD = 
1.17). Similar ratings were given for the reinstatement USs (mean pleasantness 
rating = 2.58, SD = 1.93; mean pain rating = 6.83, SD = 1.38).  
Training phase 
During the training phase, a significant main effect of CS type was 
observed for all measures, all p-values < .001 (see Table 1, Figure 2). Conditioned 
responses were stronger for CSI+E and CS-I than for CS-, showing fear expression 
on all measures, all p-values ≤ .005, with the exception of SCRs for which the CS-I 
only elicited trend-wise stronger responses than the CS-, p = .075.  Furthermore, 
the CSI+E elicited significantly stronger responses than the CS-I in Fear ratings, US 
expectancy and SCRs, all p-values < .009, and trend-wise stronger response in 
FPS, p = .072 (see Table 1, Figure 2). Taken together, these results demonstrate 
enhanced cognitive and emotional responding during the training phase to the 
US-predictive CSI+E. Responses were, however, also enhanced to the CS-I despite 
instructions that this stimulus was explicitly safe during this but not a later 
experimental phase. 
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Figure 2. Mean (A) US expectancy ratings, (B) Fear ratings, (C) fear potentiated 
startle responses and (D) skin conductance responses for CSI+E (instructed + 
experienced), CS-I (instructed), CS- and ITI across all experimental phases. Error 
bars represent SEM. Note that for the statistical analyses, physiological 
responses were averaged per two (FPS) or three (SCRs) trials for analyses 
concerning the training and the test phase. 
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Test phase 
In the test phase, a significant main effect of CS type was observed for all 
measures, all p-values ≤ .001. Responses towards CSI+E and CS-I were 
significantly stronger than to the CS-, all p-values < .004 (see Table 2, Figure 2). In 
addition, CSI+E elicited significantly (US expectancy, Fear ratings, both p-values < 
.001) or trend-wise (FPS, p = .082)2 stronger responses than CS-I, despite the fact 
that participants were told that both CSs would be equally predictive of the US 
during this experimental phase. For SCRs, however, there was no significant 
difference between CSI+E and CS-I, F(1,35) < 1. Thus, verbal instructions 
completely abolished differences between the merely instructed CS (CS-I) and the 
instructed and experienced CS (CSI+E) only in SCRs. For all other measures the 
effect of experience carried over from the training to the test phase which was 
reflected in a significantly or marginally maintained CSI+E/CS-I discrimination. 
A significant main effect of block was also observed for all measures, all p-
values < .001. Importantly, this main effect of block was qualified by an 
interaction between CS type and block for US expectancy, Fear ratings, and FPS, 
all p-values < .05. For US expectancy and Fear ratings, this interaction was due to 
decreasing responses for both the CSI+E and CS-I relative to the CS- (i.e., 
extinction). For FPS, the interaction was due to extinction of responding towards 
CSI+E but not towards CS-I (see Table 2 for contrasts).  
Comparing training and test phase 
                                                     
2
 When the analyses of the test phase is restricted to the first block only, which was the 
most sensitive block for effects of CS-US pairing experience in the study of Raes et al. (2014), fear 
reactions are significantly higher for CSI+E compared to CS-I on US expectancy, F(1, 35) 10.85, p = 
.002, Partial Eta² = .24; Fear ratings F(1, 35) = 21.09, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .38; and FPS, F(1, 33) 
= 6.20, p = .018, Partial Eta² = 0.16; but not on SCR, F(1, 35) < 1. 
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As was noted by Raes et al. (2014), a change in the difference score 
between CS-I and CS- from training to test would show that there is not only an 
impact of threat information per se (i.e., that CS-I can be followed by the US), but 
also of the information about when the threat information is valid (i.e., that CS-I 
will be followed by the US only during test). We did indeed find that the CS-I/CS- 
difference was larger in the first block of the test phase than in the last block of 
the training phase for US expectancy, Fear ratings and SCR, all p-values < .03. For 
FPS, there was a weak trend in the same direction (p = .097, see Table 3 and 
Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Mean difference between CS-I and CS- in the training (last block) and 
the test phase (first block) for (A) US expectancy ratings, (B) Fear ratings, (C) fear 
potentiated startle responses and (D) skin conductance responses. Error bars 
represent SEM. Asterixes and hash indicate statistical significance (**p < .01, *p < 
.05, #p < .1). 
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Reinstatement 
For all measures, there was a main effect of time (pre or post 
reinstatement manipulation), showing that fear generally increased after 
reinstatement (generalized reinstatement), all p-values < .05 (see Table 4, Figure 
2). 
A significant time x CS interaction, p = .021, was observed only for Fear 
ratings (differential reinstatement, see Table 4). This interaction was due to 
increased Fear ratings for CS-I in comparison to the CS- after the reinstatement 
manipulation (p = .014), while response enhancement to the CSI+E following 
reinstatement did not differ from either response enhancement to the CS- or the 
CS-I (both p’s >= .105, see Table 4).  
 
 
Table 1. Main effect of CS type for the training phase. 
 
DV: dependent variable 
a
All stimuli differ significantly or trend-wise (p < .1) from each other: 
1: CSI+E vs. CS-: F(1, 35) = 208.70, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .86; CS-I vs. CS-: F(1, 35) = 32.80, p < 
.001, Partial Eta² = .48; CSI+E vs. CS-I: F(1, 35) = 22.82, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .40 
2: CSI+E vs. CS-: F(1, 35) = 126.91, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .78; CS-I vs. CS-: F(1, 35) = 45.24, p < 
.001, Partial Eta² = .56; CSI+E vs. CS-I: F(1,35) = 19.06, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .35 
3: CSI+E vs. CS-: F(1, 35) = 14.62, p = .001, Partial Eta² = .30; CS-I vs. CS-: F(1, 35) = 3.37, p = 
.075, Partial Eta² = .09; CSI+E vs. CS-I: F(1, 35) = 7.57, p = .009, Partial Eta² = .18 
 
b
No difference between CS- and ITI, all other contrast are significant or trend-wise (p < .1): 
CSI+E vs. CS-: F(1, 34) = 28.08, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .45; CS-I vs. CS-: F(1, 34) = 11.62, p = 
.002, Partial Eta² = .26; CSI+E vs. CS-I: F(1, 34) = 3.44, p = .072, Partial Eta² = .09; ITI vs. CS-: 
F(1, 34) < 1 
 
 
 
DV Df F Partial Eta² p-value Contrasts 
US expectancy 1.75, 61.23 65.98 .65 < .001 
a1 
Fear ratings 2, 70 63.01 .64 < .001 
a2 
SCR 2, 70 9.03 .21 < .001 
a3 
FPS 3, 102 17.40 .34 < .001 
b 
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Table 2. Main effects of CS type and block as well as CS type x block interaction 
for the test phase. 
 
DV: dependent variable 
 
a
All stimuli differ significantly from each other: 
1: CSI+E vs. CS-: F(1, 35) = 104.17, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .75; CS-I vs. CS-: F(1, 35) = 56.18, p < 
.001, Partial Eta² = .62; CSI+E vs. CS-I: F(1, 35) = 18.94, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .35 
2: CSI+E vs. CS-: F(1, 35) = 95.55, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .73; CS-I vs. CS-: F(1, 35) = 58.20, p < 
.001, Partial Eta² = .62; CSI+E vs. CS-I: F(1, 35) = 18.77, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .35 
 
b
For all measures, there is a significant linear decrease in responding over blocks: 
1: F(1,35) = 32.82, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .48 
2: F(1,35) = 39.75, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .53 
DV df F Partial Eta² p-value Contrasts 
US expectancy      
CS type 1.33, 46.53 72.46 .67 < .001 
a1 
Block 1.36, 47.66 27.03 .44 < .001 
b1 
CS type x Block 4, 140 9.26 .21 < .001 
c1 
Fear ratings     
 
CS type 1.37, 47.82 70.63 .67 < .001 
a2 
Block 1.75, 61.18 27.38 .44 < .001 
b2 
CS type x Block 4, 140 15.74 .31 < .001 
c2 
SCR     
 
CS type 2, 70 8.78 .20 .001 
d 
Block 1.56, 54.49 32.70 .48 < .001 
b3 
CS type x Block 4, 140 1.59 .04 .188 
 
FPS     
 
CS type 2.24, 71.65 25.87 .45 < .001 
e 
Block 2, 64 29.85 .48 < .001 
b4 
CS type x Block 4.44, 142.02 2.45 .07 .043 
f* 
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3: F(1,35) = 38.94, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .53 
4: F(1,32) = 64.84, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .67 
 
c
The difference between both CSI+E and CS-I and CS- decreases over blocks, linear contrasts 
with block: 
1: CSI+E vs. CS- * Block: F(1, 35) = 20.40, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .37; CS-I vs. CS- * Block: F(1, 
35) = 18.34, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .34 
2: CSI+E vs. CS- * Block: F(1, 35) = 54.32, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .61; CS-I vs. CS- * Block: F(1, 
35) = 29.07, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .45 
 
d
CSI+E and CS-I both differ from CS-, but not from one another: 
CSI+E vs. CS-: F(1,35) = 9.37, p = .004, Partial Eta² = .21; CS-I vs. CS-: F(1,35) = 16.66, p < .001, 
Partial Eta² = .32; CSI+E vs. CS-I: F(1,35) < 1 
 
e
No difference between CS- and ITI, all other contrasts are significant or trend-wise (p < .1): 
CSI+E vs. CS-: F(1, 32) = 40.70, p < .001, Partial Eta² = .56; CS-I vs. CS-: F(1, 32) = 21.27, p < 
.001, Partial Eta² = .40; CSI+E vs. CS-I: F(1, 32) = 3.23, p = .082, Partial Eta² = .09; ITI vs. CS-: 
F(1, 32) < 1 
 
f
The difference between CSI+E and CS- decreases over blocks, but not the difference between 
CS-I and CS- or CSI+E and CS-I, linear contrasts with block: 
CSI+E vs. CS- * Block: F(1, 32) = 7.85, p = .009, Partial Eta² = .20; CS-I vs. CS- * Block: F(1, 32) = 
2.20, p = .15, Partial Eta² = .06; CS-I vs. CSI+E * block: F(1, 32) = 1.45, p = .237, Partial Eta² = 
.04 
 
*The results are similar when ITI is included into the contrasts instead of CS- 
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Table 3. Main effect of experimental phase: Difference between CS-I and CS- in 
the last block of the training phase and the first block of the test phase. 
DV Df F Partial Eta² p-value 
US expectancy 1, 35 6.04 .15 .019 
Fear ratings 1, 35 8.96 .20 .005 
SCR 1, 35 5.62 .14 .023 
FPS 1, 31 2.93 .09 .097 
DV: dependent variable 
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Table 4. Main effects of CS type and time as well as CS type x time 
interaction for the reinstatement analysis. 
DV Df F Partial Eta² p-value Contrasts 
US expectancy      
CS type 1.54, 54.00 55.91 .62 < .001 
a1 
Time 1, 35 8.03 .19 .008 
b 
 CS type x Time 1.54, 53.75 1.33 .04 .269 
 
Fear ratings     
 
CS type 1.32, 46.25 54.48 .61 < .001 
a2 
Time 1, 35 21.33 .38 < .001 
b 
CS type x Time 2, 70 4.09 .11 .021 
c 
SCR     
 
CS type 2, 64 3.04 .09 .055 
d 
Time 1, 32 8.94 .22 .005 
b 
CS type x Time 1.58, 50.59 < 1 .01 .652 
 
FPS     
 
CS type 2, 40 2.73 .12 .077 
e 
Time 1, 20 5.51 .22 .029 
b 
CS type x Time 2, 40 < 1 .02 .671 * 
DV: dependent variable 
a
All stimuli differ significantly or trend-wise (p<0.1) from each other 
1: CSI+E vs. CS-: F(1,35) = 86.63, p < .001, Partial Eta
2 
= 0.71; CS-I vs. CS-: F(1,35) = 47.64, 
p < .001, Partial Eta
2
 = 0.56; CSI+E vs. CS-I: F(1,35) = 6.70, p = .014, Partial Eta
2
 = .16 
2: CSI+E vs. CS-: F(1,35) = 66.08, p < .001, Partial Eta
2
 = .65; CS-I vs. CS-: F(1,35) = 53.39, p 
< .001, Partial Eta
2
 = .60; CSI+E vs. CS-I: F(1,35) = 3.71, p = .06, Partial Eta
2
 = .10 
b
Post-reinstatement significantly stronger reactions than pre-reinstatement 
c
Response enhancement to CS-I differs significantly from CS- , but response enhancement 
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to CSI+E and CS- and to CSI+E and CS-I does not differ: 
CSI+E vs. CS- * Time: F(1, 35) = 2.78, p = .105, Partial Eta² = .07; CS-I vs. CS- * Time: F(1, 
35) = 6.63, p = .014, Partial Eta² = .16; CSI+E vs. CS-I * Time: F(1, 35) = 1.76, p = .193, 
Partial Eta² = .05 
d
CSI+E differs significantly from CS- while all other stimuli do not differ 
CSI+E vs. CS-: F(1,32) = 4.96, p = .033, Partial Eta
2
 = .13; CS-I vs. CS-: F(1,32) < 1; CSI+E vs. 
CS-I: F(1,32) = 2.61, p = .12, Partial Eta
2
 = .08 
e
CS-I differs significantly from CS- while all other stimuli do not differ 
CSI+E vs. CS-: F(1,20) = 2.84, p = .11, Partial Eta
2
=0.12; CS-I vs. CS-: F(1,20) = 5.13, p = 
.035, Partial Eta
2
 = .60; CSI+E vs. CS-I: F(1,20) < 1 
*When taking the ITI into account (4 [CS type] x 2 [Time] analysis), there is still no CS type x 
Time interaction, F(3,39) = 1.67, p = .19, Partial Eta² = .11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46  CHAPTER 2  
DISCUSSION 
The present study investigated the effect of actual CS-US contingency 
experience beyond verbal instructions on different autonomous and declarative 
measures in an instructed fear expression paradigm. We thereby extended 
previous work (Raes et al., 2014) by including FPS as well as a reinstatement 
manipulation to the study. Thereby we were able to investigate for the first time 
reinstatement of fear to stimuli that differ in actual reinforcement experience 
but not in verbally assigned danger. Two CSs were explicitly told to predict US 
occurrence during the test phase of the experiment. Via a cover story 
participants were told that only one CS (CSI+E), but not the other (CS-I) would be 
followed by the US during an initial training phase. During the subsequent test 
phase however, contrary to instructions, none of the CSs were followed by the 
US. 
We discuss three main findings: First, (a) CS-US contingency experience 
enhances fear reactions beyond the effect of verbal instructions in the test phase 
for subjective ratings (US expectancy, Fear) and (marginally) FPS reactions but 
not for SCRs and (b) discrimination between CS-I (instructed but never 
experienced) and the CS- became more pronounced from training to test for all 
dependent variables except for FPS, mirroring the provided information about 
CS-US contingencies. Second, verbal threat information can have profound 
effects that cannot be completely overridden by situational safety information 
(“better safe than sorry”). Finally, third, ROF does generally not differ for verbally 
transmitted fear with or without direct CS-US contingency experience. In the 
following, we will discuss these findings in depth. 
First,  results are in line with previous demonstrations that actual 
experience of CS-US contingencies enhances fear reactions beyond the effect of 
verbal instructions (Field & Storksen-Coulson, 2007; Raes et al., 2014). These and 
related results (e.g., Field & Storksen-Coulson, 2007) are in agreement with 
theories that highlight the role of conditioning in phobic fears which propose 
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that a trauma should induce stronger effects when it matches previous beliefs 
(Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). A previous study  (Raes et al., 2014) observed such an 
additive effect of instruction and direct CS-US contingency experience only for 
Fear ratings but not any other dependent variable (SCRs, US expectancy). These 
findings could point to a difference between dependent measures that are 
thought to tap a more cognitive (US expectancy, SCRs) vs. emotional (Fear 
ratings) component of fear learning (e.g. Hamm & Weike, 2005; Sevenster et al., 
2012a). The present study aimed at testing this hypothesis by including FPS as an 
additional dependent variable in the same paradigm. As in the previous study 
(Raes et al., 2014), no effect of direct CS-US contingency experience beyond the 
effect of contingency instruction (nonsignificant CSI+E/CS-I discrimination during 
test) was observed for SCRs. The significant CSI+E/CS-I discrimination observed 
during the training phase was completely abolished by instructions preceding the 
test phase and thus our results add to the interpretation of SCRs reflecting CS-US 
contingency knowledge (Hamm & Weike, 2005; Sevenster et al., 2012a). An 
effect of experience beyond instruction, as indicated by significant CSI+E/CS-I 
discrimination during the test phase was, however, evident for subjective ratings 
(both Fear and Expectancy ratings) and FPS (even though marginally significant). 
This maintained discrimination likely reflects remainders of the previous CSI+E-
US contingency experience in the preceding training phase. 
Based on this evidence, it seems unlikely that experience only adds an 
effect beyond instructions for measures that tap the emotional but not a rather 
cognitive component of fear or for measures that capture subjective ratings as 
opposed to psychophysiological reactions. In fact, interesting differences 
between both psychophysiological measures emerged. While FPS reactions 
during the test phase showed only marginal effects of both CS-US contingency 
experience during the preceding phase (marginal CSI+E/CS-I difference during 
test) and situational threat instruction provided before the test phase (marginal 
change in CS-I/CS- difference from training to test), SCRs were not influenced by 
direct CS-US contingency experience during the preceding phase (no CSI+E/CS-I 
difference during test) but were very sensitive to situational threat information 
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(large change in CS-I/CS- difference from training to test). Thus, our results 
suggest that SCRs and FPS might be differentially sensitive to contingency 
instructions and direct experience respectively. This is in line with previous 
studies that demonstrated that FPS is less affected by verbal instructions and 
explicit contingency knowledge than SCR or subjective ratings (Sevenster et al., 
2012a, 2012b). Alternatively, FPS might follow the initial threat information that 
both CSs will at a later time point be predictive of the US. This is reflected in a 
weak CSI+E/CS-I discrimination for FPS while both CSI+E and CS-I are potentiated 
against the CS- and the ITI. In sum, our data replicate previous findings that show 
an additive effect of experience and verbal threat information that, however, 
does not emerge in the same way in different dependent variables. Furthermore 
these inconsistencies between different dependent measures highlight the 
importance of multimodal assessment (e.g., different subjective measures and 
psychophysiological indicators of fear; see also: Mauss and Robinson, 2009). 
Second, it is striking that the CS-I, which was said to be predictive of the US 
only in a later experimental phase, but to be explicitly safe during the initial 
training phase, elicited responses that were significantly enhanced as compared 
to the CS- in all dependent measures. This observation replicates the results of 
Raes et al. (2014) and extends them to FPS as an additional dependent measure. 
Together, this suggests that verbal threat information for a specific stimulus can 
have profound effects on both cognitive and autonomous measures that cannot 
be completely overridden by situational safety information (“better safe than 
sorry”). However, it needs to be acknowledged that in the current design we did 
not employ CSs that were purely verbally or Pavlovian conditioned. During the 
training phase, the CS-I was paired with the placeholder US which may have 
allowed for conditioning (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 
2010; White & Davey, 1989). This may have led to an overestimation of the 
impact of verbal instructions during the practice phase and an underestimation 
of the impact of CS-US pairing experience during the test phase (see Raes et al., 
2014 for an extensive discussion of this issue).  
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Third, after reinstatement, non-differential response enhancement 
(‘generalized reinstatement’) was observed for all dependent measures as often 
seen in human differential conditioning studies in reinstatement (Dirikx, 
Vansteenwegen, Eelen, & Hermans, 2009; for a review see Haaker et al., 2014) 
and other return of fear manipulations (Vervliet et al., 2013). In addition to this 
general reinstatement, that affects all CSs in a similar way, differential ROF to the 
CS-I as compared to the CS- was observed only in Fear ratings (‘differential 
reinstatement’). It is not uncommon in human studies that different dependent 
measures reflect a different quality (e.g., differential vs. generalized) of the 
reinstatement effect even in the same study  (Haaker et al., 2014).  
To date, the experimental and individual boundary of differential or 
generalized reinstatement as well as the mechanisms behind remain elusive 
(Dirikx et al., 2009; Haaker et al., 2014). The dissociation between these two 
qualities of reinstatement effects have only recently gained more attention.  In 
rodent work on this topic nearly exclusively single-cue conditioning designs were 
used that do not allow for a discrimination between differential and generalized 
reinstatement effects, as there is only one conditioned stimulus. Differential 
conditioning protocols in turn allow for a dissociation between association-based 
and non-association based (e.g. sensitization) effect. However, it is important to 
note, that generalized reinstatement effects do not preclude genuine 
association-based mechanisms, as it may result from stimulus generalization and 
associative learning to the CS (discussed by Vervliet et al., 2013 in the context of 
renewal). 
 What is particularly striking with the present results is that the quantity 
and quality of reinstatement effects did not differ between both stimuli that 
were instructed to be predictive of the US, irrespective of whether this CS-US 
contingency was in fact experienced. These results might have important 
implications for clinical situations as they suggest that fears that are acquired via 
instructions have the same risk for relapse after treatment compared with fears 
that are acquired via the experience of aversive events. However, we cannot 
exclude that differences between our two CSs might arise under different 
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conditions (Haaker et al., 2014). Nevertheless, our data illustrates how harmful 
and resistant verbally transmitted fears might be. 
In line with the arguments put forward by Raes et al. (2014), we believe 
that our results put important constraints on theories of associative learning. 
Both experiments provide evidence that the actual experience of CS-US pairings 
can add to the effects of clear and believable contingency instructions. 
Associative learning models might explain this result by assuming that a CS-US 
association established on the basis of verbal instructions is further strengthened 
through subsequent CS-US pairings. Propositional models of associative learning, 
on the other hand, could argue that subsequent CS-US pairings add to the truth-
value of propositions formed while receiving instructions. However, currently, 
both classes of models are underspecified with regard to the conditions under 
which actual experience can add to the effect of verbal instructions, which limits 
the possibility to interpret our data in favor of one model or the other (see Raes 
et al., 2014, for a more extensive discussion). Furthermore, models of associative 
learning will have to handle similarities and differences between different 
measures such as those observed in the current study. We have discussed dual-
systems models in the introduction that highlight similarities between US 
expectancy ratings and SCRs in reflecting cognitive processing, which can be 
distinguished from measures that tap more into emotional processing such as 
FPS and Fear ratings (Hamm & Weike, 2005; Sevenster et al., 2012a). In the 
current study, however, CS-US pairings did not have the same effects on US 
expectancy and SCRs, which argues against the idea that both measures being 
affected by one common underlying (cognitive) factor. Dissociations between 
both measures have been reported before (e.g., Bechara et al., 1995; McAndrew, 
Jones, McLaren, & McLaren, 2012) while cognitive and emotional components of 
fear conditioning sometimes converge (e.g., Costa, Bradley, & Lang, 2014; 
Dawson, Rissling, Schell, & Wilcox, 2007), questioning the classification into 
cognitive versus emotional measures. Thus, carefully designed experiments 
employing a multimodal approach will be invaluable to further refine and 
develop models of associative learning. 
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Our study might be extended in several ways. First,  neutral stimuli were 
used as CSs in this experiment. It cannot be excluded that results would be 
different if fear-relevant or “biologically prepared” stimuli were used as CSs 
(Hugdahl & Öhman, 1977; Hugdahl, 1978; Lipp & Edwards, 2002), in particular as 
theories relying on conditioning models of phobic fears propose that a trauma 
should induce stronger effects when it matches previous beliefs (Mineka & 
Zinbarg, 2006). Hence, effects of actual CS-US pairings might be particularly 
pronounced when fear-relevant stimuli are used as CSs. Furthermore, it would 
also be interesting to investigate conditions in which the trauma does not match 
the beliefs, for instance, when a stimulus was previously experienced or 
instructed to be safe or has been predictive of a positive event (e.g. a reward). 
Previous studies with observational learning suggest that such prior positive 
information could be protective for later acquisition of fear (Egliston & Rapee, 
2007; Mineka & Cook, 1986). Second, it would be interesting in future studies to 
not pair the CS-I during the training phase with the placeholder US. Such a 
procedure would allow us to strengthen the conclusion that CRs to CS-I during 
training are due to the threat instructions rather than to the pairings between 
CS-I and the placeholder. Related to this, it would be interesting to include a 
pretesting phase in which CRs to the CSs are measured before any instructions 
have been given. Including this phase would provide a baseline for each 
participant and each CS for the effect of the threat instructions. Finally, the fact 
that participants directly experienced the electro-tactile stimulus might have 
influenced how participants reacted to our threat instructions. Other studies 
investigating effects of threat instructions have often not exposed the 
participants to the US before the experiment (Olsson & Phelps, 2004; Soeter & 
Kindt, 2012). In future studies it would certainly be worthwhile to compare the 
effect of threat instructions between groups of participants that did or did not 
directly experience the US. 
In sum, our data demonstrate that instructions represent a very powerful 
tool for the acquisition of fear and that verbal threat information can only partly 
be overridden by later situational safety information. We also demonstrate that 
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direct experience can, at least for some dependent measures, have an effect 
beyond contingency instructions. Importantly, ROF as a model for clinical 
relapse, did not differ for fears that are acquired through instructions with or 
without compound CS-US experience. Taken together we provide evidence for 
the power and persistence of verbal threat information but also highlight the 
importance of considering different pathways to fear (direct experience, 
instructions) and stress the importance of multimodal assessment in 
experimental research. 
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DOES CONFIRMATION OF VERBAL THREAT 
MODULATE EARLY VISUAL PROCESSING?1 
 
Fear conditioning procedures, that is, the pairing of a conditioned stimulus 
(CS) with an aversive unconditioned stimulus (US), can change the early sensory 
processing of the CS as evidenced by ERP. Similar modulations of early sensory 
processing have been obtained by merely providing CS-US contingency 
instructions. So far, however, no study has investigated whether direct experience 
of instructed contingencies adds to the effects of the instructions. To address this 
question, we instructed participants in a series of blocks about the contingency 
between two CS+s and an electric stimulus (US). A third CS was instructed to be 
safe. Novel CSs were selected in each block and only half of the instructed CS+s 
were actually paired with the US. We found a reduction of the P3 component due 
to the contingency instructions, but we did not find effects on earlier components 
(C1, P1 and N1). Furthermore, no additive effects of pairing the threatened CS 
with the US were found. We discuss these results in relation to the results of 
previous studies investigating the impact of fear conditioning and threat 
instructions on visual processing. 
                                                     
1Based on Mertens, G., Everaert, T., Rossi, V., & De Houwer, J. (Manuscript 
in preparation). Does confirmation of verbal threat modulate early visual 
processing? 
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INTRODUCTION 
Survival relies in part on the effective detection of threatening stimuli. 
Evidence for such facilitated processing of threatening stimuli comes from event-
related potential (ERP) studies. These studies have found that early sensory 
responses are strengthened for threatening stimuli compared to neutral stimuli, 
suggesting that these stimuli are subject to preferential processing (Li, Howard, 
Parrish, & Gottfried, 2008; Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006; Pourtois, Grandjean, 
Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2004). It has been proposed that these effects are the 
result of attention gain control mechanisms mediated by the amygdala (Pourtois, 
Schettino, & Vuilleumier, 2013). Interestingly, this facilitated processing of 
threatening stimuli seems to be a flexible process. Initially neutral stimuli (or 
conditioned stimuli, CSs) that have been paired with an aversive event (or an 
unconditioned stimulus, US) also engage facilitated sensory processing compared 
to stimuli that were not paired with the US (for a review see: Miskovic & Keil, 
2012). Hence, attention gain mechanisms can be flexibly deployed in response to 
newly acquired information. Furthermore, similar enhanced visual processing has 
even been obtained by merely threatening participants that a certain stimulus 
would be followed by an unpleasant event (Baas, Kenemans, Böcker, & 
Verbaten, 2002; Bublatzky & Schupp, 2012; Weymar, Bradley, Hamm, & Lang, 
2013). 
In the current study we were interested whether the latter two ways of 
learning about the threatening value of a stimulus can have additive effects with 
regard to the amplification of early sensory processing. More specifically, we 
were interested whether actual experience of CS-US pairings can add to the 
effect of contingency instructions. There are several reasons to suspect that such 
additive effects of instructions and actual experience could be obtained. First of 
all, research from our own laboratory has found that actually experiencing an 
instructed CS-US contingency can add to the effects of mere CS-US contingency 
instructions on subjective and physiological measures of fear (Mertens et al., 
2015; Raes, De Houwer, De Schryver, Brass, & Kalisch, 2014; see also: Field & 
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Storksen-Coulson, 2007). These results fit with conditioning models of 
(maladaptive) fear acquisition which propose that prior negative beliefs can 
amplify the effects of a negative encounter (e.g., Davey, 1997; Field & Storksen-
Coulson, 2007; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). Hence, both prior research and models 
of fear acquisition propose that threat information and negative experiences can 
have additive effects with regard to the experience of fear. In turn, based on 
these models and findings, it could be predicted that these two pathways of fear 
learning also have an additional impact on facilitating early stimulus processing. 
Another reason to expect that actual CS-US pairings might add to the effect of 
threat instructions is that actual CS-US pairing experience seem to recruit the 
amygdala into the learning process, whereas threatening instructions alone are 
believed to be insufficient for such amygdala mediated learning (Olsson & 
Phelps, 2004, 2007). This more affective way of learning due to CS-US pairing 
experience may also result in the facilitated processing of threatened CSs. 
Conversely, however, it could be argued that threat instructions result in a (near) 
asymptotic level of fear for a CS and that actual CS-US pairings might therefore 
not result in much additional fear. This, in turn, could suggest that CS-US pairings 
would not further modulate early processing of a threatened CS. 
All in all, there are arguments for both the absence or presence of additive 
effects of CS-US pairings to the effects of threat instructions. Interestingly, the 
additive effects of these two pathways of fear acquisition could depend on which 
time point in the visual processing stream the additive effects are assessed. In a 
study of Bublatzky and Schupp (2012) such dynamic effects of two independent 
sources of threat were obtained. That is, early visually evoked event-related 
potentials (VEPs) were sensitive only to threat instructions but not to the 
inherent threatening properties of the pictures themselves, whereas later VEPs 
were sensitive to threat instructions and threatening picture contents in an 
additive fashion. Thus, continued stimulus processing resulted in more accurate 
representation of different sources of threat. In line with these results, it could 
be that ERPs related to early sensory processing are only sensitive to one source 
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of threat information, whereas later components may differentiate between our 
different sources of threat.  
Hence, the study presented in this manuscript aimed at answering two 
related questions: (a) Whether additive effects of threat instructions and 
experience of CS-US pairings can be obtained with regard to the early processing 
of CSs and (b) whether the observation of these additive effects depends on 
continued stimulus processing. We have focused on several ERP components in 
the visual processing cascade that have been found to be affected by fear 
conditioning. A particularly striking example of modulation of early visual 
processing by fear conditioning is the amplification of the C1 response (Baas et 
al., 2002; Stolarova et al., 2006). The C1 component is usually observed around 
60-90 ms post stimulus onset and its polarity depends on the retinotopic 
presentation of the stimulus. That is, stimuli presented in the upper half of the 
visual field elicit a negative C1, while stimuli presented in the lower half of the 
visual field elicit a positive C1. Given the early peak of this component, it is well 
suited to answer our research question on whether our two sources of threat 
can have additive effects on very early stimulus processing. Furthermore, we 
have looked at effects of threat instructions on two more components related to 
early visual processing that have previously been found to be affected by fear 
conditioning, the P1 and N1 (Liu, Keil, & Ding, 2012; Ugland, Dyson, & Field, 
2013; Wong, Bernat, Bunce, & Shevrin, 1997). These two components are 
expressed later along the visual processing stream and may therefore be more 
sensitive to combined effects of our two sources of threat. Finally, a final 
component that we have considered is the P3 component. The P3 component is 
believed to reflect attention allocation (Böcker, Baas, Kenemans, & Verbaten, 
2004; Polich, 2007) and has previously been found to be affected by fear 
conditioning (Baas et al., 2002; Weymar et al., 2013). Furthermore, given its 
relatively late latency, it should be particularly sensitive to additive effects of our 
two sources of threat (Bublatzky & Schupp, 2012). For all these different 
components, we expect amplitudes to be larger for the stimulus predicting an 
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aversive event (i.e., CS+) compared to the stimulus that does not predict the 
aversive event (i.e., CS-) (Ugland et al., 2013). 
METHOD 
Participants 
Twenty-four students (6 men, 18 women) at Ghent University participated 
in the experiment in exchange for a monetary compensation. Age ranged 
between 20 and 34 years (M = 22.92, SD = 2.76). All participants filled in an 
informed consent and were instructed that they could discontinue the 
experiment at any point without any negative consequences. This study was 
approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Educational 
Sciences of Ghent University. Two participants from this sample were excluded 
from the analyses because they were insufficiently attentive during the 
experiment. 
Material 
Conditioned Stimuli  
CSs were either Chinese, Mayan or Arabic symbols that were presented in 
arrays of six by fifteen stimuli that covered the whole upper half of a 19 inch Dell 
computer screen with a black background (resolution: 1024 by 768 pixels), above 
a fixation cross that was presented in the middle of the screen (see Figure 1). In 
each new block of the experiment (see further), new stimuli were randomly 
drawn from our stimuli set to ensure that the threatening properties of these 
stimuli were a function only of verbal instructions, rather than actual CS-US 
pairings. 
Unconditioned Stimulus  
The US was an electrical stimulus that consisted of 10 rectangular pulses of 
2 ms with and inter pulse interval of 8 ms, creating an electrical stimulus of 100 
ms. This stimulus was administered by two lubricated Fukuda standard Ag/AgCl 
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electrodes (1-cm diameter; inter-electrode distance: ~2-cm) to the left leg over 
the retromalleolar course of the sural nerve. The stimulus was generated by a 
constant current stimulator (DS7A, Digitimer, Hertfordshire, UK). The intensity of 
the electrical stimulus was determined for each participant individually to be 
unpleasant but not painful using a stepwise work-up procedure (see the 
Procedure section). 
Questionnaires 
Anxiety levels of the participants was assessed with the trait version of the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & 
Jacobs, 1983; Dutch translation: van der Ploeg, Defares, & Spielberger, 2000). 
STAI-T scores in our sample ranged between 24 and 54 (M = 34.5; SD = 8.64). 
Because STAI-T scores did not moderate any of the critical effects, we will not 
discuss this variable in the remainder of the manuscript. 
Figure 1. Schematic overview of the trial procedure. Shock administration was 
limited to 50% of the trials on which a CS+s was presented. 
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Procedure 
Work-up procedure 
After filling in the informed consent and STAI-T, participants first went 
through a work-up procedure to determine the  intensity level of the electrical 
stimulus. During this procedure, participants were exposed to gradually 
increasing stimulus intensity levels and were asked to report on their experience. 
Specifically, participants were asked after each intensity level to verbally rate the 
electric stimulus on a painfulness scale ranging from zero (not painful at all) to 
ten (maximally tolerable pain). A minimal painfulness threshold for the electric 
stimulus was set at seven. The procedure was stopped when participants 
indicated that they felt uncomfortable experiencing higher intensities of the 
electric stimulus. If a participant gave a rating of less than seven and indicated 
that he or she did not want to experience a more intense electric stimulus, the 
work-up was also stopped and the stimulus with the highest tolerated intensity 
was selected.  The final selected electrical stimulus intensity levels ranged 
between 1.5 and 10 mA (M = 4.13, SD = 1.84) and pain ratings ranged between 6 
and 9 (M = 7.5, SD = 0.71).  
Instructions 
At the start of the experiment, participants were informed that they would 
see symbols appear on the computer screen. They were additionally informed 
that their task was to attend to the presentation of the stimuli while retaining 
their gaze fixated on a cross presented in the middle of the screen. Next, 
participants were informed that in each block of the experiment they would see 
three different symbols. They were further informed that two of these symbols 
could sometimes be followed by an electrical stimulus while the third stimulus 
would not be followed by the electrical stimulus. Furthermore, they were 
informed that the administration of the electrical stimulus after the symbols that 
could be followed by the electrical stimulus was determined completely at 
random and that this implied that the chance of getting an electric stimulus on 
those trials was completely independent of what happened on the previous 
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trials. These latter instructions were added because we wanted to avoid that 
participants would increase their expectancies after a non-reinforced CS (i.e., 
display the gambler’s fallacy; e.g., McAndrew, Jones, McLaren, & McLaren, 
2012). Results from a prior pilot study indicated that participants did not display 
this pattern, but rather slightly increased their expectancies after a reinforced CS 
(see also the expectancy ratings results in the Results section). 
Before each block, participants were shown an exemplar of each of the 
three arrays of symbols (see Figure 1) that would be presented in that particular 
block together with information about which symbols would be predictive of an 
electrical stimulation and which symbol would be safe.  The sentence “Can be 
followed by the electrical stimulation.” was presented next to the two CS+s and 
the sentence “Can NOT be followed by the electrical stimulation.” was presented 
next to the CS-. They were encouraged to remember this information well and 
reminded to keep their eyes fixated on the fixation cross. The three CSs were 
randomly drawn in each block from the three different families of symbols 
(Mayan, Arabic or Chinese symbols) and were hence easily distinguishable. There 
was no systematic relationship between the type of CS and the families of the 
symbols. 
Stimulus presentation 
After the contingency instructions, stimuli were presented in short blocks 
of six trials (two presentations of each CS). They were presented in a pseudo-
random order, implying that each stimulus had to be displayed once before a 
second presentation of any of the stimuli could occur. Importantly, this allowed 
us to distinguish between the first presentation of the stimuli, where learning 
could be established only on the basis of verbal instructions because no prior 
learning based on stimulus pairings could have occurred at this point, and the 
second presentation of the stimuli, where learning through verbal information 
and stimuli pairings is combined for those CSs that were paired with the US on 
the first presentation. Stimuli were presented above the fixation cross, occupying 
the whole upper half of the screen (see the Materials section and Figure 1). The 
fixation cross remained continuously on the screen throughout the blocks. 
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Stimuli were presented on the screen for 2 seconds and, in case of a CS+, could 
be followed by the electrical stimulus immediately at offset on half of the 
presentations (50% reinforcement rate). We refer to a CS+ that was paired with 
the electric stimulus as CS+T/P (threatened and paired) and a CS+ that was not 
paired with the electric stimulus a CS+T (threatened). The inter-trial interval was 
either 7, 9 or 11 seconds, randomly selected. 
Expectancy ratings 
At the end of one third of the blocks (i.e., after 16 of the blocks), 
participants were asked to provide expectancy ratings about the CSs in that block 
to ensure that participants were able to remember the contingencies. On each 
trial, the CSs were presented in the upper half of the screen (as in the 
conditioning blocks) and participants were asked to rate to what extent they 
thought that these symbols would be followed by the electrical stimulus. They 
could indicate their answer by clicking one of the options on a 9-point Likert 
scale presented at the bottom of the screen. Anchor were “certainly not” (1), 
“unsure” (5) and “completely certain” (9). There was no response deadline for 
providing the expectancy ratings. 
EEG acquisition, response definition and statistical comparisons 
An elastic cap was used to allow for the recording of the EEG through 64 
Ag/AgCl electrodes that were distributed according to the extended 10/20 
system. The signal was recorded with a Biosemi Active Two System 
(http://www.biosemi.com) and was referenced online to a CMS-DRL ground 
which drives the subject’s average potential as close as possible to the reference 
voltage of the amplifier (i.e. the amplifier zero). Additionally, two external 
electrodes linking the mastoids were used to reference the data off line and 4 
external electrodes served to monitor vertical and horizontal eye movements. 
EEGs were digitized at 512 Hz and were band-pass filtered off line between 0.016 
and 70 Hz. An additional notch filter centered around 50 Hz reduced AC 
interference. 
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Off line computations were performed with Brain Vision Analyzer 2.0 (Brain 
Products, GmbH, Munich, Germany). Segmentation was performed relative to 
stimulus onset with an interval ranging from 100 ms before to 2000 ms after 
stimulus onset. We corrected for eye-blink artifacts using the standard algorithm 
of Gratton et al. (1983). Each segment was baseline corrected to the 100 ms pre-
stimulus onset interval. Trials contaminated by residual artifacts were semi-
automatically detected and rejected with a ± 75 μV criterion relative to the 
baseline. Grand average waveforms were calculated separately for each CS 
(CS+T, CS+T/P, CS-). 
Electrode sites for our components of interest were selected on the basis 
of previous reports and inspection of the scalp voltage distributions and are 
reported below. C1 peaks were identified in the 54-94 ms interval, P1 peaks in 
the 114-154 ms interval, N1 peaks in the 154-214 ms interval and P3 peaks in the 
324-674 ms interval post stimulus onset (see also: Figure 3).  
For the statistical comparisons, we have focused on the second 
presentation of the CSs only, because only at this point could stimuli that were 
previously paired (i.e., on the first trial) with the US be compared to stimuli that 
were not previously paired with the US (see the Stimulus presentation section). 
Voltages from our different components of interest were compared with 
repeated measures ANOVA’s with the within-subjects factor CS (CS-, CS+T, 
CS+T/P). Violations of the sphericity assumption were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted degrees of freedom. 
RESULTS 
US expectancy ratings 
We selected four blocks after which participants provided US expectancy 
ratings in which either one of the CS+s was paired, both were paired or none 
were paired with the electric stimulus on the first presentation, and where none 
of the CSs were followed by the electric stimulus on the second presentation. 
Hence, with this selection of blocks, we could investigate how participants 
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adjusted their expectancies to the CS-US pairings on the first presentations, 
without interference of learning on the second presentations (because US 
expectancy ratings were provided at the end of the blocks and could therefore 
be influenced by learning on the second presentations of the stimuli as well). 
These results are summarized in Figure 2. These US expectancy ratings were 
analyzed with a repeated measures ANOVA with CS (CS-, CS+1, CS+2) and block 
(neither paired, CS+1 paired, CS+2 paired, both paired) as within-subject factors1. 
This analysis produced a significant effect of CS, F(1.37, 28.73) = 217.10, p < .001, 
η²p = .91, but no significant effect of block, F < 1, and no significant interaction 
effect between CS and block, F(3.36, 70.51) = 1.55, p = .204, η²p = .07. These 
results demonstrate that US expectancy ratings were very much in line with the 
threat instructions, illustrated by higher US expectancy ratings for CS+1 and CS+2 
than for CS-, even in a block where these two CS+s were not actually paired with 
the US. We do not find, however, that US expectancy ratings were strongly 
modulated by CS-US pairings. That is, US expectancy were not specifically 
increased for the CS+ that was paired with the US, as illustrated by a lack of an 
interaction between CS and block. However, when we have a closer look at the 
US expectancy ratings, we do find some suggestive evidence that US expectancy 
ratings were slightly increased for a CS+ that was paired with the US in the block 
where CS+1 was paired with the US, t(21) = 1.93, p = .067, Cohen’s d = 0.55 (see 
Figure 2). A (near) significant difference between CS+1 and CS+2 was not 
observed in any of the other blocks, t’s < 1.6, p-values > .140. 
 
 
                                                     
1
 Note that the analyses of the US expectancy ratings are more fine-grained than the 
analyses of the ERP components. This is due to the requirement of having a sufficient number of 
trials to detect differences on ERP components. Applying the analyses of the US expectancy 
ratings to the ERP components would entail only having 12 observations in each cell, which 
would render the signal-to-noise ratio too low for the analyses of the ERP components. 
Therefore, we collapsed cells according to whether CSs were safe, were threatened, or were 
threatened and paired with the US (see the EEG acquisition, response definition and statistical 
comparisons section), resulting in 48 observations in each cell. 
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Figure 2. US expectancy ratings for the three different CSs when either none of 
the CS+s were paired, CS+1 was paired, CS+2 was paired, or both were paired 
with the electric stimulus. Error bars reflect standard error. 
 
C1 
No effects of the within-subject factor CS (CS-, CS+T/P, CS+T) for the 
amplitude of the C1 component were found for the Pz, Oz or POz electrode, F-
values < 1 (see Figures 3 and 4), suggesting that our threat instructions and the 
combination of the threat instructions with CS-US pairings were not successful to 
modulate this component. 
P1 
No effects of the factor CS were found for the amplitude of the P1 
component either on the same selection of electrodes (Pz, Oz or POz), F-values < 
1 (see Figures 3 and 4), again suggesting that our threat and CS-US pairing 
manipulations were unsuccessful to manipulate stimulus processing at this time-
point. 
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N1 
No effects of the factor CS were found for the amplitude of the N1 
component either on the Fz or Pz electrodes, F-values < 1, the FPz electrode, F(2, 
42) = 1.22, p = .306, η²p = .06, or the AFz electrode, F(1.63, 34.27) = 1.73, p = 
.197, η²p = .08 (see Figures 3 and 4). Again, these results suggest that our 
manipulations were unsuccessful to impact on stimulus processing at this time-
point. 
P3 
A significant effect of the factor CS was found for the amplitude of the P3 
component on the Pz electrode (no other electrodes were investigated), F(2, 42) 
= 4.38, p = .019, η²p = .17. This effect was due to smaller P3 amplitudes for the 
CS+T (M = 12.29 µV, SD = 9.88), t(21) = 1.88, p = .074, Cohen’s d = 0.12, and the 
CS+T/P (M = 11.82 µV, SD = 9.38), t(21) = 2.86, p = .009, Cohen’s d = 0.18, 
compared to the CS- (M = 13.53 µV, SD = 10.54) (see Figure 3). The P3 amplitude 
for the CS+T and CS+T/P did not differ, t(21) < 1. Thus, these results demonstrate 
that threat instructions led to a reduction of the P3 component. Furthermore, 
our results suggest that actual experience of CS-US pairings did not add much to 
the effect of the threat instructions on the P3 amplitude. 
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Figure 3. Smoothed ERPs (20 Hz low-pass filer) relative to CS onset at the Pz 
electrode for the different CSs on their second presentation (see the Procedure 
and the EEG acquisition, response definition and statistical comparisons 
sections). 
74  CHAPTER 3  
 
Figure 4. Scalp voltage distributions for the different CS types during the time 
intervals of the components of interest. 
 DISCUSSION 
In the current study we investigated whether actually experiencing 
instructed CS-US contingencies adds to the effects of these instructions. To this 
end, participants were on a block by block basis instructed about the contingency 
between certain symbols (i.e., CSs) and an electric stimulus (i.e., the US). New 
symbols were randomly selected in each block to ascertain that learning was 
only established on the basis of verbal instructions. Within the blocks, CSs that 
were instructed to be predictive of the US (i.e., CS+s) were reinforced with the 
US on 50% of the trials, allowing us to compare CS+s that were and were not 
paired with the US. Our results indicate that participants could remember which 
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symbols would be paired with the US, as evidenced by the higher US expectancy 
ratings for the CS+T and CS+T/P compared to the CS-. With regard to the ERP 
components, we did not find evidence that either the contingency instructions or 
the combination of contingency instructions and a CS-US pairing resulted in a 
modulation of components related to early visual processing. However, at later 
stages (on the P3b component) we did find differences between the different 
CSs. Specifically, the P3 amplitude was larger for the CS- compared to the CS+T 
and the CS+T/P. The P3 amplitude for these latter two CSs did not differ. We will 
discuss these results in more detail below. 
First, contingency instructions resulted in higher US expectancy ratings for 
the instructed CS+ compared to the instructed CS-, even when in the block 
preceding the expectancy ratings no USs were delivered. This result replicates 
the well-known finding that verbal instructions can install conditioned fear (as 
measured by expectancy of the US in this case) (e.g., Cook & Harris, 1937; 
Hugdahl, 1978). Furthermore, experience of an instructed CS-US contingency 
seemed to further strengthen US expectancies, replicating previous results from 
our lab (Mertens & De Houwer, 2016; Mertens et al., 2015). However, it must be 
noted that the additional effect of a CS-US pairing on the US expectancies was 
quite modest, perhaps because the verbal contingency instructions installed a 
near asymptotic level of fear. This could in turn have limited the effects of a CS-
US pairing on our other measures of conditioned fear. 
Second, with regard to the strengthening of ERP components related to 
early sensory processing, we did not find any evidence that either contingency 
instructions or CS-US pairings were successful in modulating components related 
to early visual processing (i.e., C1, P1 and N1). This is a somewhat surprising 
result in light of many previous studies that did find modulations of these 
components due to fear conditioning (e.g., Baas et al., 2002; Bublatzky & Schupp, 
2012; Liu et al., 2012; Stolarova et al., 2006; Ugland et al., 2013; Weymar et al., 
2013; Wong, Shevrin, & Williams, 1994). However, this difference between these 
previous studies and our own study may be explained by our specific procedure. 
That is, new CSs were constantly selected throughout our experiment, whereas 
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in these earlier studies the same CSs or a certain shared feature of the CSs 
recurred throughout the experiment. This specific feature of our experiment may 
have rendered our participants insufficiently familiar with the CSs and therefore 
left participants unable to differentiate between the CSs very early after CS 
onset. It would be interesting in a future study to use stimuli with which 
participants are highly familiar or for which participants have a high expertise of 
discriminating (e.g., alphabetical letters, colors or human faces) and see whether 
modulations of early sensory processing on the basis of contingency instructions 
can be obtained for these stimuli. Alternatively, it could be that extended fear 
conditioning with the same stimuli (regardless of prior expertise) is necessary to 
obtain early modulations of sensory processing. 
Finally, we did obtain an effect of contingency instructions on the P3 
component. We did not find evidence, however, that this effect was further 
modulated by experience of a CS-US pairing. Furthermore, and surprisingly, the 
P3 amplitude was larger for the CS- rather than for the CS+T or the CS+T/P. This 
in contrast to our initial predictions, according to which we had expected that 
the P3 amplitude would be bigger for the CS+ and CS+T/P compared to the CS- 
(e.g., Baas et al., 2002; Weymar et al., 2013). A likely explanation for our finding 
could be that participants tended to pay more attention to the CS- because it 
was more infrequent (i.e., the CS- acted as an oddball) and/or because it was 
easier to remember the instructions by remembering the CS-, thereby making 
the CS- more relevant and resulting in a larger P3 for this stimulus. Furthermore, 
the CS- was the most reliable predictor of events in our experiment, predicting 
the absence of the US 100% accurately, again making this CS more relevant and 
thereby possibly increasing the P3 amplitude for this CS. 
Combined, in the current study we did not find evidence for additive 
effects of a CS-US pairing to the effects of instructions, neither at the early visual 
level, nor at later processing stages. These results may be explained by certain 
features of our procedure such as a near asymptotic level of fear due to the 
contingency instructions, the use of unfamiliar stimuli as CSs, the lack of 
extended training of the contingencies, the use of an infrequent CS- and the use 
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of a 50% reinforcement rate for the CS+s. Further research will be required to 
disentangle how contingency instructions and experience of CS-US pairings 
interact to shape early sensory processing of stimuli. 
78  CHAPTER 3  
REFERENCES 
Baas, J. M. P., Kenemans, J. L., Böcker, K. B. E., & Verbaten, M. N. (2002). Threat-
induced cortical processing and startle potentiation. Neuroreport, 13(1), 
133–7. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11926166 
Böcker, K. B. E., Baas, J. M. P., Kenemans, J. L., & Verbaten, M. N. (2004). 
Differences in startle modulation during instructed threat and selective 
attention. Biological Psychology, 67(3), 343–58. 
doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2004.01.001 
Bublatzky, F., & Schupp, H. T. (2012). Pictures cueing threat: brain dynamics in 
viewing explicitly instructed danger cues. Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience, 7(6), 611–22. doi:10.1093/scan/nsr032 
Cook, S. W., & Harris, R. E. (1937). The verbal conditioning of the galvanic skin 
reflex. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 21(2), 202–210. 
doi:10.1037/h0063197 
Davey, G. C. L. (1997). A conditioning model of phobias. In Phobias: a handbook 
of theory, research and treatment (pp. 301–322). 
Field, A. P., & Storksen-Coulson, H. (2007). The interaction of pathways to fear in 
childhood anxiety: a preliminary study. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
45(12), 3051–3059. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2007.09.001 
Hugdahl, K. (1978). Electrodermal conditioning to potentially phobic stimuli: 
effects of instructed extinction. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 16(5), 
315–321. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(78)90001-3 
Li, W., Howard, J. D., Parrish, T. B., & Gottfried, J. A. (2008). Aversive Learning 
Enhances Perceptual and Cortical Discrimination of Indiscriminable Odor 
Cues. Science, 319(5871), 1842–1845. doi:10.1126/science.1152837 
Liu, Y., Keil, A., & Ding, M. (2012). Effects of emotional conditioning on early 
visual processing: Temporal dynamics revealed by ERP single-trial analysis. 
Human Brain Mapping, 33(4), 909–919. doi:10.1002/hbm.21259 
McAndrew,  a, Jones, F. W., McLaren, R. P., & McLaren, I. P. L. (2012). 
Dissociating expectancy of shock and changes in skin conductance: an 
EARLY VISUAL PROCESSING  79 
investigation of the Perruchet effect using an electrodermal paradigm. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology. Animal Behavior Processes, 38(2), 203–
8. doi:10.1037/a0026718 
Mertens, G., & De Houwer, J. (2016). Potentiation of the startle reflex is in line 
with contingency reversal instructions rather than the conditioning history. 
Biological Psychology, 113, 91–99. doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2015.11.014 
Mertens, G., Kuhn, M., Raes, A. K., Kalisch, R., De Houwer, J., & Lonsdorf, T. B. 
(2015). Fear expression and return of fear following threat instruction with 
or without direct contingency experience. Cognition and Emotion, (May), 
1–17. doi:10.1080/02699931.2015.1038219 
Mineka, S., & Zinbarg, R. (2006). A contemporary learning theory perspective on 
the etiology of anxiety disorders: it’s not what you thought it was. The 
American Psychologist, 61(1), 10–26. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.61.1.10 
Miskovic, V., & Keil, A. (2012). Acquired fears reflected in cortical sensory 
processing: a review of electrophysiological studies of human classical 
conditioning. Psychophysiology, 49(9), 1230–1241. doi:10.1111/j.1469-
8986.2012.01398.x.Acquired 
Olsson, A., & Phelps, E. a. (2004). Learned fear of “unseen” faces after Pavlovian, 
observational, and instructed fear. Psychological Science, 15(12), 822–828. 
doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00762.x 
Olsson, A., & Phelps, E. a. (2007). Social learning of fear. Nature Neuroscience, 
10(9), 1095–1102. doi:10.1038/nn1968 
Phelps, E. A., Ling, S., & Carrasco, M. (2006). Emotion Facilitates Perception and 
Potentiates the Perceptual Benefits of Attention. Psychological Science, 
17(4), 292–299. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01701.x 
Polich, J. (2007). Updating P300: An integrative theory of P3a and P3b. Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 118(10), 2128–2148. doi:10.1016/j.clinph.2007.04.019 
Pourtois, G., Grandjean, D., Sander, D., & Vuilleumier, P. (2004). 
Electrophysiological Correlates of Rapid Spatial Orienting Towards Fearful 
Faces. Cerebral Cortex, 14(6), 619–633. doi:10.1093/cercor/bhh023 
Pourtois, G., Schettino, A., & Vuilleumier, P. (2013). Brain mechanisms for 
emotional influences on perception and attention: What is magic and what 
80  CHAPTER 3  
is not. Biological Psychology, 92(3), 492–512. 
doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2012.02.007 
Raes, A. K., De Houwer, J., De Schryver, M., Brass, M., & Kalisch, R. (2014). Do CS-
US Pairings Actually Matter? A Within-Subject Comparison of Instructed 
Fear Conditioning with and without Actual CS-US Pairings. PloS One, 9(1), 
e84888. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084888 
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L., Lushene, R., Vagg, P. R., & Jacobs, G. A. (1983). 
Manual for the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting 
Psychologists Press. 
Stolarova, M., Keil, A., & Moratti, S. (2006). Modulation of the C1 visual event-
related component by conditioned stimuli: evidence for sensory plasticity 
in early affective perception. Cerebral Cortex, 16(6), 876–87. 
doi:10.1093/cercor/bhj031 
Ugland, C. C. O., Dyson, B. J., & Field, A. P. (2013). An ERP study of the interaction 
between verbal information and conditioning pathways to fear. Biological 
Psychology, 92(1), 69–81. doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2012.02.003 
van der Ploeg, H. M., Defares, P. B., & Spielberger, C. D. (2000). Handleiding bij 
de Zelfbeoordelings Vragenlijst. Een Nederlandstalige bewerking van de 
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Lisse, The Netherlands. 
Weymar, M., Bradley, M. M., Hamm, A. O., & Lang, P. J. (2013). When fear forms 
memories: threat of shock and brain potentials during encoding and 
recognition. Cortex, 49(3), 819–26. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2012.02.012 
Wong, P. S., Bernat, E., Bunce, S., & Shevrin, H. (1997). Brain indices of 
nonconscious associative learning. Consciousness and Cognition, 6(4), 519–
44. doi:10.1006/ccog.1997.0322 
Wong, P. S., Shevrin, H., & Williams, W. J. (1994). Conscious and nonconscious 
processes: An ERP index of an anticipatory response in a conditioning 
paradigm using visually masked stimuli. Psychophysiology, 31(1), 87–101. 
doi:10.1111/j.1469-8986.1994.tb01028.x 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CAN PREPARED FEAR CONDITIONING RESULT FROM 
VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS?1 
 
Evolutionary fear-relevant stimuli such as snakes or spiders are thought to be 
prepared to elicit fear reactions. This implies that the acquisition of conditioned fear 
responses is facilitated when these  stimuli serve as conditioned stimuli (CSs). Moreover, 
extinction of conditioned fear responses is delayed when CSs are prepared stimuli. The 
research presented in this article addresses the question whether such selective learning 
effects can be obtained even when participants do not experience pairings of CSs and US 
but receive only instructions about those pairings. Two experiments were conducted in 
which participants were verbally informed about the relationship between fear-relevant 
and fear-irrelevant CSs and the presence of an electrical stimulus (US). However, CSs 
were never actually paired with the US. US expectancy ratings and skin conductance 
responses were recorded during multiple CS only trials. In the first experiment, we 
observed acquisition, extinction and reinstatement of fear on the basis of instructions, 
but these effects were not modulated by the fear-relevance of the CSs. In the second 
experiment, we manipulated whether participants actually experienced the CS-US 
contingencies or were merely instructed. We obtained facilitated acquisition for the 
merely instructed fear-relevant CS+. We discuss these results in relation to the 
evolutionary fear learning model of Öhman and Mineka (2001) and the expectancy bias 
model of Davey (1992). 
                                                     
1Based on Mertens, G., Raes, A. K., & De Houwer, J. (2016). Can prepared 
fear conditioning result from verbal instructions? Learning and Motivation, 53, 
7–23. doi:10.1016/j.lmot.2015.11.001 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fear conditioning in the lab is commonly established by repeatedly pairing 
an initial neutral stimulus (the Conditioned Stimulus or CS) with an aversive 
stimulus (the Unconditioned Stimulus or US), resulting in fearful reactions (or 
Conditioned Responses, CRs) to the initial neutral CS. However, direct pairings of 
the CS and US are not necessary to establish fearful CRs. Fearful reactions can 
also be established by providing participants with verbal information about the 
contingency between the CS and US, in the absence of any actual CS-US pairings 
(Field, 2006; Rachman, 1977). Previous research has demonstrated that verbal 
instructions can be a very powerful tool for inducing fear reactions (e.g., 
Cameron, Roche, Schlund, & Dymond, 2016; King, Eleonora, & Ollendick, 1998; 
Merckelbach, de Jong, Muris, & van den Hout, 1996; Muris & Field, 2010).  
Despite its potency, however, fear conditioning through verbal instructions is still 
poorly understood (e.g., Olsson & Phelps, 2007). 
According to Olsson and Phelps (2007), fear conditioning through verbal 
instructions can be partly dissociated from learning via direct experience and 
learning via social observation (see also: Olsson & Phelps, 2004). That is, verbal 
instructions primarily result in cognitive contingency learning, while learning via 
direct experience and via social observation result in both contingency learning 
and affective learning. Affective learning is the acquisition of defensive responses 
to potentially threatening stimuli. This type of learning is proposed to take place 
in an automatic way and is assumed to be independent of cognitive contingency 
learning (Hamm & Weike, 2005; Mineka & Öhman, 2002). Cognitive contingency 
learning, on the other hand, refers to the purely cognitive learning of 
contingencies between events. 
Alternatively, according to single-process models of associative learning 
(De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009), learning is the result 
of the non-automatic formation of propositions. According to this view, there 
should not be any qualitative differences between pathways of learning because 
learning via all the different pathways is mediated by the same underlying 
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processes. Thus, verbal instructions should be able to result in learning on 
measures that are believed to capture affective components of learning as well. 
This is supported by a number of studies that show that verbal instructions can 
result in the acquisition of defensive responses (Cameron et al., 2016; Costa, 
Bradley, & Lang, 2015; Grillon, Ameli, Woods, Merikangas, & Davis, 1991) and 
subjective feelings of fear and distress (Raes, De Houwer, De Schryver, Brass, & 
Kalisch, 2014; Soeter & Kindt, 2012), which are considered to be affective 
measures of fear (Hamm & Weike, 2005; Soeter & Kindt, 2012). Such results call 
into question whether distinctions should be made between the processes 
underlying learning via verbal instructions and other types of learning. 
Nevertheless, it may be that there are certain instances of affective 
learning that cannot be obtained through verbal instructions, thus requiring a 
multi-process account for the different pathways of fear acquisition. The most 
prototypical example of affective learning is perhaps prepared learning (Öhman 
& Mineka, 2001). Selective or prepared learning refers to the finding that the 
pairing of a fear-relevant CS (e.g., pictures of snakes or spiders) with an aversive 
US  (e.g., an electric shock) produces a stronger CR that is more easily established 
or more resistant to extinction than CRs to fear-irrelevant CSs (e.g., a picture of a 
flower or a bird). The idea for a varying capacity of stimuli to become associated 
with an aversive event was introduced by Seligman (1971) in his preparedness 
theory. According to this theory, stimuli that were potentially threatening for 
survival in our ancestral history are more easily learned to be feared. This 
auxiliary assumption to learning theory could explain why certain types of 
phobias, such as these for heights and spiders, are more prevalent than others 
(Rachman, 1977). A large set of experiments have provided evidence for this 
preparedness theory in the lab using fear conditioning (for a review see: Öhman 
& Mineka, 2001).  
It has been argued that prepared learning is due to the operation of a 
specific fear learning module (Mineka & Öhman, 2002; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). 
Features of this proposed module include selective activation in the presence of 
aversive events, automatic activation with a minimal amount of stimulus 
processing, and encapsulation from higher cognitive influences. Because of the 
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selective and automatic nature of this learning module, we would not expect 
that prepared learning is a property of fear conditioning via verbal instructions 
because it seems unlikely that verbal instructions provide the conditions to 
recruit this module in the learning process (Olsson & Phelps, 2004, 2007).  
However, several previous experiments have provided evidence that 
prepared learning can be obtained via verbal instructions. Öhman, Eriksson, 
Fredriksson, Hugdahl and Olofsson (1974) and Davey (1992) both reported that 
threatening participants that a shock will follow the CSs during the experiment, 
without actually pairing the CSs with the US, potentiated fear reactions more in 
the group that saw fear-relevant CSs than in the group that saw fear-irrelevant 
CSs. However, because no non-threatened CSs had been included in these 
experiments, it is impossible to determine whether threat instructions generated 
specific potentiation of fearful reactions to the threatened fear-relevant CS+s, or 
generated a general potentiation of fearful reactions to all fear-relevant stimuli. 
While the former would be an instance of selective learning, the latter is not. In 
two other studies by Hugdahl and Öhman (1977) and Hugdahl (1978), 
participants were given instructions that one CS would be followed by a shock 
but the other CS would not. These instructions led to stronger acquisition effects 
(Hugdahl & Öhman, 1977) and to more resistance to instructed extinction (i.e., 
the combination of verbal CS-no US instructions and removal of the shock 
electrodes; Hugdahl, 1978) in the group receiving these instructions about fear-
relevant CSs compared to the group receiving these instructions about fear-
irrelevant CSs, even though participants had never actually experienced the 
instructed contingencies. These studies clearly show that prepared learning can 
be obtained when conditioning is established through verbal instructions, and 
thus further show that learning via verbal instructions and learning through 
direct experience of contingencies may be very similar. However, the fact that 
instructed extinction was less strong with fear-relevant than with fear-irrelevant 
CSs does demonstrates that there are limits to what can be learned through 
verbal instructions (Hugdahl, 1978), and seems to contradict a single-process 
account of fear learning (De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2009). 
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Nevertheless, there are several caveats that potentially limit the 
interpretability of these experiments. First, the resistance to instructed 
extinction effect (Hugdahl & Öhman, 1977; Hugdahl, 1978; Öhman, Erixon, & 
Lofberg, 1975) has been difficult to replicate. In subsequent studies, the 
combination of an extinction phase with explicit instructions that USs would no 
longer be presented, resulted in a complete reduction of the CR for both fear-
relevant and fear-irrelevant CSs (Lovibond, 2004; McNally, 1987). Second, there 
is a methodological issue that might complicate the interpretation of the results 
from Hugdahl and Öhman (1977) and Hugdahl (1978). In both experiments, a 
between-subjects design was used in which one group was verbally conditioned 
with fear-relevant CSs and the other group was verbally conditioned with fear-
irrelevant CSs. Such a design is not optimal because differences between groups, 
such as elevated state-anxiety due to repeated exposure to fear eliciting stimuli 
(pictures of snakes and spiders), are not controlled for. Such uncontrolled 
differences in state-anxiety between groups may lead to alterations in 
conditioning that do not reflect prepared learning (e.g., Vriends et al., 2011). 
Recent studies on prepared learning therefore usually make use of a within-
subject design (Ho & Lipp, 2014; Olsson, Ebert, Banaji, & Phelps, 2005). Finally, it 
is possible that the prepared learning in the studies of Hugdahl might reflect 
expectancy biases, that is, a bias to expect the US in the presence of a fear-
relevant CS, and thus do not reflect learning through a specialized module that is 
independent of higher-order cognitions (Davey, 1992). Demonstrating that 
prepared learning effects are due to expectancy biases would challenge the need 
for a separate fear learning system (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). The studies of 
Hugdahl and Öhman (1977) and Hugdahl (1978) lacked the inclusion of 
expectancy ratings to determine whether the observed prepared learning effects 
were due to such expectancy biases.  
Hence, so far it remains unclear whether prepared learning can be 
obtained with verbal instructions, and whether these prepared learning effects 
are due to expectancy biases. We conducted two new experiments employing a 
within-subjects design to investigate these issues and to thus shed new light on 
the important theoretical debate about the need to supplement a cognitive 
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(propositional) learning system with an affective fear learning module. In both 
experiments, participants received instructions about the contingency between 
fear-relevant and fear-irrelevant CSs, on the one hand, and an aversive US (an 
electrical stimulation), on the other hand. Within each fear-relevance category, 
one CS was instructed to be followed by the US while the other was instructed 
never to be followed by the US. After the instructions, a short test was given to 
make sure that participants understood and remembered the instructions 
correctly. After the instructions and test, participants continued to an 
unannounced extinction phase. Evidence for selective learning could be 
established during this phase through stronger CRs to the fear-relevant CS+ (i.e., 
facilitated acquisition) or through resistance to extinction of CRs for the fear-
relevant CS+.  
We collected skin conductance responses (SCR) and US expectancy ratings 
as dependent measures in both experiments. SCRs are traditionally measured in 
studies that investigated prepared fear learning, and have been shown to be 
sensitive to prepared learning effects. Inclusion of US expectancy ratings allowed 
us to evaluate whether obtained preparedness effects were due to expectancy 
biases (Davey, 1992). Furthermore, these two measures were supplemented 
with fear ratings in the second experiment. Fear ratings are considered to be a 
more affective measure of fear learning (Mertens et al., 2015; Soeter & Kindt, 
2012) and may therefore be more sensitive to preparedness effects. 
Additionally, in the second experiment, we manipulated whether the 
instructed contingencies were actually experienced or merely instructed. This 
was accomplished by adopting a procedure introduced by Raes, De Houwer, De 
Schryver, Brass and Kalisch (2014) that allowed us to manipulate on a within-
subjects basis whether verbally threatened CSs are actually paired with the US. 
On the basis of the fear learning module account of Öhman and Mineka (2001), 
we expected that actually experiencing the instructed contingencies would 
strengthen prepared learning effects because effects of actual CS-US pairings are 
assumed to be mediated in part by the fear learning module (Olsson & Phelps, 
2004, 2007).  
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Finally, we included a reinstatement shock after the extinction phase. So 
far, preparedness effects on the reinstatement of extinguished fear have not 
been investigated before, although several interesting predictions can be made 
with regard to the reinstatement of fear with fear-relevant stimuli as CSs. That is, 
given that reinstatement is believed to reflect the facilitated retrieval of the 
excitatory CS-US relationship learned during acquisition instead of the competing 
inhibitory CS-noUS relationship learned during extinction (Bouton, 2004; Haaker, 
Golkar, Hermans, & Lonsdorf, 2014), reinstatement should be less pronounced 
for fear-relevant CSs because less inhibitory learning (extinction) takes place for 
fear-relevant CSs. Alternatively, more reinstatement could be expected for fear-
relevant CSs because acquisition is more pronounced for these CSs (Fredrikson, 
Hugdahl, & Öhman, 1976; Öhman, Fredrikson, & Hugdahl, 1978) and therefore 
the excitatory CS-US memory is more easily retrieved after a reinstatement 
manipulation. Including a reinstatement shock after the extinction phase in our 
study allowed us to explore these different predictions regarding reinstatement 
of fear for fear-relevant CSs. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Participants 
Thirty-seven right-handed psychology students at Ghent University 
participated in exchange for €8. Of these, the data of eight participants were 
excluded from analyses because they either did not believe the instructions (N = 
5), did not find the US sufficiently unpleasant (N = 1), or both (N = 2) (see below 
for more details on how this was assessed). 
Material 
Psychophysiology  
SCRs were collected using a Coulbourn Lablinc V system (Coulbourn 
Instruments, Allentown, PA) and standard Ag/AgCl electrodes (0.8 cm diameter) 
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filled with K-Y jelly. The electrodes were attached to the thenar and hypothenar 
eminences of the non-dominant hand. The signal was measured using a constant 
voltage coupler (0.5 V) and digitized at 10 Hz. The collected data were analyzed 
with Psychophysiological Analysis (PSPHA) (De Clercq, Verschuere, De Vlieger, & 
Crombez, 2006). SCRs were calculated by subtracting the mean value of a 
baseline period (2 seconds before CS onset) from the highest amplitude within a 
1 to 8 s interval after CS onset (Pineles, Orr, & Orr, 2009). In this scoring method, 
negative values were recoded to zero. Finally, collected SCRs were range 
corrected with the highest recorded amplitude for that participant to account for 
individual differences in responsivity (Lykken & Venables, 1971) and square root 
transformed to normalize the data (Dawson, Schell, Filion, & Berntson, 2007). 
US expectancy ratings  
US expectancy ratings were collected on each trial using a 9-point Likert 
scale presented below the CSs with 5 anchor points: 1 = “not at all”, 3 = “rather 
not”, 5 = “uncertain”, 7 = “to some extent”, 9 = “certainly”. Above the CSs the 
question: “To what extent do you expect the shock?” was presented. Participants 
indicated their answer by clicking one of the response options of the Likert scale 
with the computer mouse using their dominant hand. 
Stimuli  
Four pictures of a snake, spider, bird and butterfly, each 570 by 400 pixels 
in size (15 by 10.5 cm), were used as CSs in the experiment. These were the same 
pictures as used in the first experiment from Olsson et al. (2005) in which 
prepared learning was observed. Assignment of the pictures to the role of CS+ 
and CS- was orthogonally counterbalanced over participants within each fear-
relevance category. For the practice phase, a white and a yellow square were 
used, also 570 by 400 pixels in size.  
The US was an electrical stimulus that consisted of 38 rectangular pulses of 
2 ms with and inter pulse interval of 6 ms, creating a stimulus of approximately 
300 ms. This stimulus was administered by two lubricated Fukuda standard 
Ag/AgCl electrodes (1-cm diameter) to the left leg over the retromalleolar course 
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of the sural nerve. The stimulus was generated by a constant current stimulator 
(DS7A, Digitimer, Hertfordshire, UK). The intensity of this stimulus was 
determined for each participant individually to be unpleasant but not painful 
using a stepwise work-up procedure (mean intensity = 3.17 mA, SD = 1.13). 
Procedure 
General information and work-up procedure  
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were seated and informed 
about the general characteristics of the experiment. They were informed that in 
the experiment an electrical stimulus would be presented to them but that this 
stimulus was not harmful. Furthermore, they were informed about the presence 
of a camera and an intercom system that allowed the experimenter to monitor 
for artifacts that might interfere with the skin conductance measures (such as 
sneezing, yawning, …). After this information, the electrodes for measuring skin 
conductance and for administering the US were attached to the left hand and 
the left leg, respectively. The skin conductance signal was checked by having 
participants breathing deeply in and out. If the signal was clear, participants 
went through the work-up procedure. During this work-up, participants were 
exposed to gradually increasing intensities of the electrical stimulus. Participants 
could verbally report after each exposure how they had experienced the 
stimulus. When they indicated the stimulus to be unpleasant but not painful, the 
procedure was stopped and participants were informed that this was the 
electrical stimulus intensity level that would be used during the experiment. 
Finally, the experiment program was started and continued automatically 
without the presence of the experimenter. 
Pre-training instructions and training phase  
Participants were told that they would see four pictures during the 
experiment and that two of these pictures would sometimes be followed by the 
shock while the other two pictures would never be followed by the shock. They 
were instructed that their task was to indicate during the experiment to what 
extent they expected the shock using a scale presented below the pictures. 
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Furthermore, they were told that before they would see the pictures they had to 
complete a training phase to become familiar with the setup of the experiment. 
In this training phase, they would see a white square which would sometimes be 
followed by the shock and a yellow square which would never be followed by the 
shock.  
During the training phase, participants were shown white and yellow 
squares, each presented four times (8 trials in total), in the middle of the screen 
for 8 s. The squares were preceded by a fixation cross presented for 3 s, signaling 
the onset of the CSs. Three out of four presentations of the white square (CS+) 
were followed by the US, determined in a random fashion. CSs were presented in 
a random sequence. On each trial, SCRs were measured and participants 
provided expectancy ratings (see the Materials section). The inter-trial interval 
was 10, 12 or 16 s, randomly selected. 
Verbal instructions and retention test  
After the training phase, participants were told that they would now see 
the different stimuli together with information about whether a stimulus can be 
followed by the shock. Participants were asked to remember this information 
well and were told that they would have to complete a test afterwards about the 
instructions. Subsequently, all the CSs were shown one by one in the middle of 
the screen in a random order. For CS+s the sentence “Will SOMETIMES be 
followed by the shock” was presented above the picture, while for CS-s the 
sentence “Will NEVER be followed by the shock” was presented. Participants 
could navigate through these instructions by pressing the space bar.  
After these instructions, the participants completed a short test about the 
instructions. During this test, each stimulus was presented twice in the middle of 
the screen in a random sequence. Participants were asked to decide for each 
stimulus whether it could be followed by a shock by clicking one of two response 
buttons depicted on the screen below the stimulus. On one button (200 by 100 
pixels) “sometimes shock” and on the on the other “never shock” was projected. 
If participants failed to select the correct answer for each picture, they were told 
that they had not selected the right option for all the pictures and that they will 
92  CHAPTER 4  
have to redo the test. After that, they received the contingency instructions 
again, followed by the test. This continued until participants passed the test 
without making errors (average number of tests until pass = 1.28, SD = 0.53, 
range = 1-3). 
Extinction phase and reinstatement  
After the retention test, participants continued to an unannounced 
extinction phase. During this phase, participants saw each stimulus six times (24 
trials in total). On no occasion was a stimulus followed by the US. Stimulus order 
was randomized with the exception that the same CS could not be presented on 
more than two consecutive trials. Stimulus and ITI duration were identical to 
those used in the preceding training phase. Similarly, SCRs and US expectancy 
ratings were collected online throughout the extinction phase.  
After the last extinction trial, an unannounced reinstatement US was 
presented to the participants. The US was administered 15, 17 or 21 s after the 
last extinction trial ended and was followed by the first post-reinstatement trial 
after 18, 20 or 24 s, randomly selected. The reinstatement US was administered 
while participants viewed a black screen. After this unannounced US, each 
stimulus was presented to the participants two more times using a trial 
procedure identical to that of the extinction trials. 
Manipulation checks  
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to rate their belief in 
the instructions by selecting one of four forced-choice options (“not believable”, 
“somewhat believable”, “very believable” and “fully believable”) and to indicate 
how unpleasant they found the shock, using a scale with seven forced-choice 
possibilities (“very pleasant”, “rather pleasant”, “somewhat pleasant”, “neutral”, 
“somewhat unpleasant”, “rather unpleasant”, “very unpleasant”). In both cases, 
options were presented  using a dropdown list. The two questions were 
presented in a random order. 
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Data analysis  
US expectancy ratings and SCRs were analyzed separately with repeated 
measures ANOVAs. Two ANOVAs were run to assess the effects of our 
experimental manipulations. First, the extinction phase was analyzed using an 
ANOVA with CS (CS+ or CS-), Fear-relevance (fear-relevant or fear-irrelevant) and 
Trial (one to six) as within-subject factors. Second, the effect of the 
reinstatement US was assessed by comparing the last trial of the test phase with 
the first trial after the reinstatement US (factor Time) with factors CS and Fear-
relevance. The crucial interactions for our research question are those between 
Fear-relevance and CS (facilitated acquisition), between Fear-relevance, CS and 
trial (resistance to extinction) and between Fear-relevance, CS and Time 
(reinstatement for the fear-relevant CS+). 
An alpha-level of .05 was applied for statistical significance and 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections are reported when the sphericity assumption 
was violated. 
Results 
Manipulations checks 
The majority of the participants indicated that they found the instructions 
to be very believable (20 participants, 54%) or fully believable (10 participants, 
27%). Six participants indicated that they found the instructions somewhat 
believable (16%) and one participant reported not to believe the instructions 
(3%). These latter seven participants were excluded from analyses. 
Furthermore, most of the participants experienced the US as rather 
unpleasant (24 participants, 65%) or as somewhat unpleasant (10 participants, 
27%). Three participants indicated the US to be neutral or pleasant (8%) and 
were excluded from analyses (see Participants section)1. 
                                                     
1
 Exclusion of these participants did not alter our conclusions regarding the data. Similar 
results were obtained when all participants were included in the statistical analyses. 
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US expectancy ratings 
Extinction phase 
 We obtained instruction-based fear conditioning as evidenced by higher 
US expectancy ratings for CS+s than for CS-s (see Figure 1), main effect of CS: F(1, 
28) = 208.31, p < .001, η²p = .88. However, this conditioning effect was not 
qualified by the nature of the CS, interaction between CS and Fear-relevance: 
F(1, 28) = 1.93, p = .176, η²p = .06. Hence, no evidence for facilitated acquisition 
was obtained for US expectancy ratings. Furthermore, US expectancy ratings 
tended to decrease over trials, main effect of Trial: F(1.85, 51.91) = 18.52, p < 
.001, η²p = .40, and this effect was qualified by a significant interaction between 
CS and Trial, F(1.75, 48.90) = 11.29, p < .001, η²p = .29, indicating that US 
expectancy decreased more strongly for the CS+s (i.e., extinction; see Figure 1). 
However, this extinction effect was also not reliably modulated by the nature of 
the CS, three way interaction between CS, Trial and Fear-relevance: F(3.58, 
100.17) = 1.91, p = .122, η²p = .06. Hence, neither facilitated acquisition nor 
resistance to extinction was obtained for the US expectancy ratings during the 
extinction phase. 
Reinstatement effect 
The reinstatement shock led to a general increase in US expectancy, main 
effect of Time: F(1, 28) = 21.98, p < .001, η²p = .44. Importantly, the main effect 
of time was qualified by a significant interaction between Time and CS, F(1, 28) = 
7.83, p = .009, η²p = .22. This interaction was due to larger increases in US 
expectancy for CS+s after the reinstatement shocks than for CS-s (see Figure 1). 
Again, these results were not modulated by the factor Fear-relevance: main 
effect Relevance, F < 1; interaction between Time and Relevance, F(1, 28) = 1.51, 
p = .229, η²p = .05; three way interaction between Time, CS and Relevance, F(1, 
28) = 2.03, p = .165, η²p = .07. 
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Figure 1. Mean US expectancy ratings and SCRs for all CSs throughout 
Experiment 1. Error bars represent Standard Error. RI = reinstatement; FR = fear-
relevant; FI = fear-irrelevant. 
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SCRs 
Extinction phase 
SCRs to the CS+s were stronger than to the CS-s (see Figure 1), 
demonstrating acquisition of fearful reactions on an autonomous measure on 
the basis of verbal instructions, main effects of CS, F(1, 28) = 9.68, p = .004, η²p = 
0.26. Furthermore, SCRs decreased over trials throughout the extinction phase, 
main effect of Trial: F(3.16, 88.47) = 3.19; p = .026; η²p = 0.10. This effect tended 
to be larger for CS+s than for CS-s (i.e., extinction; see Figure 1), interaction 
between CS and Trial number, F(5, 140) = 2.16; p = .062; η²p = 0.07.  
However, as for the US expectancy ratings, neither the acquisition effect 
nor the extinction effect on the SCRs were qualified by Fear-relevance, all F’s < 1. 
Reinstatement effect 
Unlike the case for the US expectancy ratings, the reinstatement US did not 
lead to a general increase in SCRs, main effect of Time, F(1, 28) = 1.90; p = .179; 
η²p = 0.06. However, it did lead to a specific increase of SCRs for CS+s (see Figure 
1), interaction between Time and CS, F(1, 28) = 5.83; p = .023; η²p = 0.17. The 
main effect of Fear-relevance and the interaction effects related to this factor 
were not significant, all F‘s < 1. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1, we observed acquisition, extinction and reinstatement 
effects on the basis of verbal contingency instructions, both on US expectancy 
ratings and SCRs. To our knowledge, this is the first study to show reinstatement 
for US expectancy ratings and SCRs in conditioning through verbal instructions 
(Haaker et al., 2014).  
Regarding our main research question, however, we did not find evidence 
for stronger acquisition or slower extinction for fear-relevant CSs. One reason for 
a lack of prepared learning effects in our experiment might be the fact that the 
CSs and the US were never actually paired. On the basis of the previously 
outlined evolutionary fear learning module, one could argue that giving mere 
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verbal contingency instructions might not be sufficient to recruit this module into 
the learning process (Mineka & Öhman, 2002; Olsson & Phelps, 2004, pp. 287). 
Previous experiments indeed suggest that verbal instructions mainly result in 
expectancy learning but to a smaller degree in affective learning (Lipp, Mallan, 
Libera, & Tan, 2010; Olsson & Phelps, 2004; Sevenster, Beckers, & Kindt, 2012). 
Therefore, direct experience of the CS-US contingency might be necessary for 
affective learning and consequently to obtain fear-relevance effects. 
To test for this hypothesis, we adopted a procedure developed by Raes, De 
Houwer, De Schryver, Brass, and Kalisch (2014) which allowed a within-subject 
comparison of instructed fear conditioning with and without actual CS-US 
pairings. In this procedure, participants are instructed about two CSs that are 
said to be predictive of an electrical stimulus. Participants are also informed that 
in a first training phase only one of the CSs (i.e., CS+1) will be actually paired with 
the US while the other CS (i.e., CS+2) will only be followed by the electrical 
stimulus in a later test phase of the experiment. Before that test phase, 
participants are warned that now both CS+1 and CS+2 will be followed by the 
electrical stimulus, while in fact neither of them is followed by the stimulus 
during this phase. The crucial comparison in this procedure is the comparison 
during test between the CS whose relation to the US was both instructed and 
experienced as the result of actual CS-US pairings (i.e., CS+1) and the CS whose 
relation with the US was only instructed (i.e., CS+2). Any difference between 
CS+1 and CS+2 during test can be attributed to the presence of actual CS-US 
pairings. We extended this procedure by including both a fear-relevant and a 
fear-irrelevant CS+1 and CS+2 to assess whether actual experience strengthens 
selective learning effects. 
Furthermore, in Experiment 2, we collected fear ratings in addition to US 
expectancy ratings and SCRs. Even though prepared learning effects have been 
observed on US expectancy ratings and SCRs (e.g., Davey, 1992; Lovibond, Siddle, 
& Bond, 1993; Öhman, Erixon, & Löfberg, 1975), fear ratings might be a better 
measure for capturing the emotional components of preparedness effects, that 
is, components that are driven by a fear learning module (Mertens et al., 2015; 
Soeter & Kindt, 2012). 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
Participants 
 A sample of 41 right-handed psychology students at Ghent University 
completed the experiment in exchange for €12. Of these, five were removed 
from analyses because they reported not to believe the instructions (N = 2) or 
because of lost data during recording (N = 3).  
Material 
Psychophysiology  
SCRs were collected and pre-processed in the same manner as in 
Experiment 1. Additionally, SCRs were averaged per two trials to obtain an equal 
number of data points as for the subjective ratings (as in Raes et al., 2014).  
US expectancy and fear ratings 
US expectancy and fear ratings were collected in separate blocks, 
interspersed throughout the experiment (as in Raes et al., 2014). Right before 
this block, participants were asked to think back to their most recent encounter 
with the stimulus and were told that questions regarding the expectancy of the 
electrical stimulus referred only to the actual electrical stimulus and not the 
picture of the lightning bolt (which was used as a placeholder for CS+2 during a 
practice phase; see below). For each CS, fear and US expectancy ratings were 
collected, resulting in 12 trials in each ratings block. The order of the trials in the 
rating block was randomized.  
During rating trials, a CS was presented in the middle of the screen with 
either the question “To what extent did you expect an electrical stimulus while 
viewing this photo?” (US expectancy) or “How much fear did you experience 
while viewing this photo?” (fear). Participants could provide an answer by 
clicking one of the response alternatives of a 9-point Likert scale presented 
below the CSs.  For US expectancy, the anchors of the Likert scale were 1 = 
“certainly not”, 3 =  “rather not”, 5 =  “uncertain”, 7 = “rather certain”, 9 = 
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“certain”. For fear ratings, the anchors were 1 = “none at all”, 3 = “very little”, 5 = 
“uncertain”, 7 = “to some extent”, 9 = “very much”. There was no response 
deadline.  
Stimuli  
Six stimuli were selected from the IAPS database. These were pictures of a 
spider, snake, rat, cow, deer and a rabbit (IAPS pictures 1200, 1080, 1280, 1670, 
1620 and 1610, respectively)2. All pictures were 300 by 230 pixels in size (8 by 6 
cm). Allocation of these pictures within each fear-relevance category to the role 
of CS+1, CS+2 and CS- was randomized for each participant. 
The same electrical stimulus as in Experiment 1 served as the US in this 
experiment. Again, the intensity of this stimulus was determined for each 
participants individually via a work-up procedure (mean intensity = 5.36 mA, SD = 
2.86). 
Finally, a picture of a lightning bolt (approximately 200 by 200 pixels) 
presented for 500 ms was used as the placeholder US (as in Raes et al., 2014). 
Questionnaires  
Prior to the experiment, participants completed a Dutch translation of the 
trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S; Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983; van der Ploeg, Defares, & Spielberger, 2000). 
After the experiment, participants completed a custom-made questionnaire 
about credibility of the experimental instructions. In this questionnaire, 
participants indicated the clarity and believability of the instructions on a 10-
point scale and could additionally provide general remarks about the experiment 
(as in Raes et al., 2014). 
                                                     
2
 Virtually all fear conditioning studies investigating prepared learning in the laboratory 
have used pictures of either snakes or spiders as CSs. We considered rats to be a third fear-
relevant CS based on a study from Hygge and Öhman (1978) who found preparedness effects 
with a rat picture as a fear-relevant stimulus and based on correlational studies that have found 
rats to be a universal fear-relevant animal similar to snakes and spiders (Davey et al., 1998; Ware, 
Jain, Burgess, & Davey, 1994). 
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Procedure 
Pre-practice instructions  
After arrival at the laboratory, participants were informed about the 
general characteristics of the study and went through a work-up procedure as in 
Experiment 1.  
After all electrodes had been applied and checked, participants received 
instructions about the contingencies on the computer screen without the 
presence of the experimenter. Participants could move through the instructions 
in a self-paced way by pressing the spacebar. First, participants were shown the 
six CSs simultaneously on the screen for a minimum duration of 5 s. On the 
following instruction page, participants were informed that four of these 
photographs could sometimes be followed by an electrical stimulus, while the 
other two could never be followed by the stimulus. Next, participants saw the 
four CS+s, two fear-relevant and two fear-irrelevant, presented simultaneously 
on the screen with the sentence “+electrical stimulus!” beneath them. 
Thereafter, they saw the two CS-s simultaneously on the screen together with 
the sentence “NO electrical stimulus!”. 
After these instructions, participants were warned that they would first go 
through a practice phase. In this phase, they were told, some of the electrical 
stimuli would be replaced by a picture of a lightning bolt in order to avoid 
administering too many electrical stimuli before the actual experiment starts. 
They were informed that on the next page they would see which photographs 
would be followed, during the practice phase, by the picture of the lightning bolt. 
On the following page, participants again saw all four CS+s. Two CS+s (CS+1s), 
one fear-relevant and one fear-irrelevant, were accompanied by the sentence 
“+electrical stimulus!” and the other two CSs (CS+2s), one fear-relevant and one 
fear-irrelevant, were accompanied by a plus sign and the placeholder US. 
Finally, participants were warned that they would have to complete a short 
test about the instructions. In the first half of this test, participants were asked to 
indicate for each picture whether it could be followed by the electrical stimulus 
during the test phase. In the second half of the test, they were asked to indicate 
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whether a picture would be followed by either the electrical stimulus, a picture 
of a lightning bolt or whether it would not be followed by the electrical stimulus 
during the practice phase. On each trial of this test, participants were shown a CS 
in the middle of the screen together with the possible response buttons (100 by 
100 pixels): “shock”, “no shock” and (only for trials related to the practice phase) 
“lightning bolt” depicted below it. Above the CSs, the sentence “Please select the 
correct option for the test(/practice) phase.” was shown. Participants could 
select their answer by clicking one of the response buttons. Each CS was 
presented twice, once for the questions regarding the test phase and once for 
the questions regarding the practice phase (12 trials in total). Participants were 
required to select the correct answer on each trial. If they failed to do so, they 
received the instructions again and had to redo the test (average number of tests 
until pass = 1.81, SD = 0.95, range = 1-5). 
Practice phase  
During the practice phase, CSs were presented on the screen for 8 seconds. 
CS presentation was preceded by fixation cross depicted for 4 s. The ITI was 
either 12, 14 or 16 s, randomly selected. Each CS was shown six times (36 trials 
total). Trial order was randomized with the restriction that maximally two 
consecutive trials could contain the same CS. On the first, third and last 
occurrence of the fear-relevant and fear-irrelevant CS+1, stimulus offset was 
followed by the electrical stimulus. Similarly, on the first, second and fifth 
occurrence of the fear-relevant and fear-irrelevant CS+2, stimulus offset was 
followed by the placeholder US. The practice phase was interrupted three times, 
after every twelve trials, for a rating block (see the Materials section). 
Pre-test instructions, test phase and reinstatement  
Before the start of the test phase, participants were warned that all CS+s 
would now be predictive of the electrical stimulus. The trial procedure was 
identical to that of the practice phase, apart from omitting all US and placeholder 
US administration. Similarly, the test phase was interrupted three times for a 
rating block. 
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After the last rating block of the test phase, an unannounced US was 
presented. Next, each CS was presented two more times using the same trial 
procedure as in the test phase. The experiment ended with a final rating block. 
Data analysis  
US expectancy ratings, fear ratings and SCRs were analyzed separately with 
repeated measures ANOVAs. Both the practice and the test phase were analyzed 
using an ANOVA with the within-subject factors CS (CS+1, CS+2, CS-), Fear-
relevance (relevant or irrelevant) and Block (1 to 3). Additionally, an extra 
ANOVA was run to examine the reinstatement effect. Responses from the last 
block of the test phase and the reinstatement phase (factor Phase) were 
subjected to a repeated measures ANOVA with CS, Fear-relevance and Time 
(before or after reinstatement US) as within-subjects variables. As in Experiment 
1, evidence for prepared learning can be provided by significant interactions 
between Fear-relevance and CS (facilitated acquisition), between Fear-relevance, 
CS and Block (resistance to extinction), or between Fear-relevance, CS and Phase 
(facilitated or inhibited reinstatement). Such interactions were followed up with 
specific t-tests. Greenhouse-Geisser corrections are reported when the sphericity 
assumption was violated and an alpha-level of .05 was applied. 
Results 
Questionnaires 
Trait STAI scores ranged between 21 and 59 with a mean of 36.83 (SD = 
9.19). Because of the small sample, STAI scores were not included as a variable in 
the analyses. Participants indicated that the instructions were clear (Range = 5-
10; Mean = 9.43; SD = 1.17) and believable (Range = 5-10; Mean = 8.77; SD = 
1.42). Two participants who rated the believability as 5 were excluded from 
analyses3. 
                                                     
3
 As in Experiment 1, exclusion of these participants did not alter our conclusions. 
PREPARED LEARNING  103 
US expectancy ratings 
Practice phase 
The main effects of all three factors were significant: CS, F(1.39, 48.57) = 
218.50, p < .001, η²p = .86; Fear-relevance, F(1, 35) = 9.07, p = .005, η²p = .21; 
Block, F(2, 70) = 6.21, p = .003, η²p = .15. The main effect of CS reflects 
significantly higher US expectancy ratings for CS+1, F(1, 35) = 1291.37, p < .001, 
η²p = .97, and CS+2, F(1, 35) = 60.26, p < .001, η²p = .63, compared to CS- (see 
Figure 2). Furthermore, US expectancy ratings were also significantly higher for 
CS+1s than for CS+2s, F(1, 35) = 105.47, p < .001, η²p = .75. The main effect of 
Fear-relevance was due to higher US expectancy ratings for fear-relevant CSs (M 
= 4.39, SD = 0.91) than for fear-irrelevant CSs (M = 4.09, SD = 0.87). The main 
effect of Block was due to gradually lower US expectancy ratings throughout the 
Practice phase (see Figure 2). 
The main effects of CS and Block were partially qualified by an interaction 
between these two factors, F(2.67, 93.34) = 3.39, p = .015, η²p = .09. This 
interaction reflects changes in the difference between CS+1 and CS+2 over 
blocks. While US expectancy for CS+1 dropped from Block 1 to Block 2 and then 
remained constant, US expectancy for CS+2 slightly increased in Block 2 and then 
dropped in Block 3. Furthermore, and crucially, the interaction between CS and 
Fear-relevance, F(1.69, 59.05) = 6.74, p = .004, η²p = .16, was significant because 
of larger conditioning effects for the fear-relevant CS+2 (M = 2.92, SD = 2.22) 
than for the fear-irrelevant CS+2 (M = 2.48, SD = 2.05; t(35) = 2.79, p = .008, 
Cohen’s d = .47) (see Figure 2).  
Finally, neither the interaction between Fear-relevance and Block, F < 1, 
nor the three-way interaction between CS, Fear-relevance and Block, F(3.29, 
115.02) = 1.70, p = .167, η²p = .05, was significant. 
Test phase 
As in the Practice phase, all three main effects were significant: CS, F(2, 70) 
= 157.07, p < .001, η²p = .82, Fear-relevance, F(1, 35) = 10.00, p = .003, η²p = .22, 
Block, F(1.73, 60.38) = 56.67, p < .001, η²p = .62. These effects are due to similar 
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patterns as in the Practice phase. Importantly, however, the difference between 
CS+1 and CS+2 was still significant, F(1, 35) = 30.51, p < .001, η²p = .47, despite 
instructions that both would be equally predictive of the shock during this phase.  
Furthermore, the interaction between CS and Block was significant, F(2.75, 
96.16) = 30.14, p < .001, η²p = .46. This interaction is due to decreasing US 
expectancy ratings for CS+1 and CS+2 throughout the test phase, while US 
expectancy remained similar for CS- (i.e., extinction; see Figure 2). The 
interaction between Fear-relevance and Block approached significance, F(2, 70) = 
2.72, p = .073, η²p = .07, due to a slightly slower decrease of US expectancy 
ratings throughout the Test phase for fear-relevant CSs (see Figure 2). 
The crucial interactions between CS and Fear-relevance, F(1.65, 57.68) = 1.95, p = 
.159, η²p = .05, and between CS, Fear-relevance and Block, F < 1, did not reach 
significance in the test phase. 
Reinstatement effect 
Only the main effect of CS was significant, F(1.68, 58.91) = 78.15, p < .001, 
η²p = .69, again reflecting the same differences between CSs as in the practice 
phase. The effects of all other main and interaction effects did not reach 
significance threshold, F’s < 2.1, p-values > .15. 
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Figure 2. Mean US expectancy ratings, fear ratings and SCRs for all CSs 
throughout Experiment 2. Error bars represent Standard Error. RI = 
reinstatement; FR = fear-relevant; FI = fear-irrelevant; CS+1 = instructed + paired 
with US; CS+2 = instructed. 
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Fear ratings 
Practice phase 
Both the main effects of CS, F(2, 70) = 135.16, p < .001, η²p = .79, and of 
Fear-relevance, F(1, 35) = 24.79, p < .001, η²p = .42, were significant. The main 
effects of CS reflects higher fear ratings for CS+1s, F(1, 35) = 349.61, p < .001, η²p 
= .91, and CS+2s, F(1, 35) = 54.61, p < .001, η²p = .61, than for CS-s. Fear ratings 
for CS+1s were in turn higher than for CS+2s, F(1, 35) = 66.43, p < .001, η²p = .66 
(see Figure 2). The effect of Fear-relevance is explained by higher fear ratings for 
fear-relevant CSs than for fear-irrelevant CSs (see Figure 2). All other main and 
interaction effects were not significant, F’s < 1.7, p-values > .2. 
Test phase 
The main effects of all three main factors were significant: CS, F(1.70, 
59.54) = 113.69, p < .001, η²p = .77, Fear-relevance, F(1, 35) = 13.39, p = .001, η²p 
= .28, Block, F(1.39, 48.80) = 53.39, p < .001, η²p = .60. The first two effects 
reflect similar patterns as in the Practice phase. Importantly, the difference 
between CS+1s and CS+2s remained significant in the Test phase, F(1, 35) = 
31.15, p < .001, η²p = .47, despite instructions that both would be equally 
predictive of the US during this phase. 
Furthermore, the interaction between CS and Block was significant, F(2.26, 
78.94) = 24.77, p < .001, η²p = .41, due to decreasing fear ratings for the CS+1s 
and CS+2s throughout the Test phase while fear ratings for the CS-s remained 
constant (i.e., extinction; see Figure 2).  
The interactions related to the factor Fear-relevance failed to reach 
significance: interaction between CS and Fear-relevance, F(1.64, 57.46) = 2.31, p 
= .118, η²p = .06; interaction between Block and Fear-relevance, F(2, 70) = 1.75, p 
= .182, η²p = .05; three way interaction between CS, Trial and Fear-relevance, F < 
1. 
Reinstatement effect 
Both the main effects of CS, F(1.68, 58.74) = 65.15, p < .001, η²p = .65, and 
of Fear-relevance, F(1, 35) = 12.19, p = .001, η²p = .26, were significant. 
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Importantly, the main effect of Time approached significance, F(1, 35) = 3.73, p = 
.062, η²p = .10, due to higher fear ratings after the reinstatement US compared 
to before (see Figure 2).  
The only interaction effect that approached significance was that between 
CS and Fear-relevance, F(1.76, 61.61) = 3.03, p = .062, η²p = .08. This interaction 
was due to larger conditioning effects for the fear-relevant CS+2 (M = 2.01, SD = 
1.58) than for the fear-irrelevant CS+2 (M = 1.58, SD = 1.25; t(35) = 2.39, p = .023, 
Cohen’s d = .40) (see Figure 2). The other interaction effects were not significant, 
F’s < 1. 
SCRs 
Practice phase 
The main effect of CS was significant, F(1.40, 49.09) = 33.36, p < .001, η²p = 
.49. This was due to significantly stronger SCRs for CS+1s, F(1, 35) = 43.02, p < 
.001, η²p = .55, and CS+2s, F(1, 35) = 9.88, p = .003, η²p = .22, compared to CS-s 
(see Figure 2). Furthermore, SCRs to CS+1s were in turn significantly stronger 
than to CS+2s, F(1, 35) = 28.99, p < .001, η²p = .45. The main effects for Fear-
relevance, F(1, 35) = 6.71, p = .014, η²p = .16, and for Block, F(1.70, 59.35) = 7.05, 
p = .003, η²p = .17, were also significant. The former was due to stronger SCRs to 
fear-relevant CSs than to fear-irrelevant CSs, while the latter was the result of 
gradually lower SCRs for all CSs throughout the practice phase (see Figure 2). 
None of the interaction effects between these factors was significant, all F’s < 
1.5. 
Test phase 
Both the main effects of CS, F(1.63, 56.97) = 4.24, p = .026, η²p = .11, and of 
Block, F(1.61, 56.31) = 4.79, p = .018, η²p = .12, were significant. The main effect 
of CS was due to stronger SCRs to CS+1s, F(1, 35) = 5.78, p = .025, η²p = .14, and 
marginally stronger SCRs to CS+2s, F(1, 35) = 3.35, p = .076, η²p = .09 than to CS-s 
(see Figure 2). Importantly, the difference between CS+1s and CS+2s was not 
significant, F(1, 35) = 2.00, p = .166, η²p = .05, which is in line with the 
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instructions that both CSs would be equally predictive of the US during the Test 
phase.  
Furthermore, the interaction between CS and Block was also significant, 
F(4, 140) = 3.32, p = .012, η²p = .09, which was due to gradually decreasing SCRs 
for CS+1s and CS+2s while SCRs to the CS-s remained constant (extinction, see 
Figure 2).  
The main effect of Fear-relevance, F < 1, and the crucial interactions 
between CS and Fear-relevance, F <1, Block and Fear-relevance, F < 1, and 
between CS, Block and Fear-relevance, F(4, 140) = 1.34, p = .257, η²p = .04, did 
not reach significance. 
Reinstatement effect 
The only significant effect observed was the interaction between factors CS 
and Fear-relevance, F(2, 70) = 3.73, p-value = .029, η²p = .10. This interaction was 
due to larger differential SCRs to the fear-relevant CS+2 (M = 0.02, SD = 0.16) 
than to the fear-irrelevant CS+2 (M = -0.04, SD = 0.14; t(35) = 2.08, p = .045, 
Cohen’s d = .35; see Figure 2). The main effects of and interaction effects of the 
other factors did not reach significance: main effect of Fear-relevance, F(1, 35) = 
2.26, p = .142, η²p = .06; all other F’s < 1. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, we again obtained acquisition and extinction of fearful 
CRs on the basis of verbal instructions on all collected measures. A reinstatement 
manipulation only generated a trend for increased fear ratings for all CSs, but did 
not generate effects for US expectancy and SCRs. Furthermore, in line with the 
results of Raes et al. (2014), we observed additional effects of previous CS-US 
pairings for both fear ratings and US expectancy ratings in the test phase, while 
such an effect was not significant for SCRs. 
Regarding our main research question, however, no evidence was obtained 
for the hypothesis that selective learning effects are especially pronounced for 
the fear-relevant CS+ that had actually been paired with the US as compared to 
the fear-relevant CS+ that was merely involved in verbal instructions. On the 
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contrary, during the practice phase, conditioning effects were especially 
pronounced for the fear-relevant verbally conditioned CS+. Specifically, 
conditioning effects for the fear-relevant CS+2 were stronger than those for the 
fear-irrelevant CS+2 on US expectancy ratings during the practice phase and for 
fear ratings and SCRs at the time of the reinstatement manipulation. 
BAYESIAN ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT 1 AND 2 
We performed Bayesian analyses to complement the traditional analyses 
of Experiment 1 and 2. There are a number of advantages of using Bayesian 
statistics over classical null hypothesis significance testing, which we will not all 
reiterate here (arguments for using Bayesian analyses can be found in, Dienes, 
2011, and Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). With regard to our 
own research questions, performing Bayesian analyses allowed us to (a) evaluate 
to what extent non-significant effects actually provided evidence for the null 
hypothesis (i.e., the absence of preparedness effects) (Dienes, 2014); and (b) 
interpret the evidence for preparedness effects from the different tests we have 
conducted, without being confronted with the multiple testing problem (Dienes, 
2011). 
The primary tool for statistical inference in a Bayesian framework is the 
Bayes Factor (BF). The BF expresses the likelihood of the alternative hypothesis 
relative to the null hypothesis. For instance, a BF of 2 would indicate that the 
likelihood of the alternative hypothesis being true based on the data is two times 
larger than the null hypothesis being true. In line with Jeffreys (1961; see also: 
Andraszewicz et al., 2015), we consider BFs larger than 3 (moderate evidence) or 
larger than 10 (strong evidence) as providing evidence for the alternative 
hypothesis. Likewise, BFs smaller than 0.33 (moderate evidence) or smaller than 
0.10 (strong evidence) were considered as evidence for the null hypothesis. BFs 
between three and 0.33 are considered to provide only anecdotal evidence for 
either the null or alternative hypothesis. BFs for our different tests of 
preparedness in the two experiments were calculated using Bayesian repeated 
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measures (with default priors; see: Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012) 
in JASP (version 6.0; Love et al., 2014) and are summarized in Tables 1 to 3. 
As can be seen in Tables 1 to 3, most tests of preparedness in both 
experiments provided moderate (BF < 0.33) to strong (BF < 0.1) evidence for an 
absence of a preparedness effect. However, in a few instances, the overall test 
for preparedness effects was inconclusive (i.e., a BF > 0.33 and < 3). Specifically, 
this was the case for the interaction between fear-relevance and CS in the 
practice phase for US expectancy ratings and the interactions between fear-
relevance and CS in the test phase and at the time of the reinstatement 
manipulation for fear ratings (see Tables 1 and 3). When these interactions were 
analyzed further using Bayesian paired samples t-test (Cauchy prior width = 
0.707), evidence for preparedness effects (i.e., larger differential conditioning for 
the fear-relevant CS+ than for the fear-irrelevant CS+) were obtained for CS+2. 
That is, moderate evidence for preparedness effects for the fear-relevant CS+2 
was obtained on US expectancy ratings in the practice phase (BF = 4.89) and on 
fear ratings in the test phase (BF = 3.11). At the time of the reinstatement 
manipulation, there was anecdotal evidence for larger differential fear ratings for 
the fear-relevant CS+2 (BF = 2.13). In contrast, corresponding tests for the CS+1s 
resulted in moderate evidence for an absence of preparedness effects (BFs < 0.3; 
see also Figure 2). 
Taken together, these results demonstrate that our data provided 
moderate to strong evidence for an absence of most of the potential 
preparedness effects in our experiments. However, in cases of uncertainty with 
regard to the presence of preparedness effects, our data favored the conclusion 
that preparedness effects were present for the fear-relevant CS+2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PREPARED LEARNING  111 
Table 1. F-values, p-values and BF’s for the different tests for preparedness 
effects for US expectancy ratings. 
 F-value p-value BF 
Experiment 1 
Extinction phase 
Fear-relevance*CS 
Fear-relevance*CS*Trial 
Reinstatement 
Fear-relevance*CS*Time 
Experiment 2 
Practice phase 
Fear-relevance*CS 
Fear-relevance*CS*Trial 
Test phase 
Fear-relevance*CS 
Fear-relevance*CS*Trial 
Reinstatement 
Fear-relevance*CS 
Fear-relevance*CS*Time 
 
 
F(1, 28) = 1.93 
F(3.58, 100.17) = 1.91 
 
F(1, 28) = 2.03 
 
 
F(1.69, 59.05) = 6.74 
F(3.29, 115.02) = 1.70 
 
F(1.65, 57.68) = 1.95 
F < 1 
 
F(2, 70) = 1.20 
F(2, 70) = 1.23 
 
 
.176 
.122 
 
.165 
 
 
.004 
.167 
 
.159 
.821 
 
.308 
.300 
 
 
0.032 
< 0.001 
 
0.023 
 
 
0.509 
< 0.001 
 
0.082 
< 0.001 
 
0.033 
< 0.001 
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Table 2. F-values, p-values and BF’s for the different tests for preparedness 
effects for SCRs. 
 F-value p-value BF 
Experiment 1 
Extinction phase 
Fear-relevance*CS 
Fear-relevance*CS*Trial 
Reinstatement  
Fear-relevance*CS*Time 
Experiment 2 
Practice phase 
Fear-relevance*CS 
Fear-relevance*CS*Trial 
Test phase 
Fear-relevance*CS 
Fear-relevance*CS*Trial 
Reinstatement 
Fear-relevance*CS 
Fear-relevance*CS*Time 
 
 
F < 1 
F < 1 
 
F < 1 
 
 
F(2, 70) = 1.02 
F < 1 
 
F < 1 
F(4, 140) = 1.34 
 
F(2, 70) = 3.73 
F < 1 
 
 
.867 
.815 
 
.942 
 
 
.368 
.868 
 
.592 
.257 
 
.029 
.954 
 
 
0.021 
< 0.001 
 
0.008 
 
 
0.107 
< 0.001 
 
0.010 
< 0.001 
 
0.041 
< 0.001 
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Table 3. F-values, p-values and BF’s for the different tests for preparedness 
effects for fear ratings. Note that fear ratings were only collected in Experiment 
2. 
 F-value p-value BF 
Practice phase 
Fear-relevance*CS 
Fear-relevance*CS*Trial 
Test phase 
Fear-relevance*CS 
Fear-relevance*CS*Trial 
Reinstatement 
Fear-relevance*CS 
Fear-relevance*CS*Time 
 
F < 1 
F(3.20, 112.06) = 1.42  
 
F(1.64, 57.46) = 2.31 
F < 1 
 
F(1.76, 61.61) = 3.03 
F < 1 
 
.683 
.238 
 
.118 
.872 
 
.062 
.962 
 
0.091 
< 0.001 
 
0.350 
0.002 
 
0.384 
< 0.001 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Two experiments were conducted to assess whether selective learning 
effects can be obtained when conditioning is established via verbal instructions. 
In the first experiment, participants were verbally instructed about the 
contingency between fear-relevant and fear-irrelevant CSs and an electrical 
stimulus. In the second experiment, we additionally manipulated whether the 
contingency described in the instructions was actually experienced by the 
participants, using a design developed by Raes et al. (2014). This allowed us to 
test whether selective learning depends on actual experience of the fear-
relevant CS-US pairing. As a secondary aim, we also examined reinstatement of 
fear induced by verbal instructions. Below we will first summarize and discuss 
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the findings related to selective learning. Afterwards, we focus on the 
reinstatement results. 
In both experiments, participants reacted more fearfully towards 
instructed CS+s than to CS-s. These fearful reactions tended to extinguish 
throughout the test phase. These results replicate the well-known finding that 
fear conditioning can be observed on the basis of verbal instructions (Cook & 
Harris, 1937; Grings, 1973; Lovibond, 2003). However, the extinction of fear 
reactions was not modulated by the fear-relevance of the CSs in either 
experiment. Hence, we did not find evidence for resistance to extinction when 
learning took place via verbal instructions, even when participants had 
experienced the instructed CS-US pairings in Experiment 2. This result is in 
contrast with those from Hugdahl (1978), who did find strong resistance to 
extinction for fear-relevant CS+s on the basis of verbal instructions, but is 
reminiscent of the results of several subsequent studies that failed to replicate 
this effect (see: Lovibond, 2004; McNally, 1981; 1987). 
In Experiment 2, however, stronger acquisition effects were observed for 
fear-relevant verbally conditioned CSs compared to fear-irrelevant verbally 
conditioned CSs. This result can be regarded as an instance of selective learning 
(i.e., stronger acquisition) and is in line with the results of the only relevant study 
(i.e., Hugdahl & Öhman,  1977). Specifically, this effect was observed during the 
practice phase for US expectancy ratings and at the time of the reinstatement US 
for fear ratings and SCRs. Surprisingly, this selective learning effect was 
specifically observed for the CS that was merely instructed to be contingent with 
the US (CS+2), but not for the CS that was instructed and actually paired with the 
US (CS+1). Our Bayesian analyses confirmed that there was substantial evidence 
for this preparedness effect on the US expectancy ratings and fear ratings for the 
CS+2s. Conversely, there was substantial evidence for an absence of 
preparedness effects on all different measures of conditioned fear for the CS+1s. 
Hence, some aspects of our results suggest that selective learning effects 
can be obtained when conditioning is established on the basis of verbal 
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instructions. Furthermore, our results provide no indication that actual CS-US 
pairings strengthen selective learning effects. On the contrary, we obtained 
selective learning effects specifically for the CS that was not actually paired with 
the US in Experiment 2.  
These results do not fit well with the proposal that an evolved fear learning 
module explains selective learning effects (Mineka & Öhman, 2002; Öhman & 
Mineka, 2001). As mentioned before, this module is thought to be specifically 
and automatically activated by fear-relevant stimuli and to be encapsulated from 
conscious cognitive control. Based on this model, we would predict that selective 
learning would not be observed when conditioning is established through verbal 
instructions, unless the CSs are actually paired with the US (Olsson & Phelps, 
2004, 2007). However, we obtained the opposite pattern of results in Experiment 
2: selective learning was observed on the basis of verbal instructed conditioning 
and only for the CSs that were not paired with the US. Furthermore, if prepared 
learning is due to affective learning, prepared learning effects should have been 
particularly pronounced on measures that are thought to be particularly 
sensitive to capture this type of learning (i.e., fear ratings; Mertens et al., 2015; 
Soeter & Kindt, 2012). This was not the case in our results. If anything, according 
to our Bayesian analyses, preparedness effects seemed to be especially 
pronounced on US expectancy ratings, which is considered to be a cognitive 
measure of learning (e.g., Kindt, Soeter, & Vervliet, 2009). 
We believe that our results fit better with the expectancy bias model of 
Davey (Davey, 1992; Honeybourne, Matchett, & Davey, 1993). According to this 
model, fear-relevant CSs are accompanied by a bias to expect aversive events 
before any conditioning has taken place. This bias rapidly disappears when the 
fear-relevant CSs are not reinforced but is maintained when fear-relevant CSs are 
reinforced, resulting in an expectancy bias specifically for the fear-relevant CS+. 
This bias is translated into stronger conditioned reactions on other measures, 
such as SCRs (Davey, 1992; Lovibond, Siddle, & Bond, 1993). In our Experiment 2, 
selective learning effects were obtained on US expectancy ratings, replicating the 
US expectancy bias effect of Davey (1992) and Lovibond et al. (1993). Arguably, 
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the no-reinforcement instructions rapidly abolished the expectancy bias for the 
fear-relevant CS- whereas the threat instructions retained the expectancy bias 
for the fear-relevant CS+2, resulting in a selective learning effect on US 
expectancy ratings. However, in our experiment, the US expectancy bias is not 
accompanied by selective learning effects on other measures during the practice 
phase. Only later in the experiment, at the time of the reinstatement shock, are 
selective learning effects obtained for SCRs and fear ratings (but not US 
expectancy, see Figure 2). These inconsistencies between US expectancy ratings 
and other measures do not fit with the expectancy bias model of Davey (1992) 
and may be accounted for by subtle differences in the measures. However, taken 
together, selective learning effects are most pronounced on US expectancy 
ratings, and therefore we believe that our data are best accounted for by the 
model of Davey (1992). 
It is still not clear, however, why selective learning effects are obtained for 
the fear-relevant CS+2, but not for the fear-relevant CS+1 or for the fear-relevant 
CS+ in Experiment 1. We propose that expectancy bias for fear-relevant 
threatened CSs is especially pronounced under conditions of uncertainty. While 
uncertain, there is opportunity for expectancy biases to shift conditioned 
responses. In our own experiment, there is most uncertainty for the CS+2s, as 
indicated by the US expectancy ratings for these CSs that are situated in the 
middle of the scale. For the CS+1s the training phase of Experiment 2 and for 
CS+s in Experiment 1, US expectancy ratings are at an extreme end of the scale. 
These differences in uncertainty might explain why we observe selective learning 
for CS+2s but not for CS+1s. Indeed, research on expectancy biases of anxious 
populations has shown that these biases are especially pronounced under 
conditions of uncertainty (Calvo & Dolores Castillo, 2001; Chan & Lovibond, 
1996; Ly & Roelofs, 2009). However, while there is some suggestive correlational 
evidence showing that the spatiotemporal uncertainty of aversive events (US) 
related to the CS makes this CS fearful (Harald Merckelbach, van den Hout, 
Jansen, & van der Molen, 1988), our suggestion that expectancy biases for fear-
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relevant CSs are especially pronounced under uncertainty remains to be 
explicitly tested (for instance by manipulating the CS-US contingency).  
Whereas our data are generally in correspondence with the expectancy 
bias model of Davey (1992), our experiments did not include a replication of the 
resistance to instructed extinction effect (Hugdahl & Öhman, 1977; Hugdahl, 
1978). This effect strongly favors the theory of a fear learning module because it 
shows that fear for fear-relevant CSs seems to be insensitive to cognitive 
interventions once it has been installed (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). Interestingly, 
Hugdahl (1978) and Öhman and Hugdahl (1977) show that verbal threat 
instructions can install prepared learning, but safety instructions do not disrupt 
this learning. Thus, the limitations of learning via verbal instructions may be 
primarily pronounced during safety (i.e., extinction) learning (see also: Luck & 
Lipp, 2015 and Sevenster et al., 2012 for related results). However, as mentioned 
previously, this effect has proven difficult to reproduce in subsequent 
experiment (see: Lovibond, 2004; McNally, 1981; 1987). It would certainly be 
worthwhile for future studies to further explore this intriguing finding. This could 
help us to pinpoint the conditions under which the effect occurs and, in doing so, 
map the possible limitations of learning through instructions. Furthermore, we 
want to stress that the systematic inclusion of expectancy ratings in these studies 
is necessary to evaluate whether these effects could be explained by expectancy 
biases, or are independent of higher-order cognitions as proposed by Öhman and 
Mineka (2001). 
Finally, we turn to the issue of reinstatement. We observe a selective 
return of US expectancy ratings and SCRs to the CS+s in the first experiment, and 
marginally increased fear ratings for all CSs in the second experiment after the 
reinstatement US. This is the first study, to our knowledge, to demonstrate 
differential reinstatement on US expectancy ratings and SCRs when conditioning 
was established on the basis of verbal instructions (Haaker et al., 2014). This is an 
interesting finding because it suggests that similar mechanisms of return of fear 
may exist for fear acquired through verbal instructions and fear acquired through 
direct CS-US pairings (see also: Mertens et al., 2015). Unfortunately, due to the 
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absence of (strong) preparedness effects in our experiments, it is difficult to 
evaluate the (lack of) impact of fear-relevance on the return of fear through 
reinstatement. As we noted in the final paragraph of the introduction, stronger 
acquisition and/or less extinction for fear-relevant CSs are probably necessary 
conditions to observe an effect of fear-relevance on subsequent reinstatement 
of fear. Hence, the fact that reinstatement effects in our studies were similar for 
fear-relevant and fear-irrelevant CSs could simply be due to the limited effect of 
fear-relevance on acquisition and extinction. It would certainly be interesting for 
future studies to further investigate the impact of fear-relevance on the return of 
fear through reinstatement or other manipulations in situations where there are 
strong preparedness effects in the preceding acquisition or extinction phase. 
In summary, our data suggests that selective learning can be obtained 
when conditioning is established through verbal instructions, without requiring 
direct CS-US pairings. Our results further suggest that these selective learning 
effects are due to US expectancy biases for fear-relevant CSs, which are 
proposed to be especially pronounced under conditions of uncertainty. Finally, 
our results revealed reinstatement of fear that was induced by verbal 
instructions, but reinstatement was not modulated by fear-relevance. 
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POTENTIATION OF THE STARTLE REFLEX IS IN LINE 
WITH CONTINGENCY REVERSAL INSTRUCTIONS 
RATHER THAN THE CONDITIONING HISTORY
1 
In the context of fear conditioning, different psychophysiological measures 
have been related to different learning processes. Specifically, skin conductance 
responses (SCRs) have been related to cognitive expectancy learning, while fear 
potentiated startle (FPS) has been proposed to reflect affective learning that 
operates according to simple associative learning principles. On the basis of this 
two level account of fear conditioning we predicted that FPS should be less 
affected  by verbal instructions and more affected by direct experience than SCRs. 
We tested this hypothesis by informing participants that contingencies would be 
reversed after a differential conditioning phase. Our results indicate that 
contingency reversal instructions led to an immediate and complete reversal of 
FPS regardless of the previous conditioning history. This change was 
accompanied by similar changes on US expectancy ratings and SCRs. These 
results conform with an expectancy model of fear conditioning but argue against 
a two level account of fear conditioning. 
                                                     
1Based on Mertens, G., & De Houwer, J. (2016). Potentiation of the startle 
reflex is in line with contingency reversal instructions rather than the 
conditioning history. Biological Psychology, 113, 91-99. 
doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2015.11.014 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fear conditioning is an adaptive process through which organisms learn to 
fear and avoid a conditioned stimulus (CS) that has been paired with an aversive 
event (unconditioned stimulus, US). This is usually modeled in the lab by pairing 
neutral stimuli (lights, geometric shapes) with an unpleasant but harmless 
electric stimulus. For humans, fear conditioning is often believed to be mediated 
by the generation of cognitive expectancies about the occurrence of the US in 
the presence of the CS (e.g., Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2009; 
Reiss, 1980). However, according to the two level account of human fear 
conditioning (e.g., Hamm & Weike, 2005; Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Sevenster, 
Beckers, & Kindt, 2012a), this cognitive contingency learning between the CS and 
the US is supplemented with affective learning. Affective learning is proposed to 
be a highly automatic process, taking place independent of cognitive contingency 
learning (Baeyens, Eelen, & Crombez, 1995; Hamm & Weike, 2005; Mineka & 
Öhman, 2002; Öhman & Mineka, 2001) and mediated by a specifically dedicated 
neural system centered on the amygdala (Mineka & Öhman, 2002; Öhman & 
Mineka, 2001). 
These two forms of learning have been mapped onto different 
physiological responses (Hamm & Weike, 2005). Conditioned skin conductance 
responses (SCRs) are usually considered to reflect cognitive contingency learning 
about the occurrence of the aversive US in the presence of the CS (e.g., Dawson 
& Furedy, 1976; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). This hypothesis is supported by 
studies showing that conditioning of the SCRs only occurs when participants are 
aware of the CS-US contingencies (e.g., Dawson, 1970; Dawson & Furedy, 1976; 
Sevenster et al., 2014; Singh et al., 2013) and that conditioned SCRs are very 
sensitive to verbal instructions (Hugdahl, 1978; Luck & Lipp, 2015b; Sevenster et 
al., 2012a). Conditioned potentiation of the startle reflex (or fear potentiated 
startle, FPS), on the other hand, is believed to primarily reflect affective learning. 
Evidence for this idea was provided by studies suggesting that conditioning of 
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the startle reflex does not require awareness of the CS-US contingency (Hamm & 
Weike, 2005; Hamm & Vaitl, 1996; Sevenster et al., 2014) and that FPS is less 
sensitive to verbal instructions (Dawson, Rissling, Schell, & Wilcox, 2007; 
Sevenster et al., 2012). Furthermore, in a number of recent 
psychopharmacological studies, FPS was abolished by the administration of 
propranolol during a reconsolidation period while leaving expectancy of the US 
and SCRs intact, demonstrating a strong dissociation between FPS and cognitive 
measures of conditioned fear (Kindt, Soeter, & Vervliet, 2009; Soeter & Kindt, 
2010). However, the evidence is not unequivocal. For instance, in a number of 
other studies, conditioning of the startle reflex was obtained only for participants 
who became aware of the CS-US contingencies (Dawson, Rissling, et al., 2007; 
Grillon, 2002; Jovanovic et al., 2006; Purkis & Lipp, 2001).  
In the current study, we tested a different prediction that follows from the 
proposal that FPS reflect automatic affective learning. That is, if FPS primarily 
reflects simple associative learning, it should primarily be a function of the past 
stimulus pairings (i.e., conditioning history; Lipp & Purkis, 2005) and should be 
relatively insensitive to verbal instructions about future stimulus pairings 
(Mineka & Öhman, 2002; Sevenster et al., 2012a). To test this hypothesis, we 
made use of the contingency reversal procedure (Grings, Schell, & Carey, 1973; 
McNally, 1981; Wilson, 1968). In this procedure, participants are informed after a 
differential conditioning phase that the contingencies of the first phase will be 
reversed in a second phase. Consequently, in this second phase, cognitive 
contingency information as provided by the verbal instructions is directly 
opposed to what has been learned through CS-US pairings in the first phase. If 
learning is a function of experienced stimulus pairings, conditioned responses in 
the second phase should be in line with the conditioning history of the first 
phase. However, if learning is the result of cognitive beliefs regarding the CS-US 
contingency, conditioned responses should be in line with the verbal 
instructions, regardless of the conditioning history. In previous studies employing 
this procedure with SCRs as the measure of conditioning (Grings et al., 1973; 
McNally, 1981; Wilson, 1968), conditioning in the second phase of the 
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experiment was in line with the verbal instructions and no evidence for effects of 
past stimulus pairings was obtained. 
In a recent study by Costa, Bradley, and Lang (2015), fear was installed in a 
first phase by providing threat information to participants. In a second phase, 
one of the threatened CSs was instructed to be safe, while the other threatened 
CS remained a threatening stimulus. Similarly, for the initially safe CSs, one of 
these was threatened, while the other CS remained safe. This adapted reversal 
procedure allowed them to compare reversed and non-reversed CSs after the 
reversal instructions and thus controlled for time-related changes (e.g., 
habituation, sensitization) that could explain the reversal effect. Costa et al. 
(2015) found that fear reactions, including FPS, completely reversed on the basis 
of verbal contingency instructions, which demonstrates that FPS is very sensitive 
to cognitive information (see also: Grillon, Ameli, Woods, Merikangas, & Davis, 
1991). However, conditioned responses in their study were  instantiated only via 
verbal threat instructions and not by direct conditioning. Therefore, pairings of 
the CS in close proximity to the US were absent in the study of Costa et al. 
(2015), possibly excluding simple associative learning as the result of actual 
stimulus pairings (Blair, Schafe, Bauer, Rodrigues, & LeDoux, 2001). Hence, it is 
possible that affective learning did not take place in the study of Costa et al. 
(2015) due to the absence of CS-US pairings (see also: Olsson & Phelps, 2007, 
2004). Therefore, in the current study, we set out to investigate whether FPS to a 
threatened CS can be reversed on the basis of verbal instructions, even when this 
CS has actually been paired with the US. Furthermore, we included threatened, 
but not actually conditioned CSs in our experiment to conceptually replicate the 
results of Costa et al. (2015) and to compare reversal on these CSs to reversal of 
threatened CSs that have been actually paired with the US. In line with the 
hypothesis that FPS reflects affective learning, we predicted that reversal of 
conditioned responses would be less pronounced for FPS than for SCR and 
ratings of US expectancy when threat instructions are combined with direct CS-
US pairings.  
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METHOD 
Participants 
Thirty-six right-handed students (11 men, 25 women) at Ghent University 
participated in the experiment in exchange for €8. Age ranged between 18 and 
32 years (M = 21.44, SD = 2.66). Psychophysiological data from one participant 
was lost due to a recording error. All participants completed an informed 
consent form and were instructed that they could discontinue the experiment at 
any point without any negative consequences. This study was approved by the 
ethics committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent 
University. 
Materials 
Conditioned Stimuli 
CSs were six white geometric shapes (circle, square, triangle, pentagon, 
trapezium and diamond) with a maximal radius, longitude and/or latitude of 300 
pixels presented in the middle of a 17 inch Dell computer screen (resolution: 
1024 by 768 pixels) with a black background. Assignment of these shapes to the 
different CS types (see Table 1) was randomized over participants.  
Table 1. Overview of the Different CS Types. 
CS Relationship with the US Contingency reversal? 
CS+T/P Threatened + paired No 
R-CS+T/P Threatened + paired Yes 
CS+T Threatened No 
R-CS+T Threatened Yes 
CS- Safe No 
R-CS- Safe Yes 
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Unconditioned Stimulus 
The US was an electric stimulus that consisted of 10 rectangular pulses of 2 
ms with and inter pulse interval of 8 ms, creating an electric stimulus of 100 ms. 
This stimulus was administered by two lubricated Fukuda standard Ag/AgCl 
electrodes (1-cm diameter; inter-electrode distance: ~2-cm) to the left leg over 
the retromalleolar course of the sural nerve. The stimulus was generated by a 
constant current stimulator (DS7A, Digitimer, Hertfordshire, UK). The intensity of 
the electric stimulus was determined for each participant individually to be 
unpleasant but not painful using a stepwise work-up procedure (see the 
Procedure section for details concerning this work-up procedure). 
Psychophysiology 
Skin Conductance Responses (SCRs) 
SCRs were collected using a Coulbourn V71-23 skin conductance coupler 
(Coulbourn Instruments, Allentown, PA) and disposable Ag/AgCl electrodes (3M 
Red Dot 2259-50, 17 mm diameter)  attached to the thenar and hypothenar 
eminences of the non-dominant hand. The signal was measured using a constant 
voltage coupler (0.5 V) and digitized at 10 Hz. The collected data were smoothed 
and further analyzed offline with Psychophysiological Analysis (PSPHA) (De 
Clercq, Verschuere, De Vlieger, & Crombez, 2006). SCRs were calculated by 
subtracting the mean value of a baseline period (2 seconds before CS onset) from 
the highest amplitude within a 1 to 7 seconds interval after CS onset (Milad, Orr, 
Pitman, & Rauch, 2005; Pineles, Orr, & Orr, 2009; Raes, De Houwer, De Schryver, 
Brass, & Kalisch, 2014; Soeter & Kindt, 2012). In this scoring method, negative 
values and values smaller than 0.02µS were recoded to zero. Finally, collected 
SCRs were range corrected with the highest recorded amplitude for that 
participant to account for individual differences in responsivity (Lykken & 
Venables, 1971) and square root transformed to normalize the data (Dawson, 
Schell, Filion, & Berntson, 2007). 
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Fear Potentiated Startle (FPS) 
FPS was measured using two miniature Ag/AgCl electrodes (0.5 cm 
diameter) filled with conductive gel. One electrode was placed just below the 
pupil of the left eye and the other electrode was placed approximately 1 cm 
laterally. A ground electrode was placed in the middle of the forehead 
(Blumenthal et al., 2005). Electrode sites were first gently cleaned with scrub gel 
and water. The raw electromyographic signal was amplified 50,000 times, 
filtered online (band pass: 13 – 1000 Hz) and digitally stored at 1000 Hz using a 
Coulbourn V75-01 bioamplifier (Coulbourn Instruments, Allentown, PA). The 
acquired data were rectified and smoothed in the area of interest (0 – 150 ms 
after probe onset) with a FIR filter (Nitschke, Miller, & Cook, 1998) using PSPHA. 
The startle probe was a 50 ms white noise burst (104 dB) generated using a V85-
05C Coulbourn audio module and administered via Sennheiser headphones. 
The acquired signal was scored semi-automatically using PSPHA by 
subtracting the mean baseline value (0 - 20 ms after probe onset) from the peak 
value in the 21 - 150 ms window after probe onset. All startle responses were 
visually inspected and scored as missing values if a voluntary blink occurred just 
before, during or after probe onset, or if there were any other artifacts obscuring 
the startle response. On average, 4.25% of the trials were scored as missing for 
each participant (SD = 3.38; Range = 0% – 11.11%). The scores were 
subsequently T-transformed to control for inter-individual differences in 
responsivity. 
US expectancy ratings  
US expectancy ratings were collected on each trial using a 9-point Likert 
scale presented below the CSs with 5 anchor points: 1 = “not at all”, 3 = 
“probably not”, 5 = “uncertain”, 7 = “to some extent”, 9 = “certainly”. Above the 
CSs, the question “To what extent do you expect the electric stimulus?” was 
presented. Participants indicated their answer by clicking one of the response 
options of the Likert scale with the computer mouse using their dominant hand. 
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Questionnaire 
The trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983; Dutch translation: van der Ploeg, 
Defares, & Spielberger, 2000) was used to determine the general anxiety level of 
the participants. 
Procedure 
Work-up procedure 
After filling in the informed consent form and the STAI-T questionnaire 
(Spielberger et al., 1983; van der Ploeg et al., 2000), participants first went 
through a work-up procedure to determine the  intensity level of the electric 
stimulus. During this procedure, participants were exposed to gradually 
increasing stimulus intensity levels and were asked to report on their experience. 
Specifically, participants were asked after each intensity level to verbally rate the 
electric stimulus on a painfulness scale ranging from zero (not painful at all) to 
ten (maximally tolerable pain). A minimal painfulness threshold for the electric 
stimulus was set at seven. The procedure was stopped when participants 
indicated that they felt uncomfortable experiencing higher intensities of the 
electric stimulus. If a participant gave a rating of less than seven and indicated 
that he or she did not want to experience a more intense electric stimulus, the 
work-up was also stopped and the stimulus with the highest tolerated intensity 
was selected1.  The final selected electric stimulus intensity levels ranged 
between 1.6 and 14 mA (M = 5.00, SD = 2.62) and pain ratings ranged between 6 
and 9.5 (M = 7.88, SD = 0.81). After the work-up procedure, psychophysiology 
recording electrodes were applied as described above. Finally, headphones for 
the startle probe administration were put on. Participants were verbally 
informed that these headphones served to present loud but harmless noises to 
them throughout the experiment.  
                                                     
1
 The results remained similar when the data of four participants who did not reach the 
painfulness threshold were excluded. 
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Contingency instructions and memory test 
After the work-up procedure, further instructions regarding the 
experiment were provided on the computer screen in the absence of the 
experimenter. Participants were asked to read the instructions carefully. The 
instructions started with an overview of the different geometric shapes together 
with the names of these shapes to make sure participants would understand the 
instructions regarding these shapes. Next, participants were told that some of 
the shapes would be followed by the electric stimulus and that their task was to 
indicate to what extent they expect that stimulus after the shape by clicking one 
of the options on the scale below the shape. Additionally, participants were told 
that even CSs that could be followed by an electric stimulus would often not be 
followed by an electric stimulus. This instruction was added to keep the 
instructions about CS-US relations credible for the instructed CS+s that were 
never actually paired with a US (see Table 1; see the supplementary materials for 
a translation of the instructions in the experiment).  
Next, participants were instructed about which four geometrical shapes 
would be predictive of the electric stimulus and which other two shapes would 
not be followed by the electric stimulus. Participants were told to remember 
these instructions well because they would afterwards be tested to ascertain 
that they had memorized the instructions. During this test, participants were 
shown all the different geometrical shapes twice in a random order. They were 
asked to indicate for each shape whether it could be followed by the electric 
stimulus by clicking one of three response buttons projected on the computer 
screen below the shapes (yes, no, uncertain). There was no response deadline 
during the test. After responding, participants received feedback for 400 ms 
indicating whether they were correct. If they made an error on one of the twelve 
trials or indicated that they were unsure about the correct response, they 
received the contingency instructions again and had to redo the test, until they 
passed it (average number of memory tests until pass = 1.31, SD = 0.58, Range = 
1-3).  
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Conditioning phase 
Following the contingency instructions, participants continued to the first 
phase of the experiment. This phase started with six startle probe habituation 
trials (ITI: 7 s). After these habituation trials, all six different CSs were presented 
six times (36 trials total). CSs were presented on the screen for eight seconds and 
were preceded by a fixation cross presented for one second. Startle probes were 
administered on each trial seven seconds after CS onset (Sevenster et al., 2012a). 
The ITI was 13, 15 or 17 seconds, randomly selected. Trial order was randomized 
in small blocks containing two presentations of each CS (limiting the number of 
consecutive identical trials to maximally four). Two of the four CSs that had been 
instructed to be contingent with the electric stimulus were followed by the 
stimulus immediately at offset on three trials (50% reinforcement rate; 
CS+T/P’s). The other two threatened shapes were never reinforced (CS+T’s, see 
Table 1). The reinforcement rate of the CS+T/P’s was chosen to be 50% because 
this is low enough to maintain the credibility of the threat instructions for the 
threatened but not paired CS+T’s, but also high enough to allow for a sufficient 
number of CS-US pairings for the CS+T/P’s. Reinforcement of the CS+T/P’s with 
the US was distributed equally over the course of the conditioning phase (one 
reinforcement on the first or the second trial, the third or the fourth trial and the 
fifth or the sixth trial, randomly determined). SCRs, FPS and US expectancy 
ratings were collected on every trial as described above. 
Reversal instructions and memory test 
Following the conditioning phase, participants received new instructions 
that informed them that in the next phase of the experiment, other shapes 
would predict the electric stimulus. Three shapes were instructed to be 
predictive of the electric stimulus during this second phase, of which one was 
previously reinforced (CS+T/P), one was previously threatened (CS+T) and one 
was previously safe (R-CS-; see Table 1). Furthermore, three shapes were 
instructed to not be followed by electric stimulus during the second phase, of 
which one was previously paired with the stimulus (R-CS+T/P), one was 
previously threatened (R-CS+T) and one was previously safe (CS-; see Table 1). As 
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for the previous contingency instructions, participants again had to complete a 
short test to make sure that they remembered these new instructions. The 
procedure of this memory test was the same as for the previous test. 
Participants could again continue to the next part of the experiment only if they 
completed the test without making errors (average number of memory tests until 
pass = 1.39, SD = 0.64, Range = 1-3). 
Reversal phase and believability rating 
The procedure of the reversal phase was identical to the procedure of the 
conditioning phase except that none of the CSs were reinforced during this 
phase. The reversal phase was followed by a final question that asked 
participants to indicate to what extent they found the instructions of the 
experiment believable at the moment they received them. They could select one 
option of a dropdown list: “not believable”, “not very believable”, “believable” 
and “very believable”. 
Data analysis 
In order to present the data of this relatively complex experiment in a 
concise and clear way, we averaged our collected measures for each of the CSs 
over trials within the two phases, thus ignoring the factor trial. Exclusion of this 
factor did not alter our conclusions because the results for the different CSs were 
consistent over trials. Results and graphs including the factor trial are provided in 
the supplementary materials. The averaged data were first analyzed with the 
within-subject factors CS (CS+T/P, CS+T, CS-), reversal (yes, no) and phase 
(conditioning, reversal). The crucial effect in this analysis is, for our purposes, the 
three-way interaction which indicates whether reversal instructions resulted in a 
reduction of conditioned fear for the reversed relative to the consistent CS+T/P 
and CS+T in the reversal phase, but an increase in conditioned fear for the 
reversed relative to the consistent CS-.  Furthermore, results from the reversal 
phase were analyzed separately employing omnibus ANOVAs. Specifically, in a 
first ANOVA we compared the three CSs that, according to the instructions for 
the second phase, could be followed by the US (i.e., CS+T/P, CS+T, R-CS-; see 
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Table 1). If the prior conditioning history carried over to the reversal phase, 
conditioned fear reactions in this phase to the CS+T/P should be higher than to 
the R-CS- and CS+T. A similar ANOVA was carried out to compare the different 
CSs that, according to the instructions for the second phase, would not be 
followed by a US (CS-, R-CS+T/P, R-CS+T; see Table 1). Again, if the conditioning 
history of the conditioning phase carried over to the reversal phase, conditioned 
fear reactions to the R-CS+T/P should be higher than to the R-CS+T and the CS-. 
Degrees of freedom of these ANOVAs were corrected with Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrections when the sphericity assumption was violated. Finally, we calculated 
Bayes Factors (BF) using JASP (version 0.6; Love et al., 2015) for our different 
ANOVAs to complement the results of these traditional analyses. As discussed 
extensively elsewhere, there are several important limitations to classical null 
hypothesis significance testing (NHST) (e.g., Wagenmakers, 2007). A problem 
that is of particular relevance for our own research question is that a non-
significant result in NHST does not provide evidence for the null hypothesis (and 
hence, does not provide evidence for the absence of an effect). Thus, the 
absence of a significant effect in the traditional ANOVAs does not inform us 
whether there was a genuine absence of an effect of the prior conditioning 
phase or of verbal instructions, or whether our data was inconclusive in this 
regard. However, Bayesian hypothesis testing does allow to quantify the 
evidence in favor of the null hypothesis (reflected by the BF) and thus allows to 
evaluate whether effects were genuinely absent or whether our data was 
inconclusive (e.g., Dienes, 2014; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 
2009). In line with Jeffreys (1961; see also: Andraszewicz et al., 2015) we 
considered BFs between 1/3 and 1 as anecdotal evidence for the absence of an 
effect. BFs smaller than 1/3 or smaller than 1/10 were considered substantial 
and strong evidence, respectively, for the absence of an effect. Similarly, BFs 
between 1 and 3 were considered anecdotal evidence for the presence of an 
effect, while BFs greater than 3 or 10 were considered to be substantial and 
strong evidence for the presence of an effect, respectively. 
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RESULTS 
Believability of the instructions. 
Thirty-one of the participants indicated that the instructions in the 
experiment were believable or very believable. Three participants indicated that 
the instructions were not very believable. Ratings from two participants were 
missing. Overall, these results indicate that our instructions were considered 
believable by the participants. The results remained similar regardless of 
whether we included or excluded participants who indicated that the 
instructions were not very believable. Below, we report only the results for the 
full sample.  
US expectancy ratings. 
The crucial three-way interaction between CS, reversal and phase reached 
significance for the US expectancy ratings, F(1.27, 44.36) = 339.08, p < .001, η²p = 
.91. This interaction was driven by a significant increase in US expectancy ratings 
for the R-CS- from the conditioning phase to the reversal phase, while US 
expectancy ratings for the R-CS+T/P and R-CS+T decreased (see Figure 1, all t-
values > 18, p-values < .001, Cohen’s d’s > 3.8). US expectancy ratings for the 
consistent CS-, CS+T/P and CS+T did not differ significantly across the two phases 
(all t-values < 1, p-values > .3, Cohen’s d’s < 0.14; see Figure 1). Hence, US 
expectancy ratings were very sensitive to the contingency reversal instructions. 
The Bayesian analysis confirmed that this three-way interaction was a very 
robust result (BF = ~∞). 
The omnibus ANOVA comparing the CS-, the R-CS+T/P and the R-CS+T, did 
not reach significance, F(1.69, 59.17) = 2.06, p = .143, η²p = .06. This results 
suggests that there is little difference in US expectancy between a consistent CS- 
and a previously conditioned CS+ or threatened CS+ after contingency reversal 
instructions (see Figure 1). However, the result of the Bayesian analysis shows 
that there is only anecdotal evidence for an absence of a difference between 
these CSs (BF = .445). The omnibus ANOVA comparing CS+T/P, CS+T and R-CS- 
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did reach significance, F(1.73, 60.61) = 3.63, p = .039, η²p = .09. This overall effect 
was due to significantly higher US expectancy ratings for CS+T/P than for R-CS-, 
t(35) = 2.24, p = .031, Cohen’s d = 0.17, and CS+T, t(35) = 1.93, p = .062, Cohen’s d 
= 0.13 (see Figure 1). There was no significant difference between R-CS- and 
CS+T, t(35) < 1, p = .449, Cohen’s d = 0.04. Hence, this result demonstrates that 
US expectancy was slightly elevated for a consistent CS+ that was previously 
paired with the electric stimulus compared to a previously threatened CS+ or a 
reversed CS-. However, there is only anecdotal evidence for this effect according 
to the corresponding Bayesian analysis (BF = 1.49). 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean US expectancy rating for the different types of CSs in the two 
phases of the experiment. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
SCR 
The crucial interaction between CS, reversal and phase reached 
significance for SCRs as well, F(1.74, 59.20) = 5.29, p = .010, η²p = .10. SCRs were 
lower for all CSs in the reversal phase compared to the conditioning phase (t-
values > 1.9, p-values < .07, Cohen’s d’s > 0.39; see Figure 2), except for R-CS-, 
t(34) = -1.17, p = .250, Cohen’s d = -0.24. More importantly, SCRs were larger for 
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R-CS- than for CS- in the reversal phase, while SCRs for these two CSs were 
comparable in the conditioning phase (see Figure 2), interaction between 
reversal and phase for the two types of CS-‘s, F(1, 34) = 5.65, p = .023, η²p = .14.  
The reversed pattern was found for CS+T. That is, smaller SCRs were found for 
the R-CS+T compared to the CS+T in the reversal phase, again despite these two 
CSs being comparable in the conditioning phase (see Figure 2), interaction 
between reversal and phase for the CS+T’s: F(1, 34) = 4.50, p = .041, η²p = .12. 
However, there was no indication for an effect of verbal instructions on the 
CS+T/P’s, interaction between reversal and phase for CS+T/P’s, F(1, 34) < 1. That 
is, SCRs were comparable for CS+T/P and R-CS+T/P both in the reversal and 
conditioning phase (see Figure 2). These results demonstrate that our reversal 
instructions successfully induced larger SCRs for a reversed CS- and reduced SCRs 
for a reversed threatened CS+. Interestingly, however, our reversal instructions 
did not significantly influence conditioned SCRs to a threatened CS+ that has 
actually been paired with the US (i.e., CS+T/P). In fact, a Bayesian analysis 
showed that there was substantial evidence for an absence of an effect of verbal 
instructions on the CS+T/P’s (BF interaction reversal and phase = 0.254). 
Furthermore, the Bayesian analysis of the three-way interaction between CS, 
reversal and phase showed that there was only anecdotal evidence for an effect 
of verbal instructions on SCRs (BF= 2.527). 
The results from the reversal phase were again further explored using an 
ANOVA that compared responses to CS-, R-CS+T and R-CS+T/P. This ANOVA did 
not reveal a significant effect, F(2, 68) = 2.05, p = .136, η²p = .06, thus failing to 
provide evidence for transfer effects of the conditioning phase to the reversal 
phase for these CSs. The corresponding Bayesian analysis showed that there was 
only anecdotal evidence for an absence of difference between these CSs (BF = 
0.454). Likewise, the ANOVA comparing R-CS-, CS+T and CS+T/P did not reach 
significance, F(2, 68) = 1.17, p = .318, η²p = .03, thus also failing to provide 
evidence for transfer effects of the conditioning history to the verbally 
established CS+s in the reversal phase on SCRs. In fact, the corresponding 
Bayesian analysis showed that our data provided substantial evidence for an 
absence of transfer effects (BF = 0.221). 
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Figure 2. Mean range corrected and square root transformed SCRs (measured in 
µS) for the different types of CSs in the two phases of the experiment. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
FPS 
The crucial three-way interaction between CS, reversal and phase was 
significant for FPS as well, F(1.64, 55.91) = 13.35, p < .001, η²p = .28. As for SCRs, 
a general reduction of startle magnitude was observed in the reversal phase for 
all CSs (see Figure 3; t-values > 3.9, p-values < .001, Cohen’s d’s > 1.00) except for 
R-CS-, t(34) < 1, p = .925, Cohen’s d = 0.03. Importantly, reversal instructions 
resulted in larger FPS for R-CS- than for CS- in the reversal phase, while FPS was 
comparable for both these CSs in the conditioning phase (see Figure 3), 
interaction between phase and reversal for CS-‘s: F(1, 34) = 11.83, p = .002, η²p = 
.26. This pattern was reversed for the CS+T’s, with smaller FPS for R-CS+T than 
for CS+T in the reversal phase, even though FPS was comparable for these two 
CSs in the conditioning phase (see Figure 3), interaction between phase and 
reversal for CS+T’s: F(1, 34) = 11.86, p = .002, η²p = .26. A similar pattern was 
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obtained for CS+T/P and R-CS+T/P. That is, FPS was also smaller for R-CS+T/P 
than for CS+T/P in the reversal phase, while it was comparable for these two CSs 
in the conditioning phase (see Figure 3), interaction between phase and reversal 
for CS+T/P’s, F(1, 34) = 9.26, p = .004, η²p = .21. Combined, these results 
demonstrate that our verbal instructions were successful in influencing FPS both 
for previously safe and threatened CSs, including CSs that were actually followed 
by US. That is, reversal instructions resulted in an increase of FPS for the 
reversed CS- while it decreased FPS for a reversed threatened CS+, regardless of 
whether this CS+ was actually paired with the US. The Bayesian analysis 
confirmed the robustness of this effect of verbal instructions (BF three-way 
interaction CS, reversal and phase = 567 304). 
The ANOVAs comparing the different CS-‘s (CS-, R-CS+T/P, R-CS+T) and 
CS+’s (R-CS-, CS+T/P, CS+T) in the reversal phase did not reach significance, F-
values < 1. The corresponding BFs for these respective ANOVAs were 0.160 and 
0.111. Hence, our data provide substantial evidence for an absence of transfer 
effects of the previous conditioning history to the reversal phase for FPS. 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean T-transformed startle response (measured in µV) for the different 
types of CSs in the two phases of the experiment. Error bars represent standard 
errors. 
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DISCUSSION 
In the current study, we investigated whether verbal instructions can 
reverse conditioned fear responses. In the two level account of human fear 
conditioning (Hamm & Weike, 2005; Sevenster et al., 2012), FPS is considered to 
be a measure of automatic affective learning that operates according to simple 
associative learning principles whereas SCR is assumed to capture cognitive 
expectancies. We therefore predicted that the effect of reversal instructions on 
conditioned fear reactions would be less pronounced for FPS than for SCR, 
especially when CSs have been repeatedly paired with the US. Our results 
demonstrated that all measures of conditioned fear were sensitive to the 
contingency reversal instructions. Interestingly, we also obtained suggestive 
evidence for effects of CS-US pairings for US expectancy ratings and SCRs, but 
not FPS.  
FPS reactions in the second phase of the experiment were completely in 
line with the verbal instructions, and no evidence for effects of the prior CS-US 
pairings were obtained for FPS. These results extend the findings of Costa et al. 
(2015) by showing that reversal of FPS can take place even when threat 
instructions are combined with actual CS-US pairings. Hence, even though there 
was opportunity for simple associative learning to take place in the current study 
(Olsson & Phelps, 2004), verbal instructions still primarily determined FPS. This 
finding is even more striking in light of the significant impact of actual CS-US 
pairings on other measures that are typically considered to be more cognitive in 
nature (i.e., SCRs, US expectancy ratings). Hence, our results do not fit well with 
the two level account of fear conditioning that propose that FPS is a measure of 
automatic affective learning that operates according to the principles of simple 
associative learning (Blair et al., 2001; Lipp & Purkis, 2005) and that is 
independent from cognitive contingency learning as measured by SCRs and 
expectancy ratings (Hamm & Weike, 2005; Hamm & Vaitl, 1996; Sevenster et al., 
2012a). Rather, the results in the current study suggest that FPS is very sensitive 
to verbal instructions and is not influenced by previous CS-US pairings.  
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Less surprisingly, US expectancy ratings were also very sensitive to verbal 
reversal instructions as illustrated by an increase in US expectancy ratings for R-
CS- and a decrease for the R-CS+T/P and R-CS+T after the contingency reversal 
instructions (see Figure 1). Furthermore, also a small but reliable effect of the 
previous conditioning history was obtained for US expectancy ratings. That is, US 
expectancy ratings were slightly higher in the second phase for a threatened CS 
that was previously paired with the US (CS+T/P), compared to a threatened CS 
that was not previously paired with the US (CS+T) and a threatened CS that was 
previously safe (R-CS-). This latter result is in line with a prior study from our lab 
showing that US expectancy ratings were slightly elevated for a threatened CS 
when it was previously paired with the US (Mertens et al., 2015). However, the 
results of our Bayesian analysis showed that there was only anecdotal evidence 
for this effect in our data. Combined, these results show that participants 
adapted their expectancies about receiving an electric stimulus in accordance 
with the instructions, demonstrating that the instructions were clear. 
Interestingly, our data suggests that participants also took previous CS-US 
pairings into account when providing US expectancy ratings. 
Finally, results obtained for SCRs were also in line with the verbal 
instructions, except for the CSs that had been actually paired with the US 
(CS+T/P’s). For these latter CSs, SCRs were comparable in the second phase of 
the experiment, regardless of the reversal instructions (see Figure 2). However, 
results in the reversal phase for the CS+T/P’s were not completely in line with 
the prior conditioning history either. That is, SCRs to R-CS+T/P were not 
significantly higher than to CS- in the reversal phase. Hence, SCRs seem to have 
been influenced by two opposing influences, that is, instructions on the one hand 
and actual CS-US pairings on the other hand. This result is in contrast with 
previous studies employing the contingency reversal procedure that found that 
SCRs were completely in line with the reversal instructions (Grings et al., 1973; 
McNally, 1981; Wilson, 1968). One potential reason for this discrepancy between 
our own results and the results from these earlier studies is the inclusion of 
threatened, but not actually conditioned, CSs. The fact that participants noticed 
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that there were threatened and actually conditioned CS+s, as illustrated by the 
US expectancy ratings, may have prompted them to be more cautious about the 
instructions concerning the actually conditioned CS+s. However, this 
interpretation does not explain why we did not obtain a similar pattern for FPS. 
Alternatively, this result could suggest that SCRs reflect both simple associative 
learning and cognitive contingency learning. This interpretation is not in line with 
the findings of the studies outlined in the introduction, but does fit with the 
results of other studies that have found that SCRs can be dissociated under 
certain conditions from cognitive contingency learning (Bechara et al., 1995; 
McAndrew, Jones, McLaren, & McLaren, 2012). Regardless of the exact 
interpretation of the SCRs results, our results illustrate that SCRs were insensitive 
to verbal instructions when a CS had been paired with the USs, while such an 
effect was not observed for FPS. This finding demonstrates that the classification 
of FPS and SCRs as affective and cognitive measures of fear conditioning, 
respectively, does not correspond with our data.  
Our conclusion runs counter the results of a number of studies that we 
mentioned in the introduction. We will discuss these studies in more detail here. 
First, some studies have found that conditioning of the startle reflex can occur in 
the absence of CS-US contingency awareness while such unaware conditioning 
was not obtained for SCRs (Hamm & Weike, 2005; Hamm & Vaitl, 1996; 
Sevenster et al., 2014). However, as mentioned before, a number of other 
studies have found conditioning of the startle reflex only for participants that 
became aware of the CS-US contingencies (Dawson, Rissling, et al., 2007; Grillon, 
2002; Jovanovic et al., 2006; Purkis & Lipp, 2001). Whether fear conditioning, or 
learning in general, can occur without contingency awareness is a question that 
has been proven to be difficult to answer and that requires appropriate 
measurement of contingency awareness (e.g., Shanks & St. John, 1994) and 
careful experimental control of other contingencies that could explain learning 
(e.g., Singh et al., 2013). A recent study by Sevenster et al. (2014) seems to meet 
these two criteria and nevertheless provide evidence for unaware conditioning 
of FPS but not of SCRs. While these results are certainly promising, it seems 
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premature to us to conclude that conditioning of the startle reflex can occur in 
the absence of awareness given the conflicting evidence. Further replication of 
the result of Sevenster et al. (2014) will clarify whether this claim can be upheld. 
Second, two studies have shown that verbal instructions that the US will no 
longer be applied results in a complete reduction of SCRs but not of FPS, 
suggesting a dissociation between SCRs and FPS in their sensitivity to verbal 
instructions (Dawson, Rissling, et al., 2007; Sevenster et al., 2012a). However, in 
a recent study by Luck and Lipp (2015a), in which instructed extinction was 
combined with removal of the shock electrodes, a complete reduction of both 
SCRs and FPS was observed. As argued by Luck and Lipp (2015b), the incomplete 
reduction of FPS in the study of Sevenster et al. (2012a) can perhaps be 
explained by a subset of participants in their experiment that did not find the 
extinction instructions believable (because the shock electrodes remained 
attached in the study of Sevenster et al., 2012a). Furthermore, this incomplete 
reduction was perhaps not observed for SCRs due to increased SCRs to the CS- in 
the extinction phase for the instructed extinction group in the study of Sevenster 
et al. (2012a). A similar reasoning can also be applied to the results of Dawson, 
Rissling, et al. (2007) because their experiment employed a picture-picture 
evaluative conditioning procedure. Hence, participants could not be sure that the 
USs would no longer be applied (because the computer screen was not 
removed), resulting in unconvincing extinction instructions. However, it remains 
unclear from the data of Dawson, Rissling, et al. (2007) why such an effect was 
not obtained for SCRs because pre and post extinction SCR data are not provided 
in their article. Hence, taken together, the studies investigating effects of 
instructed extinction on SCRs and FPS do not provide definitive evidence for a 
dissociation between SCRs and FPS either.  
Finally, a number of recent studies have demonstrated that behavioral or 
pharmacological manipulations during a reconsolidation phase specifically 
reduce FPS but leave expectancy ratings and conditioned SCRs intact (Kindt et al., 
2009; Sevenster, Beckers, & Kindt, 2012b, 2013; Soeter & Kindt, 2010, 2012). 
These studies provide persuasive evidence that FPS can be dissociated from 
CONTINGENCY REVERSAL  149 
cognitive measures of conditioned fear. However, other studies have found a 
reduction of conditioned SCRs after disruption of reconsolidation as well 
(Oyarzún et al., 2012; Schiller et al., 2010), while still others did not find the 
disruption of reconsolidation effect either for FPS or SCRs (Bos, Beckers, & Kindt, 
2014; Golkar, Bellander, Olsson, & Ohman, 2012). Furthermore, erasure of fear 
memories through reconsolidation has been shown to depend on prediction 
error as captured by US expectancy ratings (Sevenster et al., 2013) and some 
evidence could even suggest that these disruption of reconsolidation effects are 
more pronounced with concurrent US expectancy ratings (Warren et al., 2014). 
Thus, reduction of FPS through disruption of reconsolidation may not be as 
independent of expectancies and SCRs as some studies suggest. Hence, 
considering all these different studies, currently the data available with regard to 
unaware learning, instructed extinction and disruption of reconsolidation do not 
provide definitive evidence that FPS reflects automatic affective learning. The 
results of the current study provide further evidence that FPS may reflect 
cognitive contingency learning rather than automatic affective learning. 
However, there are several limitations to this study that should be 
acknowledged. First, as described by Öhman and Mineka (2001), the affective 
learning module is only selectively activated by biologically relevant or highly 
aversive stimuli. Therefore, mild electric stimuli as USs and geometric shapes as 
CSs might not be sufficient to recruit this affective learning module in the 
learning process. It would be interesting to conduct a follow-up study looking at 
whether similar results would be obtained with more ecologically valid CSs and 
USs. A second limitation is that the CS+T/P’s and the US were paired on only 
three occasions throughout the experiment, which might not be a sufficient 
number of pairings for simple associative learning to take place. On the other 
hand, if affective learning is an evolutionary adaptive process, it is unlikely that a 
high number of CS-US pairings is required for simple associative learning to take 
place. Third, we gave explicit verbal instructions about all the contingencies and 
asked participants on every trial to provide ratings about the extent to which 
they expected the US. There is evidence that including online US expectancy 
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ratings maintains fear conditioning in patients with damage in the amygdala 
(Coppens, Spruyt, Vandenbulcke, Van Paesschen, & Vansteenwegen, 2009). 
Furthermore, some studies have compared participants who were instructed 
about the stimulus contingencies with participants who were either unaware of 
the contingencies or who learned the contingencies spontaneously. These 
studies revealed increased activation in brain areas that have been related to 
decision making and cognitive control in the instructed group (e.g., rostral 
dmPFC, lateral OFC; Mechias, Etkin, & Kalisch, 2010; Tabbert et al., 2011). 
Combined, these studies suggest that online US expectancy ratings and 
contingency instructions may induce a more cognitive way of learning about the 
CS-US pairings and consequently limited the contribution of affective learning 
(Coppens et al., 2009). Therefore, it is possible that if CS-US contingencies are 
learned in a spontaneous manner, stronger effects of the previous conditioning 
history could be obtained. 
Taking into account these reservations, we conclude that FPS should not by 
default be regarded as a measure of affective learning that is independent of 
SCRs and expectancy ratings. The results of our experiment demonstrate that 
conditioning of the startle reflex can depend on verbal instructions and 
expectancies about the occurrence of the US and does not necessarily follow 
simple associative learning rules. 
CONTINGENCY REVERSAL  151 
REFERENCES 
Andraszewicz, S., Scheibehenne, B., Rieskamp, J., Grasman, R., Verhagen, J., & 
Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2015). An Introduction to Bayesian Hypothesis Testing 
for Management Research. Journal of Management, 41(2), 521–543. 
doi:10.1177/0149206314560412 
Baeyens, F., Eelen, P., & Crombez, G. (1995). Pavlovian associations are forever: 
On classical conditioning and extinction. Journal of Psychophysiology, 9(2), 
127–141. Retrieved from 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0005796792901365 
Bechara, a., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., Adolphs, R., Rockland, C., & Damasio, A. 
(1995). Double dissociation of conditioning and declarative knowledge 
relative to the amygdala and hippocampus in humans. Science, 269(5227), 
1115–1118. doi:10.1126/science.7652558 
Blair, H. T., Schafe, G. E., Bauer, E. P., Rodrigues, S. M., & LeDoux, J. E. (2001). 
Synaptic plasticity in the lateral amygdala: a cellular hypothesis of fear 
conditioning. Learning & Memory, 8(5), 229–242. doi:10.1101/lm.30901 
Blumenthal, T. D., Cuthbert, B. N., Filion, D. L., Hackley, S., Lipp, O. V, & van 
Boxtel, A. (2005). Committee report: Guidelines for human startle eyeblink 
electromyographic studies. Psychophysiology, 42(1), 1–15. 
doi:10.1111/j.1469-8986.2005.00271.x 
Bos, M. G. N., Beckers, T., & Kindt, M. (2014). Noradrenergic Blockade of 
Memory Reconsolidation: A Failure to Reduce Conditioned Fear 
Responding. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 8(November), 1–8. 
doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00412 
Coppens, E., Spruyt, A., Vandenbulcke, M., Van Paesschen, W., & 
Vansteenwegen, D. (2009). Classically conditioned fear responses are 
preserved following unilateral temporal lobectomy in humans when 
concurrent US-expectancy ratings are used. Neuropsychologia, 47(12), 
2496–2503. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.04.021 
152  CHAPTER 5  
Costa, V. D., Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (2015). From threat to safety: 
Instructed reversal of defensive reactions. Psychophysiology, 52(3), 325–
332. doi:10.1111/psyp.12359 
Dawson, M. E. (1970). Cognition and conditioning: Effects of masking the CS-UCS 
contingency on human GSR classical conditioning. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 85(3), 389–396. doi:10.1037/h0029715 
Dawson, M. E., & Furedy, J. J. (1976). The Role of Awareness in Human 
Differential Autonomic Classical Conditioning: The Necessary-Gate 
Hypothesis. Psychophysiology, 13(1), 50–53. doi:10.1111/j.1469-
8986.1976.tb03336.x 
Dawson, M. E., Rissling, A. J., Schell, A. M., & Wilcox, R. (2007). Under what 
conditions can human affective conditioning occur without contingency 
awareness? Test of the evaluative conditioning paradigm. Emotion, 7(4), 
755–66. doi:10.1037/1528-3542.7.4.755 
Dawson, M. E., Schell, A. M., Filion, D. L., & Berntson, G. G. (2007). The 
Electrodermal System. In J. T. Cacioppo, L. G. Tassinary, & G. Berntson 
(Eds.), Handbook of Psychophysiology (3rd ed., pp. 157–181). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511546396 
De Clercq, A., Verschuere, B., De Vlieger, P., & Crombez, G. (2006). 
Psychophysiological Analysis (PSPHA): A modular script-based program for 
analyzing psychophysiological data. Behavior Research Methods, 38(3), 
504–510. doi:10.3758/BF03192805 
Dienes, Z. (2014). Using Bayes to get the most out of non-significant results. 
Frontiers in Psychology, 5(July), 1–17. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00781 
Golkar, A., Bellander, M., Olsson, A., & Ohman, A. (2012). Are fear memories 
erasable?-reconsolidation of learned fear with fear-relevant and fear-
irrelevant stimuli. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 6(November), 80. 
doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2012.00080 
Grillon, C. (2002). Associative learning deficits increase symptoms of anxiety in 
humans. Biological Psychiatry, 51(11), 851–858. doi:10.1016/S0006-
3223(01)01370-1 
CONTINGENCY REVERSAL  153 
Grillon, C., Ameli, R., Woods, S. W., Merikangas, K., & Davis, M. (1991). Fear-
Potentiated Startle in Humans: Effects of Anticipatory Anxiety on the 
Acoustic Blink Reflex. Psychophysiology, 28(5), 588–595. 
doi:10.1111/j.1469-8986.1991.tb01999.x 
Grings, W. W., Schell, A. M., & Carey, C. a. (1973). Verbal control of an autonomic 
response in a cue reversal situation. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
99(2), 215–221. doi:10.1037/h0034653 
Hamm, A. O., & Weike, A. I. (2005). The neuropsychology of fear learning and 
fear regulation. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 57(1), 5–14. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2005.01.006 
Hamm, A., & Vaitl, D. (1996). Affective learning: Awareness and aversion. 
Psychophysiology, 33, 698–710. doi:10.1111/j.1469-8986.1996.tb02 366.x 
Hugdahl, K. (1978). Electrodermal conditioning to potentially phobic stimuli: 
effects of instructed extinction. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 16(5), 
315–321. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(78)90001-3 
Jeffreys, H. (1961). Theory of Probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jovanovic, T., Norrholm, S. D., Keyes, M., Fiallos, A., Jovanovic, S., Myers, K. M., … 
Duncan, E. J. (2006). Contingency awareness and fear inhibition in a human 
fear-potentiated startle paradigm. Behavioral Neuroscience, 120(5), 995–
1004. doi:10.1037/0735-7044.120.5.995 
Kindt, M., Soeter, M., & Vervliet, B. (2009). Beyond extinction: erasing human 
fear responses and preventing the return of fear. Nature Neuroscience, 
12(3), 256–258. doi:10.1038/nn.2271 
Lipp, O. V, & Purkis, H. M. (2005). No support for dual process accounts of human 
affective learning in simple Pavlovian conditioning. Cognition & Emotion, 
19(2), 269–82. doi:10.1080/02699930441000319 
Lovibond, P. F., & Shanks, D. R. (2002). The role of awareness in Pavlovian 
conditioning: Empirical evidence and theoretical implications. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 28(1), 3–26. 
doi:10.1037//0097-7403.28.1.3 
Luck, C. C., & Lipp, O. V. (2015a). A potential pathway to the relapse of fear? 
Conditioned negative stimulus evaluation (but not physiological 
154  CHAPTER 5  
responding) resists instructed extinction. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
66, 18–31. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2015.01.001 
Luck, C. C., & Lipp, O. V. (2015b). To remove or not to remove? Removal of the 
unconditional stimulus electrode does not mediate instructed extinction 
effects. Psychophysiology, 00, n/a–n/a. doi:10.1111/psyp.12452 
Lykken, D. T., & Venables, P. H. (1971). Direct measurement of skin conductance: 
a proposal for standardization. Psychophysiology, 8(5), 656–672. 
doi:10.1111/j.1469-8986.1971.tb00501.x 
McAndrew, a, Jones, F. W., McLaren, R. P., & McLaren, I. P. L. (2012). Dissociating 
expectancy of shock and changes in skin conductance: an investigation of 
the Perruchet effect using an electrodermal paradigm. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. Animal Behavior Processes, 38(2), 203–8. 
doi:10.1037/a0026718 
McNally, R. J. (1981). Phobias and preparedness: instructional reversal of 
electrodermal conditioning to fear-relevant stimuli. Psychological Reports, 
48(1), 175–180. doi:10.2466/pr0.1981.48.1.175 
Mechias, M.-L., Etkin, A., & Kalisch, R. (2010). A meta-analysis of instructed fear 
studies: implications for conscious appraisal of threat. NeuroImage, 49(2), 
1760–8. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.09.040 
Mertens, G., Kuhn, M., Raes, A. K., Kalisch, R., De Houwer, J., & Lonsdorf, T. B. 
(2015). Fear expression and return of fear following threat instruction with 
or without direct contingency experience. Cognition and Emotion, (May), 
1–17. doi:10.1080/02699931.2015.1038219 
Milad, M. R., Orr, S. P., Pitman, R. K., & Rauch, S. L. (2005). Context modulation of 
memory for fear extinction in humans. Psychophysiology, 42(4), 456–64. 
doi:10.1111/j.1469-8986.2005.00302.x 
Mineka, S., & Öhman, A. (2002). Phobias and preparedness: the selective, 
automatic, and encapsulated nature of fear. Biological Psychiatry, 52(10), 
927–937. doi:10.1016/S0006-3223(02)01669-4 
Mitchell, C. J., De Houwer, J., & Lovibond, P. F. (2009). The propositional nature 
of human associative learning. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(2), 
183–98; discussion 198–246. doi:10.1017/S0140525X09000855 
CONTINGENCY REVERSAL  155 
Nitschke, J. B., Miller, G. a., & Cook, E. W. (1998). Digital filtering in EEG/ERP 
analysis: Some technical and empirical comparisons. Behavior Research 
Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 30(1), 54–67. 
doi:10.3758/BF03209416 
Öhman, A., & Mineka, S. (2001). Fears, phobias, and preparedness: Toward an 
evolved module of fear and fear learning. Psychological Review, 108(3), 
483–522. doi:10.1037//0033-295X.108.3.483 
Olsson, A., & Phelps, E. a. (2007). Social learning of fear. Nature Neuroscience, 
10(9), 1095–1102. doi:10.1038/nn1968 
Olsson, A., & Phelps, E. A. (2004). Learned fear of “unseen” faces after Pavlovian, 
observational, and instructed fear. Psychological Science, 15(12), 822–828. 
doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00762.x 
Oyarzún, J. P., Lopez-Barroso, D., Fuentemilla, L., Cucurell, D., Pedraza, C., 
Rodriguez-Fornells, A., & de Diego-Balaguer, R. (2012). Updating fearful 
memories with extinction training during reconsolidation: A human study 
using auditory aversive stimuli. PLoS ONE, 7(6). 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038849 
Pineles, S. L., Orr, M. R., & Orr, S. P. (2009). An alternative scoring method for 
skin conductance responding in a differential fear conditioning paradigm 
with a long-duration conditioned stimulus. Psychophysiology, 46(5), 984–
95. doi:10.1111/j.1469-8986.2009.00852.x 
Purkis, H., & Lipp, O. V. (2001). Does Affective Learning Exist in the Absence of 
Contingency Awareness? Learning and Motivation, 32(1), 84–99. 
doi:10.1006/lmot.2000.1066 
Raes, A. K., De Houwer, J., De Schryver, M., Brass, M., & Kalisch, R. (2014). Do CS-
US Pairings Actually Matter? A Within-Subject Comparison of Instructed 
Fear Conditioning with and without Actual CS-US Pairings. PloS One, 9(1), 
e84888. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084888 
Reiss, S. (1980). Pavlovian conditioning and human fear: An expectancy model. 
Behavior Therapy, 11(3), 380–396. doi:10.1016/S0005-7894(80)80054-2 
156  CHAPTER 5  
Rouder, J. N., Speckman, P. L., Sun, D., Morey, R. D., & Iverson, G. (2009). 
Bayesian t tests for accepting and rejecting the null hypothesis. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16(2), 225–237. doi:10.3758/PBR.16.2.225 
Schiller, D., Monfils, M.-H., Raio, C. M., Johnson, D. C., Ledoux, J. E., & Phelps, E. 
A. (2010). Preventing the return of fear in humans using reconsolidation 
update mechanisms. Nature, 463, 49–53. doi:10.1038/nature08637 
Sevenster, D., Beckers, T., & Kindt, M. (2012a). Instructed extinction differentially 
affects the emotional and cognitive expression of associative fear memory. 
Psychophysiology, 49(10), 1426–1435. doi:10.1111/j.1469-
8986.2012.01450.x 
Sevenster, D., Beckers, T., & Kindt, M. (2012b). Retrieval per se is not sufficient to 
trigger reconsolidation of human fear memory. Neurobiology of Learning 
and Memory, 97(3), 338–345. doi:10.1016/j.nlm.2012.01.009 
Sevenster, D., Beckers, T., & Kindt, M. (2013). Prediction error governs 
pharmacologically induced amnesia for learned fear. Science, 339(6121), 
830–3. doi:10.1126/science.1231357 
Sevenster, D., Beckers, T., & Kindt, M. (2014). Fear conditioning of SCR but not 
the startle reflex requires conscious discrimination of threat and safety. 
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 8(32). doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00032 
Shanks, D. R., & St. John, M. F. (1994). Characteristics of dissociable human 
learning-systems. Behavioral and Bain Sciences, 17(3), 367–395. 
doi:10.1017/S0140525X00035032 
Singh, K., Dawson, M. E., Schell, A. M., Courtney, C. G., & Payne, A. F. H. (2013). 
Can human autonomic classical conditioning occur without contingency 
awareness? The critical importance of the trial sequence. Biological 
Psychology, 93(1), 197–205. doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2013.02.007 
Soeter, M., & Kindt, M. (2010). Dissociating response systems: erasing fear from 
memory. Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 94(1), 30–41. 
doi:10.1016/j.nlm.2010.03.004 
Soeter, M., & Kindt, M. (2012). Erasing fear for an imagined threat event. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 37(11), 1769–1779. 
doi:10.1016/j.psyneuen.2012.03.011 
CONTINGENCY REVERSAL  157 
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L., Lushene, R., Vagg, P. R., & Jacobs, G. A. (1983). 
Manual for the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting 
Psychologists Press. 
Tabbert, K., Merz, C. J., Klucken, T., Schweckendiek, J., Vaitl, D., Wolf, O. T., & 
Stark, R. (2011). Influence of contingency awareness on neural, 
electrodermal and evaluative responses during fear conditioning. Social 
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 6(4), 495–506. 
doi:10.1093/scan/nsq070 
Van der Ploeg, H. M., Defares, P. B., & Spielberger, C. D. (2000). Handleiding bij 
de Zelfbeoordelings Vragenlijst. Een Nederlandstalige bewerking van de 
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Lisse, The Netherlands. 
Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2007). A practical solution to the pervasive problems ofp 
values. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14(5), 779–804. 
doi:10.3758/BF03194105 
Warren, V. T., Anderson, K. M., Kwon, C., Bosshardt, L., Jovanovic, T., Bradley, B., 
& Norrholm, S. D. (2014). Human fear extinction and return of fear using 
reconsolidation update mechanisms: The contribution of on-line 
expectancy ratings. Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 113(OCTOBER), 
165–173. doi:10.1016/j.nlm.2013.10.014 
Wilson, G. D. (1968). Reversal of differential GSR conditioning by instructions. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 76(3, Pt.1), 491–493. 
doi:10.1037/h0025540 
 
  
  
 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF A CONTEXT SWITCH AND CONTEXT 
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE RETURN OF VERBALLY 
CONDITIONED FEAR 
1 
Background and Objectives: Repeated exposure to a conditioned stimulus can lead to a 
reduction of conditioned fear responses towards this stimulus (i.e., extinction). However, this 
reduction is often fragile and sensitive to contextual changes. In the current study, we investigated 
whether extinction of fear responses established through verbal threat instructions is also 
sensitive to contextual changes. We additionally examined whether verbal instructions can 
strengthen the effects of a context change.  
Methods: Fifty-two participants were informed that one colored rectangle would be 
predictive of an electrocutaneous stimulus, while another colored rectangle was instructed to be 
safe. Half of these participants were additionally informed that this contingency would only hold 
when the background of the computer screen had a particular color but not when it had another 
color. After these instructions, the participants went through an unannounced extinction phase 
that was followed by a context switch.  
Results: Results indicate that extinguished verbally conditioned fear responses can return 
after a context switch, although only as indexed by self-reported expectancy ratings. This effect 
was stronger when participants were told that CS-US contingency would depend on the 
background color, in which case a return of fear was also observed on physiological measures of 
fear.  
Limitations: Extinction was not very pronounced in this study, possibly limiting the extent to 
which return of fear could be observed on physiological measures. 
Conclusions: Contextual cues can impact the return of fear established via verbal 
instructions. Verbal instructions can further strengthen the contextual control of fear. 
                                                     
1Based on Mertens, G., & De Houwer, J. (2016). The impact of a context 
switch and context instructions on the return of verbally conditioned fear. 
Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 51, 10–18. 
doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2015.11.001 
 
CHAPTER 6 
THE IMPACT OF A CONTEXT SWITCH  161 
INTRODUCTION 
Fear conditioning and extinction are considered to provide laboratory 
analogues for the acquisition of fear and phobias and the subsequent reduction 
of fear via exposure-based therapy (Field, 2006; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). 
Whereas fear conditioning refers to the acquisition of fear for a Conditioned 
Stimulus (CS) due to the pairing of the CS with an aversive Unconditioned 
Stimulus (US), extinction refers to the reduction of conditioned fear through the 
repeated unreinforced presentation of a CS after the CS-US pairings. Both 
phenomena have attracted widespread research interest because they allow to 
investigate complex phenomena such as anxiety disorders and therapeutic 
interventions in a safe and well controlled laboratory environment.  
Despite being an extremely useful framework for understanding the 
pathogenesis of anxiety disorders and the development of therapeutic 
interventions, fear conditioning as a model of the development of anxiety 
disorders has attracted strong criticism as well (e.g., Beckers, Krypotos, Boddez, 
Effting, & Kindt, 2013; Field, 2006; Rachman, 1977). One important point of 
criticism is that fear conditioning in the lab nearly always relies on directly pairing 
a CS with an aversive US. In contrast to this standard practice in lab studies, 
retrospective studies with patients have found that it is often not possible to 
identify direct experience with a traumatic event as the etiology of anxiety 
disorders (for example, most people in Western countries will in general not have 
any experience with snakes, but may nevertheless develop phobias for them; 
e.g., Fredrikson, Annas, Fischer, & Wik, 1996; Oosterink, de Jongh, & 
Hoogstraten, 2009). Rachman (1977) and Field (2006) argue that, besides directly 
experiencing a traumatic event, acquisition of (maladaptive) fear can also be 
based on verbal instructions and social observation. This suggestion is supported 
by both laboratory research in which fear and avoidance responses have been 
established on the basis of verbal instructions and observation (Cameron, Roche, 
Schlund, & Dymond, 2016; Lovibond, 2003; Muris & Field, 2010; Olsson & Phelps, 
2007) and retrospective reports of anxiety patients who identified verbal threats 
and social observation as the starting point of their psychopathology (e.g., King et 
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al., 1998; Merckelbach, de Jong, Muris, & van den Hout, 1996). However, fear 
acquisition via verbal instructions and via observation remain relatively 
understudied phenomena compared to the large amount of research available on 
fear conditioning through direct CS-US pairings. Arguably, such a lack of research 
concerning two of the major pathways of fear acquisition hampers a full 
understanding of the development and treatment of fear and phobias. Therefore, 
the primary goal of our research was to further investigate the properties of fear 
acquired through verbal instructions.  
Specifically, we wanted to investigate whether extinction of fear established 
through verbal instructions is similarly sensitive to contextual cues as fear 
established through direct experience of CS-US pairings. That is, research on 
extinction of fear (established through direct experience) has shown that 
extinction often results in a fragile reduction of the conditioned fearful reactions 
that can easily be overturned by a change in contextual cues. Based on laboratory 
research it has been suggested that extinction does not lead to unlearning of 
previously learned contingencies, but rather results in context-dependent 
inhibitory learning that suppresses the expression of previously learned 
contingencies within a certain context (Bouton, 2004). This context specificity of 
extinction is an important phenomenon to understand why relapse can occur 
after successful therapy (Bouton, 2002). That is, because extinction memory is 
more context specific than the original acquisition memory, confrontation with a 
fear-eliciting stimulus in a new context tends to preferentially activate the 
original acquisition memory rather than the extinction memory, resulting in a 
return of fear. So far, however, no study has investigated whether extinction of 
fear established through verbal information is similarly context-specific. Given 
that verbal instructions can be regarded as a major pathway to the development 
of maladaptive fears and phobias, it is important to investigate whether return of 
verbally acquired fear can occur under similar circumstances as for fear acquired 
through direct experience. 
The context-specificity of extinction is most convincingly demonstrated by 
the renewal effect. In a typical renewal experiment, conditioned fear is 
established by pairing a CS with an aversive US during an acquisition phase in a 
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certain context A. This phase is then followed by an extinction phase in a new 
context B, in which the CS is repeatedly presented without reinforcement. The 
renewal effect refers to a rapid return of the previously extinguished fear 
response that occurs when subjects are exposed to the CS in the original 
acquisition context A (ABA renewal) or in a new context C (ABC renewal), 
compared to a control condition where the context is not changed (ABB). This 
basic effect has been obtained both in animal studies (for a review see: Bouton, 
2002) and more recently in human studies as well (e.g., Alvarez, Johnson, & 
Grillon, 2007; Milad, Orr, Pitman, & Rauch, 2005; Vansteenwegen et al., 2005). 
In the current study we investigated whether renewal effects can be 
obtained for verbally conditioned fear (see Dieussaert, Vansteenwegen, & Van 
Assche, 2005, 2006, for related studies in the context of human contingency 
learning). We therefore told participants that a certain CS (CS+) would be 
predictive of an electrocutaneous stimulus (the US) while another CS was said to 
be safe (CS-). Subsequently, these participants underwent an unannounced 
extinction phase that was followed by a context switch by changing the 
background color of the computer screen (e.g., Dibbets, Havermans, & Arntz, 
2008; Haesen & Vervliet, 2014)1. We expected that the context switch would lead 
to a return of conditioned fear reactions similar to what has been observed in 
fear conditioning studies with direct CS-US pairings, even though the CS-US 
contingency was never directly experienced but merely instructed. We assessed 
conditioned fear reactions by collecting US expectancy ratings, fear potentiated 
startle reactions and skin conductance responses on every trial. 
A second aim of our study was to investigate whether verbal instructions 
could modulate the renewal effect. Several models of human associative learning 
                                                     
1
 To control for time related changes which may explain the renewal effect (i.e., 
spontaneous recovery) usually a second group is included in which the extinction context is not 
changed (ABB group). However, in the current study the extinction phase was immediately 
followed by the context switch which reduces the likelihood that time related changes cause 
context switch effects. Previous studies with a short delay between the extinction and the 
renewal phase did not find evidence for time related changes that could explain the renewal 
effect (Alvarez et al., 2007; Vansteenwegen et al., 2005). 
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argue that the acquisition and expression of fear is a function of cognitive 
expectancies about the occurrence of harmful events (Lovibond, 2004; Mitchell, 
De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009; Reiss, 1980). These expectancies can be strongly 
influenced by verbal instructions (e.g., Lovibond, 2003; McNally, 1981). 
Furthermore, verbal instructions not only allow to communicate whether two 
stimuli are related, but also allow to specify how they are related and under 
which conditions the relationship is valid (De Houwer, 2014). Hence, based on 
these models and studies, we expect that verbal instructions about the relevance 
of the context for the CS-US relationship could strongly impact the contextual 
expectancies of encountering an aversive event and hence strongly influence the 
magnitude of the renewal effect. So far, only one study has addressed the impact 
of verbal instructions on the renewal effect. In four studies, Neumann (2007) 
found that verbal instructions that informed the participant that the context was 
irrelevant for the CS-US contingency was ineffective in attenuating the renewal 
effect. However, while instructing participants that the context is irrelevant for 
the CS-US contingency seems to be ineffective in influencing the renewal effect, it 
cannot be excluded that making the context explicitly relevant for the CS-US 
contingency via verbal instructions could potentially strengthen the renewal 
effect. To test for this possibility, we included a second group of participants 
(context instructions, CI, group) who were informed that the previously 
instructed CS-US contingency would  be instantiated only when the background 
of the computer screen had a particular color but not when the background of 
the computer screen had another color. We expected that the effect of the 
context switch would be particularly pronounced for this group compared to the 
group that did not receive these context instructions (no context instructions, 
NCI, group). 
Finally, we measured startle reactions during noise alone trials to 
determine whether the obtained renewal effects could be explained by context 
conditioning (Alvarez et al., 2007). Specifically, while the renewal effect is usually 
explained by the context gated expression of a learned inhibitory CS-noUS 
relationship (Bouton, 2004), an alternative explanation is that participants learn 
that the context itself is a cue for the presence or absence of the US (context 
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conditiong; see: Vervliet, Baeyens, Van den Bergh, & Hermans, 2013 for an 
overview of explanations for the renewal effect)2. If renewal in our study is 
explained by context conditioning, startle reactions should be potentiated in the 
context predicting the US (or in any other context not predicting the absence of a 
US), even in the absence of a CS (Alvarez et al., 2007; Vansteenwegen, Iberico, 
Vervliet, Marescau, & Hermans, 2008). Hence, including startle probes in the 
absence of CSs allowed us to test whether the renewal effect could be explained 
by context conditioning, both in the CI and the NCI group.  
METHOD 
Participants 
Fifty-two right-handed students at Ghent University participated in the 
experiment in exchange for €8. Eight of these participants were excluded from 
analyses because they did not remember the instructions correctly after the 
experiment (5), because they reported not to believe the instructions (2), or 
because of a technical failure (headphones were unplugged; 1). Half of the 
participants were assigned to the CI condition and the other half to the NCI 
condition. Detailed information about each group is provided in Table 1. Even 
though there was an imbalance between the two groups in the sex distribution, 
the results remained similar when the analyses were restricted to include only 
female participants. We therefore report the results for the full sample. 
 
 
                                                     
2
 Because we established conditioned fear via verbal instructions (and hence, the US was 
never presented), little or no excitatory conditioning will take place between the context and the 
US. Nevertheless, inhibitory context conditioning can still take place in our design during the 
unannounced extinction phase. In fact, inhibitory context conditioning is a more likely alternative 
account to the Bouton (2004) retrieval model than excitatory context conditioning  because it can 
account for all the different types of renewal (e.g., ABA, ABC and AAB renewal; see Vervliet et al., 
2013). 
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Table 1. Detailed information for the two experimental groups (standard 
deviation between brackets). 
 Context instructions 
group  
(N = 22) 
No context 
instruction group  
(N = 22) 
Difference between 
groups 
Age 23.18 
(5.43) 
 
21.27 
(2.00) 
t(42) = 1.55  
Sex 
 
6 male 1 male χ²(1) = 4.25* 
Final US intensity 
(mA) 
17.30  
(12.29) 
 
17.93 
(14.46) 
t(42) < 1 
Final US painfulness 
rating 
7.84 
(0.66) 
 
7.57 
(1.81) 
t(42) < 1 
STAI-T 36.59 
(7.18) 
36.72 
(7.37) 
t(42) < 1 
*p < .05 
Note: US = Unconditioned Stimulus (an electrocutaneous stimulation); STAI-T = State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory – Trait version (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). 
 
 
Materials 
Psychophysiology  
Recording and scoring of the psychophysiological measures was done in 
accordance with standard procedures in our lab that have been published before. 
For the sake of brevity, we refer readers to Raes, De Houwer, De Schryver, Brass 
and Kalisch (2014) regarding the collection and scoring of skin conductance 
responses (SCR) and to Verschuere, Crombez, Koster, Van Bockstaele and De 
Clercq (2007) regarding the collection of the startle response. 
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US expectancy ratings  
US expectancy ratings were collected on each trial using a 9-point Likert 
scale presented below the CSs with 5 anchor points: 1 = “not at all”, 3 = “rather 
not”, 5 = “uncertain”, 7 = “to some extent”, 9 = “certainly”. Above the CSs the 
question: “To what extent do you expect the shock?” was presented. Participants 
indicated their answer by clicking one of the response options of the Likert scale 
with the computer mouse using their dominant hand. 
Stimuli  
CSs were a blue and a green rectangle (500 by 400 pixels). Assignment of 
these rectangles as the CS+ and the CS- was counterbalanced over participants.   
The US was an electrocutaneous stimulus of 300 ms administered by two 
lubricated Fukuda standard Ag/AgCl electrodes (1-cm diameter) to the left leg 
over the retromalleolar course of the sural nerve. The stimulus was generated by 
a constant current stimulator (DS7A, Digitimer, Hertfordshire, UK). The intensity 
of this stimulus was determined for each participant individually to be unpleasant 
but not painful using a stepwise work-up procedure. Note however that this 
stimulus was never administered during the experiment, but only during the 
work-up procedure. 
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Figure 1. Schematic overview of the experiment. Note that the assignment of 
background color and CS colors were counterbalanced over participants. Only 
the CI group received additional context instructions. 
 
Procedure 
At the start of the experiment, participants had to complete an informed 
consent that instructed them about the presence of an unpleasant but 
unharmful electrical stimulus and informed them that they could interrupt the 
experiment at any time without negative consequences. 
Next, participants went through a work-up procedure to determine an 
appropriate intensity level of the electrocutaneous stimulus. Participants were 
exposed to gradually increasing levels of intensity of the electrocutaneous 
stimulus and were asked to select an unpleasant but not painful stimulus. After a 
final intensity level had been determined (see Table 1), participants were told 
that this would be the stimulus intensity that they could expect during the 
experiment. Participants were asked to give a verbal rating between zero and ten 
of the experienced painfulness of the stimulation (see Table 1). Subsequently, 
physiology recording electrodes were applied and the experiment was launched 
on the test computer. 
In the first part of the experiment, participants received on the computer 
screen instructions about the contingencies between the colored rectangle and 
the electrocutaneous stimulus. This can be considered to be the “acquisition” 
phase because participants learned the contingencies at this point but were 
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never directly exposed to these instructed contingencies at any point during the 
experiment (see Figure 1 for a schematic overview of the experiment). The 
instructions (in Dutch) informed participants that they would see two colored 
rectangles during the experiment. One colored rectangle (green or blue, 
counterbalanced) was instructed to sometimes be followed by the 
electrocutaneous stimulus while the other colored rectangle was instructed to 
never be followed by the electrocutaneous stimulus. One half of the participants 
(CI group) was also informed that this rule would be valid only when the 
background of the screen is white (or black, counterbalanced) and that when the 
background of the screen is black (or white) no electrocutaneous stimuli would 
be applied. The other half of the participants did not receive these additional 
instructions (NCI, group; see Appendix A for a translation of the instructions). 
Participants were further informed that their task was to indicate to what extent 
they expect the electrocutaneous stimulus each time a rectangle appears by 
clicking one of the response options on the scale below the rectangle. They were 
asked to provide their ratings quickly after the appearance of the rectangle. The 
background color of the computer screen during the instructions was either 
black or white (counterbalanced) and was always the same as the background 
color of the renewal phase, but different from the background color in the 
extinction phase. Hence, the procedure resembled an ABA renewal design, with 
this difference that the first phase involved only instructions that referred to 
events on the second phase or third phase. Because we did not have an 
acquisition phase in which CS-US pairings were presented, it was not possible to 
return to the original acquisition context (and hence have a standard ABA 
renewal design). 
After these instructions, the extinction phase started. The background of 
the computer screen during the extinction phase changed to either black or 
white (counterbalanced; see Figure 1) and was in the color that was instructed to 
be safe for the CI group. The extinction phase started with 5 habituation startle 
probes with an interval of 7 seconds. Next, both colored rectangles were each 
presented 10 times during 8 seconds without reinforcement, preceded by a 
fixation cross during 2 seconds. On each trial, a startle probe occurred 7 seconds 
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after CS onset (Sevenster, Beckers, & Kindt, 2012). The inter-trial interval 
between the stimuli was either 6, 8 or 12 seconds, randomly determined. 
Furthermore, 10 startle probes were presented throughout the extinction phase 
in the absence of a CS (noise alone, NA, trials) with the same inter-trial interval. 
The sequence of trials was randomly determined with the exception that no 
more than two identical trials could occur in sequence.  
The extinction phase was immediately followed by an unannounced 
change in the background color of the screen (context switch; from black to 
white or vice versa). A short 5 seconds interval followed the context switch to 
avoid that SCRs on the first trial in the new context would be influenced by the 
orienting response. This new background color was always the instructed 
threatened background color for the CI group. Three unreinforced presentations 
of each colored rectangle and three additional NA trials were presented within 
this new context with the same trial procedure as during the extinction phase. 
The first trial after the context switch was experimentally controlled: half of the 
participants saw the CS+ first while the other half saw the CS- first. 
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to retrospectively 
rate the believability of the instructions at the moment they received them by 
selecting one of four options from a dropdown list: “not believable”, “not very 
believable”, “very believable” and “completely believable”. Two participants who 
selected “not believable” were excluded from the analyses. Finally, participants 
were asked to indicate which of the two colored rectangles would be followed by 
the electrocutaneous stimulation according to the instructions by selecting one 
of three response options from a dropdown list: “the green rectangle”, “the blue 
rectangle” or “I don’t know”. Five participants who did not correctly identify the 
CS+ were excluded from the analyses. 
RESULTS 
The different measures of conditioned fear (US expectancy, SCR and 
startle) were analyzed separately. For each measure, two mixed ANOVAs were 
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conducted. First, the data obtained during the extinction phase were analyzed 
using an ANOVA with the within-subjects factors CS (US expectancy ratings and 
SCR: CS+, CS-; startle: CS+, CS-, NA) and Trial (1 to 10), and the between-subjects 
factor Group (CI or NCI group). Second, the effect of the context switch was 
assessed by comparing the responses from the last trial of the extinction phase 
with the responses from the first trial of the switch phase (factor Phase). 
Additional factors in this second analyses were the factors CS (CS+, CS-) and 
Group (CI or NCI group). 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied when the sphericity 
assumption was violated and p-values below .05 were considered significant. 
US expectancy ratings 
Successful conditioning was obtained on the basis of verbal instructions as 
evidenced by significantly higher US expectancy ratings for the CS+ (M = 3.94, SE 
= 0.30) than for the CS- (M = 1.21, SE = 0.07) during the extinction phase, main 
effect of CS: F(1, 42) = 80.24, p < .001, η²p = .66. Conditioning during the 
extinction phase was more pronounced for the NCI group (M = 4.09, SD = 1.93, 
t(21) = 9.94, p < .001, d = 2.12) than for the CI group (M = 1.37, SD = 2.11, t(21) = 
3.05, p = .006, d = 0.65; see Figure 2), interaction between CS and group: F(1, 42) 
= 19.83, p < .001, η²p = .32. This result demonstrates that our context instructions 
(i.e., no USs would be applied during the extinction context for the CI group) 
successfully reduced US expectancy ratings. Furthermore, US expectancy ratings 
tended to decrease throughout the extinction phase (see Figure 2), main effect of 
trial: F(3.81, 160.21) = 6.46, p < .001, η²p = .32. There was a marginally significant 
interaction between CS and trial, indicating that US expectancies tended to 
decrease more for the CS+ than for the CS- during the extinction phase, F(3.68, 
154.61) = 2.42, p = .056, η²p = .05. The three way interaction between CS, trial 
and group was not significant, F(3.68, 154.61) = 1.32, p = .267, η²p = .03, 
suggesting that the extinction tendency was comparable for the CI and NCI 
group. 
The context switch led to a significant increase in US expectancy ratings 
after the context switch (M = 3.83, SE = 0.14) compared to before the context 
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switch (M = 2.13, SE = 0.16), main effect of phase: F(1, 42) = 237.20, p < .001, η²p 
= .85. This effect was more pronounced for the CS+ (see Figure 2), interaction 
between CS and phase: F(1, 42) = 87.36, p < .001, η²p = .65.  Importantly, this 
specific renewal effect was especially pronounced for the CI group (increase in 
differential conditioning = 4.27, SD = 2.39, t(21) = 8.37, p < .001, d = 1.79) 
compared to the NCI group (increase in differential conditioning = 1.36, SD = 1.84, 
t(21) = 3.48, p = .002, d = 0.74; see Figure 2), three-way interaction between CS, 
phase and group: F(1, 42) = 20.42, p < .001, η²p = .33. This result demonstrates 
that the context instructions strengthened the renewal effect. Note that the 
difference in the renewal effect was driven mainly by differences between the 
two groups in the extinction phase. That is, an interaction between CS and group 
was observed only at the end of the extinction phase, F(1, 42) = 17.23, p < .001, 
η²p = .29, but not at the first trial of the renewal phase, F(1, 42) < 1. Thus, the 
greater renewal effect of the CI group was mainly due to reduced differential US 
expectancy ratings in the extinction phase, rather than larger differential US 
expectancy ratings in the renewal phase (see Figure 2)3. 
 
 
Figure 2. US expectancy ratings throughout the experiment for the two 
experimental groups. Error bars represent standard error. 
                                                     
3
 However, note that when we included all three trial of the renewal phase to compare 
the CI and NCI group, we did obtain a trend for larger differential US expectancy ratings for the CI 
group, F(1, 42) = 3.24, p = .079, η²p = .07. 
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SCR 
Similar to the US expectancy ratings, there was a significant difference in 
SCR between the CS+ (M = 0.43, SE = 0.03) compared to the CS- (M = 0.24, SE = 
0.02), demonstrating conditioning on the basis of verbal instructions, main effect 
of CS: F(1, 42) = 66.70, p < .001, η²p = .61. Furthermore, there was a significant 
effect of the factor trial, F(9, 378) = 6.72, p < .001, η²p = .14, but this did not 
interact with CS, F < 1, indicating that the extinction procedure led to a reduction 
of the SCRs, but not differently so for the two CSs (see Figure 3). Finally, the 
interaction effect between CS and group was marginally significant, F(1, 42) = 
3.70, p = .061, η²p = .08, due to less differential conditioning in the CI group (M = 
0.15, SD = 0.16, t(21) = 4.24, p < .001, d =  .94) than in the NCI group (M = 0.24, 
SD = 0.15, t(21) = 7.45, p < .001, d = 1.60; see Figure 3), suggesting that our 
instructions were successful to reduce conditioned reactions for the CI group 
during the extinction phase on SCRs as well. The other interaction effects did not 
reach significance, F-values < 1. 
The context switch led to a significant increase in SCRs (see Figure 3), main 
effect of phase: F(1, 42) =  14.86, p < .001, η²p = .26. However, there was no 
significant difference in the context switch effect between the CS+ and the CS-, 
interaction between phase and CS: F(1, 42) = 1.92, p = .173, η²p = .04. This 
indicates that the context switch led to a general increase of fear for both the 
CS+ and CS-, rather than a specific increase of fear for the CS+. This is a 
commonly observed effect in studies on return of fear (Vervliet et al., 2013). 
Importantly, the interaction effect between the factor phase and group was 
significant, F(1, 42) = 15.06, p < .001, η²p = .26, demonstrating that the effect of 
the context switch (a general increase in SCRs) was larger for the CI group (M = 
0.38, SD = 0.35, t(21) = 4.97, p < .001, d = 1.09) than for the NCI group (M = -
0.001, SD = 0.29, t(21) = -0.02, p = .984, d ≈ 0; see Figure 3). This greater non-
specific renewal effect for the CI group was mainly explained by larger SCRs in 
the CI group at the first trial of the renewal phase, F(1, 42) = 13.15, p = .001, η²p 
= .24, rather than smaller SCRs in the CI group at the last trial of the extinction 
phase, F(1, 42) = 2.45, p = .125, η²p = .06. Thus, the verbal instructions increased 
174  CHAPTER 6  
SCRs to both the CS- and CS+ after a context switch, rather than reduced SCRs in 
the instructed safe context (see Figure 3). However, note that this does not apply 
for the whole extinction phase. When all trials of the extinction phase were 
considered, we did see evidence for a reduction of differential SCRs for the CI 
group (see the results of the extinction phase). Finally, there was no significant 
three-way interaction between phase, CS and group, F(1, 42) < 1. 
 
 
Figure 3. Skin conductance responses throughout the experiment for the two 
experimental groups. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
Startle 
For the analysis of the extinction phase, startle responses were averaged 
per two trials to reduce the impact of missing observations on the results. Startle 
responses were stronger to the CS+ probes (M = 53.75, SE = 0.56) than towards 
the CS- (M = 49.19, SE = 0.47) or the NA probes (M = 48.42, SE = 0.46), main 
effect of CS: F(2, 82) = 25.09, p < .001, η²p = .38, demonstrating conditioning on 
the basis of verbal instructions for startle as well. Startle magnitude tended to 
decrease throughout the extinction phase, main effect of trial, F(3.33, 136.47) = 
48.11, p < .001, η²p = .54, but this effect did not interact with CS, F < 1. 
Descriptively, conditioning effects were larger in the NCI (M = 5.56, SD = 5.08, 
t(21) = 5.14, p < .001, d = 1.09) than in the CI group (M = 3.64, SD = 5.83, t(21) = 
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2.93, p = .008, d = 0.62; see Figure 4), which would be expected on the basis of 
our instructions, but this effect failed to reach significance; interaction between 
CS and group: F(2, 82) = 1.87, p = .161, η²p = .04. All the other interaction effects 
were not significant, F-values < 1. 
 The context switch led to stronger startle responses after the context 
switch (M = 50.95, SE = 0.67) compared to before (M = 46.31, SE = 0.68); main 
effect of phase: F(1, 39) = 20.44, p < .001, η²p = .34. This effect of phase did not 
interact with CS, F < 1, indicating that the context switch led to a general increase 
in startle responses (see Figure 4). Importantly, the interaction effect between 
phase and group approached significance, F(1, 39) = 4.01, p = .052, η²p = .09, due 
to larger effects of the context switch (a general increase in startle responses) for 
the CI group (M = 6.99, SD = 6.28, t(21) = 5.22, p < .001, d = 1.11) than for the NCI 
group (M = 2.60, SD = 6.56, t(21) = 1.86, p = .077, d = 0.40; see Figure 4). As for 
SCRs, this non-specific renewal effect was mainly due to stronger startle 
responses in the CI group at the first trial of the renewal phase, F(1, 41) = 7.01, p 
= .011, η²p = .15, rather than weaker startle responses in the CI group at the end 
of the extinction phase, F(1, 40) < 1 (see Figure 4). The three way interaction 
between phase, CS and group did not reach significance, F(2, 78) = 2.13, p = .126, 
η²p = .05. 
Finally, we did not observe a significant increase in NA startle reaction after 
compared to before the context switch for the NCI group, t(21) = 1.34, p = .194, 
Cohen’s d = .29, or the CI group, t(20) < 1, p = .370, Cohen’s d = .20. Also, there 
was no difference between the two groups in the increase in context 
conditioning as measured by NA startle reactions going from the extinction 
phase to the renewal phase, F(1, 41) < 1, suggesting that differences in context 
switch effects between the two groups cannot be explained by differences in 
context conditioning. 
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Figure 4. Startle responses throughout the experiment for the two 
experimental groups. Error bars represent standard error. 
DISCUSSION 
The main aim of the current study was to investigate whether extinguished 
fear reactions that were initially established on the basis of verbal instructions 
are sensitive to a change in context. To this end, participants were verbally 
informed about the contingencies between two CSs and a US. After these 
instructions, participants were subjected to an unannounced extinction phase 
which was immediately followed by a context switch. US expectancy ratings, skin 
conductance responses and startle responses were measured throughout the 
experiment. In addition, a second group of participants was included who were 
explicitly informed about the two contexts in the experiment (i.e., a safe context 
and a second context in which CS-US pairings would occur). We report three 
main findings: First, a context switch after an unannounced extinction phase led 
to a selective return of conditioned responding (i.e., stronger for CS+ than for CS-
) as measured by US expectancy ratings. However, this was not accompanied by 
a comparable selective return of fear on SCRs or startle responses. Instead, for 
startle (but not for SCR) we observed a trend for a general return of fear (i.e., not 
different for CS+ than for CS-). Second, verbal instructions about the relevance of 
the context for the CS-US contingency resulted in stronger context switch effects 
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on all measures. Third, no evidence was obtained that the context switch effects 
could be explained by context conditioning as measured by NA startle reactions. 
These three findings will be discussed in greater detail below. 
First, evidence for a selective renewal effect was obtained on US 
expectancy ratings even though conditioning was established on the basis of 
verbal instructions (see left panel Figure 2). That is, US expectancy ratings, 
especially for the CS+, increased after the context switch relative to the last trial 
of the extinction phase. Furthermore, a trend for a general increase of fear (both 
for the CS+ and the CS-) was observed for startle responses after the context 
switch, which can also be considered to be an indication of renewal (Vervliet et 
al., 2013). However, the fact that we found specific renewal only for the US 
expectancy ratings but not for the psychophysiological measures calls for caution 
when interpreting the results. Previous studies in which conditioning was 
established through direct experience revealed specific renewal on 
psychophysiological measures as well (e.g., Alvarez et al., 2007; Milad et al., 
2005; Vansteenwegen et al., 2005). One explanation for the absence of specific 
renewal effects on the psychophysiological measures in the current experiment 
might be because extinction, despite 10 extinction trials, was quite limited in 
magnitude. This weak extinction, in turn, limits the likelihood of finding strong 
renewal effects both statistically (less room for a return of conditioned fear 
reactions) and mechanistically (less inhibition learning). Alternatively, it is 
possible that uninstructed fear conditioning, relative to instructed fear 
conditioning, leads to either more context-independent acquisition learning or 
more context-dependent inhibitory learning, therefore resulting in stronger 
renewal effects that are also observed on psychophysiological measures. It 
would be interesting for future studies to directly study the impact of including 
contingency instructions on the renewal effect. Nevertheless, the specific 
renewal effect on US expectancy ratings and the general return of fear on startle 
in the current study provide reasonable evidence that contextual cues are 
important for the return of fear, also when this fear was initially established on 
the basis of verbal instructions. 
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Our results have both clinically and theoretically interesting implications. 
Clinically, they suggests that fears acquired on the basis of verbal instructions can 
quickly return when the context changes. This is an important finding because 
previous research has demonstrated that verbal instructions can be an important 
pathway through which fear and phobias are acquired (e.g., Muris & Field, 2010). 
Given that the renewal effect can be a source of relapse after successful therapy 
(Bouton, 2002), our results suggest that fear acquired through verbal instructions 
might pose similar challenges for successful therapy as fears established through 
direct conditioning. Therefore, it would be interesting for future studies to test 
whether procedures that seem to be effective in preventing or reducing renewal, 
such as extinction training in multiple context (e.g., Gunther, Denniston, & Miller, 
1998) or including extra extinction cues in the extinction training and the 
renewal phase (e.g., Dibbets et al., 2008), are effective to reduce the renewal 
effect after verbally instructed fear conditioning as well. Theoretically, our 
results suggest that conditioning via verbal instructions also competes for 
expression with contingencies subsequently learned in an extinction phase and 
that the context can gate this expression of learned information (Bouton, 2004). 
More generally, our findings once again highlight the similarities between 
learning via instructions and via direct experience (Grings, 1973; Lovibond, 2003).  
Hence, they advocate a model of fear conditioning and learning that allows for 
strong similarities between learning via instructions and learning via direct 
experience.  
Second, informing a group of participants about the presence of two 
contexts and its relevance for the CS-US contingencies strengthened the context 
switch effects on all collected measures for this group. This finding demonstrates 
that verbal information about the context can strongly modulate the impact of a 
context switch on the expression of fear. However, the effect of the context 
instructions was differently expressed on the different measures of fear. For US 
expectancy, the context instructions primarily reduced US expectancy ratings for 
the CS+ in the extinction phase, but did not reliably increase differential US 
expectancy ratings after the context switch. For the physiological measures, on 
the other hand, the context instructions resulted in larger fear responses to both 
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the CS+ and the CS- after the context switch, but did not reduce 
psychophysiological responses before the context switch (see Figures 2, 3 and 4). 
These results may suggest that our instructions differently affected self-report 
ratings and psychophysiological measures of conditioned fear. However, when all 
the trials of the extinction and renewal phase were considered, similar trends 
were observed for both types of measures. That is, increased differential and 
non-differential US expectancy ratings were obtained when all trials of the 
renewal phase were considered, and differential fear reactions tended to be 
reduced for SCRs and startle when all trials of the extinction phase were taken 
into account. Hence, there was some evidence in our data for similar effects of 
verbal instructions on psychophysiological and self-report measures. This may 
suggest that our study may have lacked sufficient power to reliably detect 
certain, more subtle, effects of the verbal instructions on self-report ratings and 
psychophysiological measures. Context-specific inflation and reduction of 
differential fear responses on both psychophysiological and self-report measures 
through verbal instructions may be obtained when a sufficient amount of 
observations are considered. Nevertheless, regardless of these considerations 
about the differences between the psychophysiological measures and the US 
expectancy ratings, our study does provide an important proof-of-principle that 
verbal instructions about the relevance of the context for the CS-US contingency 
can strengthen contextual control of fear, on both self-report and 
psychophysiological measures. 
Our results are complementary to the only other study that has 
investigated the impact of verbal instructions on the renewal effect. Whereas we 
found that instructions can strengthen the renewal effect, Neumann (2007) 
observed that verbal instructions cannot attenuate the renewal effect. The 
combination of our own results with these of Neumann (2007) may suggest that 
verbal instructions are successful in strengthening the renewal effect, but not in 
attenuating it. However, the way conditioned reactions were measured differed 
between our own study (physiological and self-report measures) and the studies 
of Neumann (withholding a response in a videogame). Furthermore, conditioning 
was established by directly experiencing the contingencies in the studies by 
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Neumann (2007) rather than via verbal instructions in our own study. Further 
research will need to clarify exactly under which conditions verbal instructions 
can impact the contextual expression of fear.  
More generally, the effects of context instructions that we observed in our 
study are in correspondence with the aforementioned expectancy models of 
associative learning and fear conditioning (De Houwer, 2009; Lovibond, 2004; 
Mitchell et al., 2009; Reiss, 1980) by showing that the expression of learned fear 
reactions is strongly influenced by verbal instructions about when the CS-US 
contingency applies. That is, our CS-US contingency instructions strengthened 
fear reaction within a certain context in which they were instructed to apply, and 
reduced fear reactions in a context in which they were instructed not to apply. 
Such a result cannot easily be explained by the formation of simple associations 
when receiving instructions (e.g., Field, 2006; Ugland, Dyson, & Field, 2013) 
because these associations do not offer a way to encode validity information.  
Rather, it shows that our instructions are encoded and expressed in a conditional 
format, which seems to fit better with the idea of learning through the formation 
of propositions about the relationship between the CS and the US as proposed 
by propositional models of associative learning (De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell et al., 
2009).  
Finally, we did not find evidence for context conditioning as measured by 
startle reactions during NA trials, neither for the CI group nor the NCI group. This 
result suggests that the effect of the context switch cannot be explained by 
context conditioning in either group. This result fits with the results from Alvarez 
et al. (2007) who did not find any evidence either that context conditioning, as 
measured by NA startle reactions, could explain the renewal effect. 
In conclusion, our study demonstrates that extinction after conditioning via 
verbal instructions is sensitive to contextual cues. In addition, we provide 
evidence that verbal instructions can strengthen the contextual control of fear. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the research presented in this thesis was to provide a 
contribution to the functional knowledge about fear learning via verbal 
instructions and stimulus pairings and to further test mental process models of 
fear learning. As we have seen in the introduction, currently fear learning via 
verbal instructions is not so well understood (Olsson & Phelps, 2007), despite 
that it probably constitutes a major pathway of how fears are acquired (Field, 
2006; Rachman, 1977, 1991). Furthermore, mental process models disagree on 
the processes that allow for the acquisition of fear through verbal instructions 
and stimulus pairings, and under which conditions these pathways can produce 
learned fear responses. Therefore, the goal of the research presented in this 
thesis was to test a number of predictions of the different mental process 
models of fear learning and, more generally, to provide a contribution to the 
functional knowledge (i.e., which events in the environment determine behavior) 
of fear learning via verbal instructions and stimulus pairings. 
In this General Discussion, I will first briefly recapitulate the results and 
conclusions from the different empirical chapters. Then, I will discuss how the 
results of the different experiments in this thesis add to our knowledge of the 
functional properties of fear learning via verbal instructions, and the implications 
they have for mental process models of fear learning. Furthermore, I will briefly 
discuss how the results of the different studies can help to come to a better 
understanding of the etiology of anxiety disorders and what possible implications 
could be drawn for the prevention and treatment of anxiety disorders.  Finally, I 
will conclude this thesis by outlining a number of avenues for future research. 
SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS 
In Chapter 2, the effect of experiencing CS-US pairings in combination with 
verbal threat instructions was investigated for several measures. Participants 
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were informed that two CSs are predictive of an electric shock. Participants were 
further told that in a first phase the shocks that would follow one of the CSs 
would be replaced by a picture of a lightning bolt in order to not present too 
many shocks before the actual experimental phase started. This cover story 
allowed us to present two instructed CS+ stimuli of which only one was actually 
paired with the US. When, in a second phase, participants were told that both 
CSs would now be followed by electric shocks, we found additive effects of the 
previous CS-US pairings for fear ratings and US expectancy ratings. Participants 
gave slightly higher ratings for the CS that had in the previous phase been paired 
with the shock. A trend for such an additive effect was also observed for fear 
potentiated startle. However, for skin conductance responses, no evidence for 
such additive effects were obtained. This latter finding replicated the results of 
Raes, De Houwer, De Schryver, Brass and Kalisch (2014) who did not find 
evidence for an additive effect of CS-US parings for skin conductance responses 
either. Finally, in Chapter 2, we investigated the impact of an unpaired 
presentation of the shock on the different measures of fear after the testing 
phase. We found that this unpaired shock presentation led to an increase of fear 
on all the different measures (i.e., generalized reinstatement). Furthermore, for 
fear ratings, the unpaired shock presentation resulted in a specific increase for 
the instructed CS+ that had not been paired with the shock (i.e., differential 
reinstatement for the instructed but not paired CS+). 
In Chapter 3, we investigated the additive impact of experiencing an 
instructed CS-US contingency on early visual processing of the CS. Previous 
research demonstrated that both verbal threat instructions and stimulus pairings 
can enhance ERP components related to early visual processing. However, no 
previous study investigated the effects of combining these two pathways of fear. 
In our experiment, participants were told that two CSs could be predictive of an 
electric shock, while another CS was instructed to be safe. New CSs were 
selected throughout the experiment to ensure that the observed effects could 
not be due to overtraining of the CS-US relation (i.e., a large number of CS-US 
pairings). Half of the instructed CS+s were followed by the electric shock. Our 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  189 
results showed that our threat instructions resulted in a reduction of the P3 
amplitude. However, no effects of threat instructions or CS-US pairings were 
found for any of the early visual components we investigated (i.e., C1, P1 and 
N1). Furthermore, no additive effects of adding stimulus pairings were obtained 
for any of the investigated components. 
In Chapter 4, we investigated whether prepared fear learning effects could 
be obtained when fear is established via verbal instructions. Prepared fear 
learning refers to the observation that the acquisition of fear responses is 
facilitated, and extinction of these fear responses is delayed for fear-relevant 
stimuli such as pictures of snakes and spiders compared to fear-irrelevant stimuli 
such as pictures of flowers and birds. Therefore, in two experiments participants 
received contingency instructions about the relation between fear-relevant and 
fear-irrelevant CSs and the presence of an electric shock (the US). In the second 
experiment, we used the procedure from Chapter 2 to also manipulate whether 
participants actually experienced pairings of the fear-relevant and fear-irrelevant 
CSs with the US, or whether these pairings were merely instructed. This second 
experiment was included to test whether prepared learning effects might 
depend on stimulus pairings, as could be predicted from dual-process models of 
fear learning (Olsson & Phelps, 2007). We did not find any evidence for 
preparedness effects when fear was established via verbal instructions in the 
first experiment. However, in the second experiment, we found that fear 
acquisition was more pronounced for instructed fear-relevant CS+s compared to 
instructed fear-irrelevant CS+s. This effect was particularly pronounced on US 
expectancy ratings. Furthermore, we did not find evidence that preparedness 
effects depended on CS-US pairings, given that facilitated acquisition for fear-
relevant CS+s was only found for the instructed but not paired CS+, whereas 
preparedness effects were absent for the fear-relevant CS+ that was both 
instructed and paired with the US. 
In Chapter 5, we investigated whether fear reactions that were established 
by verbal threat instructions or the combination of threat instructions and 
stimulus pairings could be reversed with subsequent instructions. We predicted 
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that if stimulus pairings allow for the formation of implicit fear memories, as 
argued by the social fear learning model of Olsson and Phelps (2007), reversal 
instructions should be less pronounced for CSs that have been paired with the US 
compared to CSs that have not been paired with the US. Furthermore, given that 
the potentiation of the startle reflex is believed to reflect the implicit fear 
memory installed through stimulus pairings (Hamm & Weike, 2005; Sevenster, 
Beckers, & Kindt, 2012), the reduced instructed reversal effect for paired CSs 
should be primarily pronounced for this measure. In contrast to these 
predictions, we found a complete reversal of fear potentiated startle responses, 
regardless of whether the threatened CS had been paired with the US in a first 
phase or not. Similar patterns were found for US expectancy ratings and skin 
conductance responses. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, we investigated the impact of a context change and 
context instructions on extinguished fear responses that were initially 
established via verbal instructions. Previous research had shown that such a 
contextual change after an extinction phase can allow for the return of 
conditioned fear (Bouton, 2004). Furthermore, we wanted to investigate the 
effect of instructing participants that the presence of the electrical shock 
depends on the context. In a first part of the experiment, participants were 
informed that one colored square could be followed by an electric shock, 
whereas another colored square would not be followed by the shock. Half of the 
participants were additionally informed that electric shocks would only be 
presented if the background of the computer screen had a particular color, but 
not when it had another color. The other half of the participants did not receive 
these context instructions. After these instructions, participants continued to an 
unannounced extinction phase by presenting the colored squares without 
administering any electric shocks. We found that a change in context after this 
extinction phase (i.e., a change of the background color of the computer screen) 
allowed for a return of verbally established fear. However, this effect was only 
reliable for US expectancy ratings, while the psychophysiological measures of 
fear (skin conductance responses and fear potentiated startle) were not very 
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affected by this manipulation. Furthermore, we found that the group of 
participants that were informed that the presence of the electrical shock would 
depend on the background color of the computer screen showed a larger return 
of fear after the context change. For this group, effects of a background change 
were both observed on US expectancy ratings and psychophysiological measures 
of fear. 
NOVEL FUNCTIONAL KNOWLEDGE ABOUT FEAR LEARNING VIA VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS 
A first functional property of learning via verbal instructions that comes 
forward from our different studies is that effects of threat instructions can be 
stronger when they are combined with a pairing between the instructed CS+s 
and the US. We obtained evidence for such an additive effect of stimulus pairings 
in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. However, this additive effect of stimulus pairings may be 
moderated by the measure of fear that is investigated. That is, relatively clear 
added effects of stimulus pairings were observed for US expectancy ratings in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Similarly, for fear ratings, we found clear evidence for 
additive effects in the studies that had included this measure (i.e., Chapters 2 
and 4), and we found a trend for additive effects for fear potentiated startle in 
Chapter 2. However, on skin conductance responses in Chapters 2 and 4, and the 
P3 component in Chapter 3, such additive effects of threat instructions and 
stimulus pairings were absent. 
A second newly discovered property of fear learning via verbal instructions 
is that an unpaired presentation of the US can allow for a return of extinguished 
fear that was initially installed via verbal instructions (i.e., reinstatement of 
verbally installed fear). Hence, much like extinguished fear that was initially 
established via stimulus pairings can return through an unpaired presentation of 
the US (e.g., Hermans et al., 2005), an unpaired US presentation can also allow 
for the return of extinguished fear that was established via verbal instructions 
(see Chapters 2 and 4). Furthermore, this return of fear was not always only 
limited to the CS that was threatened (i.e., differential reinstatement), but often 
192  CHAPTER 7 
also generalized to the CS that was not threatened (i.e., generalized 
reinstatement). The same pattern is often observed for reinstatement of fear 
that was established via stimulus pairings (for a review see Haaker, Golkar, 
Hermans, & Lonsdorf, 2014). Currently, it is unclear which conditions determine 
whether differential or generalized reinstatement is observed. 
A third property of fear learning via verbal instructions that was found in 
Chapters 2 and 6 is that the effects of threat information cannot be completely 
overturned by subsequent safety information. That is, threatened CSs that were 
told not to be followed by an electric shock in Chapter 2 and threatened CSs 
presented in an instructed safe context in Chapter 6 continued to elicit fearful 
reactions both as indicated by self-reported and psychophysiological measures of 
fear. Similar effects have previously been found for fear learning via stimulus 
pairings, where safety instructions and the removal of the shock electrodes were 
unsuccessful to completely abolish conditioned fear reactions (Hugdahl, 1978; 
Sevenster et al., 2012).  
A fourth property was observed in Chapter 3, in which we demonstrated 
that verbal instructions can impact on the perceptual processing of stimuli as 
evidenced by ERPs. That is, we found that verbal instructions impacted 
processing of stimuli from about 300 ms after stimulus onset on. Although we 
did not find evidence for the idea that verbal instructions impacted on early, 
bottom-up perceptual processing of stimuli, other studies have found that verbal 
instructions may impact visual processing much earlier (Bublatzky & Schupp, 
2012; Weymar, Bradley, Hamm, & Lang, 2013), and may even modulate visual 
processing as early as 60 to 100 ms past stimulus onset (Baas, Kenemans, Böcker, 
& Verbaten, 2002). This property of fear learning via verbal instructions can again 
be argued to be very similar as for fear learning via stimulus pairings. Fear 
conditioning via stimulus pairings seems to alter the early sensory processing of 
the CSs as well (for a review see Miskovic & Keil, 2012). 
A fifth property was investigated in Chapter 4. In that chapter, the effect of 
verbal threat instructions was shown to depend on properties of the stimulus 
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that becomes threatening. That is, in Chapter 4, we found suggestive evidence 
that some effects of threat instructions are more outspoken for fear-relevant 
stimuli such as snakes, spiders and rats, compared to fear-irrelevant stimuli such 
as cow, deer and rabbits. Again, this is a property that is very similar for learning 
via the pairing of stimuli. Many previous experiments have demonstrated that 
fear acquisition through stimulus pairings is facilitated for fear-relevant stimuli 
compared to fear-irrelevant stimuli (e.g., Ho & Lipp, 2014; Öhman & Mineka, 
2001). 
A sixth property is that verbal threat instructions can override a previously 
established fear memory that had been learned on the basis of verbal 
instructions or on the basis of the combination of verbal instructions and 
stimulus pairings. While we had initially suspected that this effect might be 
strongly modulated by the specific fear measure under investigation, we found 
this effect to be present for all the measures of fear that we had investigated (US 
expectancy ratings, skin conductance responses, fear potentiated startle), 
although the evidence for a reversal effect was somewhat less pronounced for 
skin conductance responses than for the other measures. 
A seventh property is that contextual cues are important for extinguished 
fear responses that were established on the basis of verbal instructions. That is, 
in our study we found that fear responses that were established via verbal 
instructions and that were gradually extinguished through presenting 
unreinforced CSs tended to return when the background color of the computer 
screen was changed. However, this effect was only reliably observed for self-
reported expectancy of the US. Psychophysiological measures (skin conductance 
responses and fear potentiated startle) were not very affected by this context 
change. One exception was fear potentiated startle, for which we found a 
tendency for a general return of fear after the context switch. Again, this effect 
mirrors results that have been found for fear learning through the pairing of 
stimuli (renewal of conditioned fear; e.g., Alvarez, Johnson, & Grillon, 2007; 
Vansteenwegen et al., 2005). 
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Finally, an eighth property of verbally established fear that can be derived 
from the research in this thesis is that the contextual control of extinguished fear 
is influenced by verbal instructions about the context. That is, when participants 
were informed that the presence of the electric shock would depend on the 
background color of the computer screen, context switch effects were more 
outspoken and also observed on psychophysiological measures of fear. 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MENTAL PROCESS MODELS 
Our summary of the known functional properties of fear learning via verbal 
instructions shows that some key characteristics of learning via stimulus pairings 
are also evident for learning via verbal instructions. Furthermore, we found that 
these two pathways of fear acquisition strongly interact as shown by the fact 
that verbal instructions can counter fear established through stimulus pairings 
(Chapter 5) and the observation that unreinforced CS presentations can reduce 
verbally established fear (Chapter 6). Such results argue strongly for a single 
process view in which both learning via direct experience and via instructions 
interact to create a common representation that drives fear (Lovibond, 2003). 
That is, it seems unlikely and unnecessary to assume partly independent learning 
processes for these two pathways of learning given that they share very similar 
characteristics. Rather, if different processes underlie learning via these two 
pathways it would have been more likely to observe different characteristics for 
these two pathways of fear learning. Furthermore, the fact that learning via one 
of the pathways can impact fear responses acquired through another pathway 
requires that at least a part of the representation that drives these fear 
responses is affected by both these two pathways. It seems most parsimonious 
then to assume that a shared representation is affected by both pathways of fear 
learning. 
As we have seen in the introduction, this common representation can be 
thought of as the formation of mental associations that takes place for both 
learning via verbal instructions and learning via stimulus pairings (Field, 2006). 
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Alternatively, it can be argued that both pathways allow for the formation of 
propositional beliefs about the relationships between events in the environment 
(Lovibond, 2011; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). There are some 
results in this thesis that would argue for the latter mental mechanism that is 
common for both learning via verbal instructions and learning via stimulus 
pairings. First, as argued in the introduction, the instruction “this stimulus will 
NOT be followed by an electrical shock” does not result in conditioned fear 
reactions for the instructed stimulus (see Chapter 5 and Sevenster et al., 2012), 
despite that the representation of the stimulus and the representation of the 
shock are being activated together, and thus there is opportunity for association 
formation. Thus, effects of verbal instructions are determined by relational 
qualifiers embedded in the sentence, which is a result that is hard to 
accommodate with association formation models. Furthermore, in Chapter 6 we 
showed that the expression of (extinguished) fear was made more context 
dependent via verbal instructions. Specifically, conditioned fear was reduced in a 
context in which the shock was instructed not to be presented and fear was 
more pronounced in a context in which the shock was told to be possibly 
presented. This result strongly supports the conclusion that what was learned via 
the verbal instructions in Chapter 6 was represented in a conditional format. 
That is, both the instructed relationship as well as the conditions under which 
this relationship applies must have been encoded. It is difficult to see how an 
association formation model that relies on the incremental strengthening of 
associative connections can allow for such a quick establishment of conditional 
information. 
However, these results can also be accounted for by dual-process models 
of fear learning in which both verbal instructions and stimulus pairings allow for 
the formation of propositional representations. Dual-process models differ from 
single-process propositional models in that only the former propose that under 
certain circumstances (e.g., when stimuli are paired) fear learning is due to 
association formation (Olsson & Phelps, 2007). Therefore, we tested a number of 
predictions of dual-process models of fear learning to investigate whether under 
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these conditions simple association formation processes do indeed add to fear 
learning. Specifically, first, we investigated whether prepared fear learning is a 
property of fear learning via stimulus pairings only. As prepared learning is 
argued to be due to the formation of associative fear memories in the amygdala 
(Mineka & Öhman, 2002; Öhman & Mineka, 2001), it could be argued that such 
prepared learning can only be obtained through stimulus pairings, because only 
this procedure is argued to allow for amygdala-mediated fear learning (Olsson & 
Phelps, 2007). In contrast to this prediction, we have found suggestive evidence 
that prepared learning effects may also be obtained via verbal instructions, in 
line with the results of earlier studies (Hugdahl & Öhman, 1977; Hugdahl, 1978). 
This result argues against the idea that a separate association formation process 
needs to be assumed to account for prepared learning effects. Second, in 
Chapter 5, we tested whether fear reactions established through the 
combination of threat instructions and stimulus pairings can be reversed via 
verbal instructions. If stimulus pairings create implicit fear memories that are 
automatic and encapsulated from verbal instructions (LeDoux, 2014; Öhman & 
Mineka, 2001), verbal instructions should be unsuccessful to reverse these 
responses (e.g., McNally, 1981), especially for fear reactions that are believed to 
reflect this implicit associative memory such as the startle reflex (Hamm & 
Weike, 2005; Sevenster et al., 2012). In contrast to this prediction, we found that 
verbal instructions were highly successful to reverse conditioned fear reactions 
established through the combination of threat instructions and stimulus parings. 
Furthermore, as we reviewed in Chapter 5, doubts were raised about a number 
of other claims that argue for dual-process models, such as that conditioned fear 
can be acquired outside of conscious awareness (Sevenster, Beckers, & Kindt, 
2014) and that fear memories can be resistant to extinction instructions 
(Dawson, Rissling, Schell, & Wilcox, 2007; Sevenster et al., 2012). 
Taken together, the results of the different chapters in this thesis seem to 
be best accounted for by a model that argues that learning is the result of the 
non-automatic formation of propositional beliefs (De Houwer, 2009; Lovibond, 
2011; Mitchell et al., 2009). Nevertheless, it may well be that some necessary 
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conditions to obtain evidence for association formation processes were not 
fulfilled in our studies. Moreover, other studies have previously offered 
persuasive evidence that association formation processes do play a role in the 
acquisition of conditioned fear (e.g., McAndrew, Jones, McLaren, & McLaren, 
2012). The debate whether one or multiple processes need to be assumed to 
account for (fear) learning is a very lively one that has been going on for decades 
(Brewer, 1974; McLaren et al., 2014; Mitchell et al., 2009; Shanks, 2010). It is 
unlikely that the debate will be resolved with one or even a series of studies, 
which may indicate that the different models are (currently) insufficiently 
specified to render them falsifiable. The position in this thesis is that, regardless 
of whether and how the debate will ultimately be settled with these studies, the 
continued research efforts that are being directed at resolving this debate have 
contributed tremendously to the understanding of (fear) learning and is 
therefore worthwhile. Mental process models are continuously being refined to 
make increasingly specific predictions about which factors contribute to fear 
learning. For instance, the fear learning models of Öhman and Mineka (2001), 
Hamm and Weike (2005) and Olsson and Phelps (2007) have guided the research 
in this thesis extensively and have allowed for specific predictions for when 
verbal instructions could or could not have an effect on fear reactions. Testing 
these predictions has provided new functional knowledge about fear learning via 
verbal instructions that can drive the development of new models and to 
generate a better understanding of how fear is acquired. Thus, despite not being 
able to provide a final answer to which sort of model should be preferred, the 
research in this thesis has provided new knowledge to further constrain mental 
process models, to generate new testable predictions and to come to a better 
understanding of how fear is acquired. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE 
The functional knowledge that we gained about fear learning via verbal 
threat instructions and stimulus pairings not only provides an empirical basis to 
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test mental process models of fear conditioning against (De Houwer, 2011), but 
also provides a possibility to better understand anxiety disorders. Here we 
shortly discuss some of the results of the different chapters that allow for a 
better understanding of the acquisition, prevention and treatment of anxiety 
disorders.  
A first important finding throughout the chapters is that verbal instructions 
can install strong and persistent fear that is both evident on self-report measures 
of fear and on psychophysiological measures. Hence, our results add to the 
validity of the idea that verbal instructions may be a pathway for the acquisition 
of pathological fear. Furthermore, in Chapters 2 and 6 we found that fear that 
was established via verbal instructions was resistant to safety instructions. That 
is, for the instructed CS+ during the training phase of Chapter 2 and during the 
extinction phase for the context instructions group in Chapter 6 fear reactions 
were still observed, despite that participants were explicitly told that no shocks 
would be provided during these phases. Thus, these results show that verbal 
instructions can install very persistent fear that may not be completely 
overridden by subsequent safety information. A clinical implication of these 
findings might then be that care should be taken when verbal warnings or 
threats are issued (such as when parents warn their children) because this verbal 
information may install lasting fear that is resistant to subsequent safety 
information. 
Second, the studies of Chapter 4 illustrate that verbal instructions may 
even establish “irrational” fear for fear-relevant stimuli, in the absence of 
stimulus pairings. That is, the effects of threat instructions were more outspoken 
for threatened fear-relevant stimuli than for threatened fear-irrelevant stimuli in 
the second experiment of Chapter 4. A clinical implication of this finding is that it 
may be possible that irrational or pathological fears for fear-relevant stimuli 
could be established via verbal instructions, in the absence of any traumatic 
experience, as retrospective reports with phobic patients also seem to suggest 
(King, Eleonora, & Ollendick, 1998; Schindler, Vriends, Margraf, & Stieglitz, 2016). 
Again, the clinical implication is that care should be taken when providing verbal 
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threat instructions (such as, for instance, when parents warn their children). 
Note, however, that our evidence for prepared learning via instructions was 
limited only and should thus be interpreted with care. Nevertheless, the same 
qualification might apply for prepared fear learning via stimulus pairings 
(McNally, 1987). As we suggest in Chapter 4, preparedness effects might depend 
on certain moderating conditions such as uncertainty about the CS-US 
contingency. Future research will have to determine whether strong evidence for 
prepared learning could be obtained for fear learning via verbal instructions and 
stimulus pairings under these conditions. 
Finally, Chapters 2, 4 and 6 suggest that the mechanisms of return of fear 
are similar for fear established via verbal instructions and fear established via 
stimulus pairings. That is, an unpaired presentation of the US (i.e., 
reinstatement) or a change in context (i.e., renewal) allowed for a return of fear 
established through verbal instructions in these chapters. As these phenomena 
are often regarded as the laboratory analogues of how fear can relapse after 
exposure-based therapy (Bouton, 2002; Haaker et al., 2014), these studies 
suggest that pathological fear that was acquired through verbal instructions may 
pose similar challenges for relapse after therapy as fear established via the 
pairing of stimuli. The potential clinical implication is that the same precautions 
for the prevention of relapse after therapy could be taken for fears acquired 
both via stimulus pairings and via verbal instructions. 
These different findings provide a starting point for understanding how 
verbal instructions can add to the development of anxiety symptoms. However, 
much more research is obviously needed to come to a better understanding of 
how and to what extent verbal instructions contribute to the development of 
pathological fear (see also Muris & Field, 2010). As verbal instructions may 
constitute a major pathways of how fears are acquired (Field, 2006; Rachman, 
1991; Schindler et al., 2016), such continued research efforts may have far-
reaching implications for the understanding, treatment and prevention of 
anxiety disorders. 
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
One important objective of future research is to continue to refine and test 
models of fear acquisition. This practice has helped in gaining a better 
understanding of the etiology of anxiety symptoms and in developing more 
successful ways of treating anxiety disorders (Bouton, 2004; McNally, 2007; 
Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). As we discussed previously, one crucial question is 
whether and when evidence can be obtained for the contribution of simple 
(associative) learning processes to the acquisition of fear. The contingency 
reversal procedure (Grings, Schell, & Carey, 1973; McNally, 1981; Wilson, 1968) 
could be very useful to study this question because it allows to pit against each 
other the effect of a conditioning history and the effect of verbal instructions. In 
our own study, we did not find evidence for fear responses that were solely a 
function of the prior conditioning history and that were not affected by the 
contingency reversal instructions. However, as we have argued in Chapter 6, 
some aspects of our procedure may have contributed to these results. Most 
importantly, if learning would be uninstructed in the first conditioning phase, if 
the conditioning phase would be more extended, and if other CSs and USs are 
used (e.g., fear-relevant pictures as CSs or interoceptive pain as a US), effects 
that reflect simple association formation may be obtained. Hence, one 
interesting future avenue for research would be to continue to use the 
contingency reversal procedure for studying the role of simple associative 
learning processes in fear learning. 
Another interesting avenue for future research could be to investigate how 
verbal instructions can impact subsequent learning via the pairing of stimuli. A 
previous study of Field and Storksen-Coulson (2007) has shown that previous 
negative verbal information about unknown stimuli may strengthen the effect of 
subsequent conditioning experiences. It could be argued that verbal instructions 
install expectancy biases (Muris & Field, 2010) and thereby strengthen the 
effects of subsequent conditioning experience (Davey, 1997). Furthermore, it has 
been argued that prepared fear learning effects, as the ones in Chapter 4, are the 
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result of expectancy biases (Davey, 1992). Currently, it is not so clear where 
these expectancy biases for fear-relevant stimuli come from. Evolutionary 
selection may be offered as an explanation (Seligman, 1971), but it is also likely 
that cultural factors contribute to the development of these expectancy biases 
(Blanchette, 2006). Therefore it is likely that also verbal instructions add to the 
development of expectancy biases for fear-relevant stimuli. If this is indeed the 
case, initially neutral stimuli could be biased to become fear-relevant stimuli. 
Hence, it is possible that prepared learning effects could be obtained for initially 
neutral stimuli that have been biased through verbal instructions. For instance, 
unknown animals (e.g., Australian marsupials as in the study of Field and 
Storksen-Coulson, 2007) could be biased to become fear-relevant by telling 
participants that these animals carry diseases and are aggressive towards 
humans. Several properties of prepared learning for these biased stimuli could 
then be investigated such as facilitated fear acquisition, delayed fear extinction 
and facilitated return of fear. Such studies may elucidate the dynamic interplay 
between learning via verbal instructions and learning via stimulus pairings and 
help explain how stimuli can become “prepared” to elicit fear reactions. 
Another interesting avenue of future research could be to look at the 
effects of positive instructions. If verbal instructions could strengthen the effects 
of subsequent conditioning experiences through expectancy biases, they could 
possibly also weaken the effects. Prior research has already shown that positive 
verbal instructions can have fear reducing effects (Muris & Field, 2010). 
However, it is not clear whether positive information can reduce the effects of 
subsequent conditioning experience. Particularly interesting would be to 
investigate whether positive verbal information could counteract expectancy 
biases for fear-relevant stimuli and thereby counteract prepared learning effects 
for fear-relevant stimuli. For instance, positive information about spiders (e.g., 
they control the insect population, they are afraid of humans) and snakes (e.g., 
they can be trained and can be kept as a pet, their venom may be used as a 
treatment for cancer) could be provided to participants. If these instructions 
were successful to counteract the expectancy biases for these stimuli, perhaps 
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prepared learning effects could be abolished for these participants compared to 
a control group that did not receive this positive information. Such studies could 
point to promising new ways for treatment and prevention of pathological fear 
for fear-relevant stimuli. 
Finally, another potentially interesting avenue for future research is to 
investigate whether the bio-chemical processes that contribute to the 
(re)consolidation of fear conditioning via pairings also underlie (re)consolidation 
of verbally established fear memories. Research in recent years has booked 
remarkable successes in understanding the (re)consolidation of conditioned fear 
memories (e.g., Kindt, Soeter, & Vervliet, 2009; Soeter & Kindt, 2011). However, 
most of this research has focused on studying fear that was established via 
stimulus pairings, with some exceptions (Soeter & Kindt, 2012). Research on the 
(re)consolidation of verbally established fear memories provide further 
information about parallels or dissociations between different pathways of fear 
learning. Moreover, because verbal instructions probably constitute a major 
pathway of fear acquisition, it would be clinically relevant to investigate whether 
a promising new method for the treatment of anxiety disorders (i.e., disruption 
of fear memory reconsolidation; Soeter & Kindt, 2015) could be applied to treat 
anxiety symptoms acquired through verbal threat instructions as well. 
These are just a few avenues for future research that follow up on some of 
the findings of the experiments in this thesis and from other researchers. 
Obviously, many more other interesting directions for future research could be 
pursued such as investigating the impact of personality traits, neurotransmitters 
and genetic variations on fear learning via verbal instructions, as has been done 
for fear learning via stimulus pairings (e.g., Davis, 2006; Duits et al., 2015; 
Lonsdorf et al., 2009). Hence, it is clear from this section that only the very first 
steps have been taken to come to a full understanding of how verbal instructions 
contribute to fear acquisition and the development of anxiety symptoms.  
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CONCLUSION 
The goal of the research presented in this thesis was to come to a better 
understanding of how fear is acquired through verbal instructions and stimulus 
pairings. This goal was justified by the claim that verbal instructions provide an 
important pathway of how pathological fears are acquired (Field, 2006; 
Rachman, 1977, 1991). However, so far, few studies had systematically 
investigated fear acquisition via verbal instructions. Moreover, different models 
of fear learning differed in their predictions under which conditions verbal 
instructions contribute to the acquisition of (pathological) fear (Mitchell et al., 
2009; Olsson & Phelps, 2007). As we have seen in the different chapters of this 
thesis, the way in which fear is acquired via verbal instructions may be very 
similar to the way in which fear is acquired via stimulus pairings. Both pathways 
of fear acquisition share many functional properties. Furthermore, the studies in 
the different chapters of this thesis provide evidence that verbal instructions can 
install strong and persistent fear that may even override previously conditioned 
fear. The results of these studies put new constraints on mental process models 
of fear learning, help to understand how pathological fear may be acquired in 
the absence of traumatic experience and point to new opportunities for the 
prevention and treatment of pathological fear. However, the conducted research 
only provides a starting point to understand the contribution of verbal 
instructions and stimulus pairings to fear learning. A number of avenues for 
future research have been discussed in this final chapter, and it is undoubtedly 
so that many more other avenues for future research that we did not discuss 
also exist. To conclude this thesis then, we hope that the presented research can 
serve as an impetus for a durable interest in studying the contribution of verbal 
instructions and stimulus pairings to fear learning. 
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 NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
Mensen en andere dieren vertonen een specifiek gedragspatroon wanneer 
zij angstig zijn. De hartslag gaat omhoog, er wordt een ‘vecht-of-vlucht’ 
gedragspatroon geobserveerd en er worden negatieve subjectieve ervaringen 
gerapporteerd (Frijda, 1986; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998). Wat mensen en 
andere dieren vrezen is deels door hun evolutionaire geschiedenis bepaald 
(Seligman, 1971). Mensen hebben bijvoorbeeld veel vaker angst voor bepaalde 
stimuli zoals slangen, spinnen en open ruimtes, die allicht een bedreiging 
vormden voor de pre-technologische mens, dan voor moderne voorwerpen zoals 
auto’s en wapens, hoewel deze laatste voorwerpen momenteel een grotere 
direct gevaar vormen voor overleving dan de eerste soort van stimuli. 
Niettegenstaande, wat mensen en andere dieren vrezen is niet beperkt tot een 
beperkt aantal intrinsiek angstaanjagende stimuli, maar mensen en andere 
dieren bezitten ook de capaciteit om nieuwe stimuli te leren vrezen die een 
onaangename gebeurtenis voorspellen. Dit is bijvoorbeeld aangetoond met het 
‘Kleine Albert experiment’ door Watson en Rayner (1920). In hun experiment 
toonden deze onderzoekers dat een jong kind (Albert) kon worden aangeleerd 
om angstreacties te tonen in de nabijheid van een witte rat wanneer interactie 
met deze rat verschillende keren gepaard was geweest met een heel 
onaangenaam geluid. Dus, dit experiment toont dat angst kan worden 
aangeleerd omdat Albert geen angst vertoonde voor ratten alvorens de paringen 
tussen de rat en het onaangename geluid. Dit experiment wordt vaak verklaard 
in conditioneringstermen, waarbij de rat de geconditioneerde stimulus is (of 
conditioned stimulus, CS), het geluid de ongeconditioneerde stimulus 
(unconditioned stimulus, US) en de angstreactie voor de rat de geconditioneerde 
reactie (conditioned reaction, CR). 
Dit inzicht dat angst kan aangeleerd worden via de principes van klassieke 
conditionering is belangrijk geweest voor het beter begrijpen van angst en het 
ontwikkelen van interventies om pathologische angst te behandelen (Field, 2006; 
Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). Bijvoorbeeld, deze benadering kan verklaren waarom 
mensen die zijn betrokken geweest bij een scheepsramp vaker angst hebben 
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voor water of om op een schip te zijn (Field, 2006) of waarom mensen die bij een 
auto-ongeluk betrokken zijn geweest vaker angst hebben om met de auto te 
rijden. Ondanks deze successen heeft de conditioneringsverklaring van angst ook 
al veel kritiek gekregen (Menzies & Clarke, 1995; Rachman, 1977, 1991). Zo is het 
bijvoorbeeld niet duidelijk waarom mensen die een traumatische ervaring 
hebben ondergaan niet steeds angst ontwikkelen (Beckers, Krypotos, Boddez, 
Effting, & Kindt, 2013; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006) en waarom mensen soms angst 
ontwikkelen zonder ooit negatieve ervaring te hebben gehad met de stimulus 
waarvoor ze angst hebben (bijvoorbeeld, angst voor slangen in Westerse landen) 
(King, Eleonora, & Ollendick, 1998). Het paren van stimuli is dus noch een 
voldoende noch een noodzakelijk voorwaarde voor het ontwikkelen van angst. 
Omwille van deze redenen hebben verschillende onderzoekers voorgesteld dat 
angst ook kan worden aangeleerd via andere wegen zoals via verbale instructies 
en sociale observatie (Field, 2006; Rachman, 1977). 
Er is goede evidentie dat angst inderdaad kan worden aangeleerd via deze 
alternatieve wegen. Bijvoorbeeld, Olsson en Phelps (2004) hebben aangetoond 
dat als proefpersonen worden verteld dat een bepaalde stimulus door een schok 
zal gevolgd worden, of wanneer zij een andere persoon een schok zien krijgen in 
het bijzijn van deze stimulus, deze proefpersonen angstreacties zullen vertonen 
voor deze stimulus. Ook in retrospectieve studies bij patiënten met 
angststoornissen worden verbale instructies en sociale observatie vaak als een 
oorzaak gerapporteerd voor het ontstaan van de angststoornis (King et al., 1998; 
Schindler, Vriends, Margraf, & Stieglitz, 2016). Ondanks deze bevindingen is 
angstleren via verbale instructies en via sociale observatie nog niet zo goed 
begrepen (Olsson & Phelps, 2007). Verschillende psychologische modellen van 
angstleren maken andere voorspellingen over wat kan aangeleerd worden via 
deze verschillende wegen van angstleren. Tot nu toe zijn nog maar weinig van 
deze voorspellingen onderzocht geweest. De bedoeling van dit 
doctoraatsproefwerk was om een aantal van deze voorspellingen te 
onderzoeken en zodanig bij te dragen aan een beter begrip van angstleren via 
verbale instructies. Om het onderzoek in dit proefwerk samen te vatten zal ik 
eerst kort de verschillende psychologische modellen van angstleren voorstellen. 
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Daarna zal ik de bevindingen van de verschillende empirische hoofdstukken in dit 
proefwerk samenvatten en tenslotte eindigen met de implicaties samen te 
vatten dat het onderzoek in dit proefwerk heeft voor ons begrip van angstleren. 
PSYCHOLOGISCHE MODELLEN VAN ANGSTLEREN 
Angstleren via het vormen en versterken van mentale associaties 
Een belangrijk idee binnen de psychologie is dat associatief leren (dit is: 
leren via het paren van stimuli, zoals bij klassieke conditionering) het gevolg is 
van het vormen van mentale associaties in het geheugen. Een associatie is een 
ongekwalificeerde connectie die toelaat om activatie te verspreiden. Volgens dit 
idee zal het herhaaldelijk paren van een CS en een US leiden tot het vormen van 
een associatie tussen de mentale representatie van deze twee stimuli. 
Daaropvolgende presentaties van de CS zullen hierdoor niet enkel de 
representatie van de CS activeren, maar ook de representatie van de US doordat 
deze twee representatie zijn gelinkt door een associatieve connectie. Deze 
activatie van de US lokt op zijn beurt de CR uit (bv. angstig gedrag). Deze theorie 
kan dus verklaren hoe leren plaatsvindt en waarom de CS na herhaalde paringen 
met de US een CR zal uitlokken. 
Volgens Field (2006) is hetzelfde mechanisme verantwoordelijk voor het 
leren van angst via verbale instructies. Dus, volgens deze theorie, zal een verbale 
instructie “deze hond bijt” toelaten om een associatieve connectie te vormen 
tussen de CS (hond) en de US (gebeten worden). Op dezelfde manier kan dus 
latere activatie van de mentale representatie van de CS (door een hond te zien) 
een mentale representatie van de US oproepen (gebeten worden), waardoor een 
CR wordt uitgelokt (angst voor de hond). Belangrijk bij deze theorie is dat er ook 
vaak wordt aangenomen dat het vormen van associaties op een automatische 
manier gebeurt. Dat betekent dat mensen niet een intentie of motivatie moeten 
hebben om deze associaties te vormen en dat deze associaties snel en eventueel 
buiten bewustzijn kunnen gevormd worden. 
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Angstleren via het vormen van propositionele kennis 
Een andere theorie van hoe mensen associatief (angst)leren is de 
propositionele leertheorie van Mitchell, De Houwer en Lovibond (2009). Volgens 
deze theorie vormen mensen geen associaties tussen representaties in het 
geheugen, maar vormen ze propositionele ideeën over hoe evenementen of 
stimuli samenhangen. Een persoon die is gebeten geweest kan dus de propositie 
vormen dat honden hem/haar zullen bijten. Deze propositie of verwachting zal 
dan angstreacties ontlokken (Lovibond, 2011; Reiss, 1980). Het belangrijke 
verschil tussen deze theorie en de associatieve theorie is dat relaties in het 
geheugen gekwalificeerd kunnen zijn. Zo kan je bijvoorbeeld de propositie 
vormen dat een hond je kan bijten, maar dat dit enkel opgaat voor bepaalde 
hondenrassen en wanneer de hond niet aan een ketting hangt. Bepaalde 
conditionele voorwaarden kunnen dus opgenomen worden in een propositie. 
Zulke conditionele informatie kan doorgaans niet, of slechts rudimentair, 
opgeslagen worden via associaties. Verder voorspelt deze theorie ook dat 
proposities op een niet-automatische manier gevormd worden. Dit wil zeggen 
dat er tijd, motivatie en bewustzijn nodig is voor het vormen van proposities. 
Tenslotte voorspelt deze theorie ook dat het vormen van proposities het 
mechanisme vormt voor zowel leren via stimulusparingen als leren via verbale 
instructies. Dit houdt in dat deze twee manieren van angstleren sterke 
gelijkenissen zouden moeten vertonen en dat zij elkaar sterk kunnen 
beïnvloeden. 
Angstleren via het vormen van propositionele kennis én mentale associaties 
Een derde theorie over angstleren is dat zowel het vormen van 
propositionele kennis als het vormen van associaties toedragen aan het leren van 
angst. Volgens het leermodel van Olsson en Phelps (2007) worden er zowel 
proposities als associaties gevormd wanneer mensen stimulusparingen ervaren. 
Deze processen vinden op een gelijkaardige manier plaats als beschreven in de 
vorige twee secties. Echter, wanneer leren plaatsvindt via verbale instructies 
worden er enkel proposities gevormd en geen associaties volgens dit model. 
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Meer specifiek beargumenteren Olsson en Phelps (2007) dat enkel paringen 
tussen neutrale stimuli (CS’en) en intrinsiek aversieve stimuli (US’en, dit kunnen 
ook negatieve gelaatsuitdrukkingen zijn) toelaat om impliciete associatieve 
connecties met de amygdala te vormen. De amygdala is een hersenstructuur 
waarvan geloofd wordt dat deze instaat voor het genereren van defensieve 
reacties en die beargumenteerd wordt automatische te worden geactiveerd in 
situaties van dreiging (Mineka & Öhman, 2002; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). Deze 
theorie maakt dus een onderscheid tussen angstleren via verbale instructies en 
angstleren via stimulusparingen. Enkel de laatste manier van leren laat toe om 
op een onbewust en automatische manier defensieve reacties aan te leren die 
worden gemedieerd worden door associaties met de amygdala. Dit houdt in dat 
deze twee manieren van angstleren onder bepaalde condities andere 
eigenschappen kunnen vertonen en dat deze twee niet noodzakelijk elkaar zullen 
beïnvloeden onder bepaalde condities. 
Evaluatie van de modellen 
Veel onderzoekers zijn momenteel overtuigd dat leren voor een groot deel 
het gevolg is van het vormen van propositionele kennis. Leertheorieën waarbij 
leren exclusief het gevolg is van het vormen van associaties zijn onwaarschijnlijk 
omdat deze theorieën moeilijk kunnen verklaren waarom leren vaak wordt 
beïnvloed door bewustzijn (Dawson & Furedy, 1976) en redeneerprocessen (De 
Houwer, Vandorpe, & Beckers, 2005). De belangrijkste hedendaagse discussie 
vindt dus plaats tussen de laatste twee theorieën (McLaren et al., 2014). Een 
belangrijke vraag bij het kiezen tussen deze twee theorieën is of er evidentie kan 
worden gevonden voor leren dat het gevolg is van het vormen van associaties. Zo 
een bevinding zou aantonen dat een tweede leer-mechanisme moet 
verondersteld worden om al het (angst)leren te kunnen verklaren. Er bestaat 
veel discussie of er reeds dergelijke evidentie is gevonden (Lovibond, 2011; 
Mitchell et al., 2009). Het onderzoek in dit doctoraatsproefwerk wil een 
empirische bijdrage leveren aan deze discussie door te onderzoeken of 
angstleren via verbale instructies en stimulusparingen gelijkaardige 
eigenschappen vertonen en of er evidentie kan worden gevonden voor het 
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bestaan van een associatief leerproces dat onafhankelijk opereert van 
propositioneel redeneren. 
SAMENVATTING VAN DE EMPIRISCHE HOOFDSTUKKEN 
In hoofdstuk 2 onderzochten we het effect van het combineren van 
contingentie instructies en stimulusparingen. Voorgaand onderzoek heeft 
aangetoond dat instructies over de samenhang tussen een CS en een US 
angstreacties kunnen uitlokken. Weinig is echter gekend over de mate waarin 
ervaring van CS-US paringen iets kan bijdragen aan het effect van CS-US 
contingentie instructies. Om dit te onderzoeken werden proefpersonen verteld 
dat twee CS’en mogelijks gevolgd kunnen worden door een elektrische schok 
(CS+’en). Van een derde CS werd verteld dat deze niet kon gevolgd worden door 
de schok. Proefpersonen werden verder verteld dat één van de twee CS+’en 
voorlopig niet door een schok zou worden gevolgd als voorzorg om hen nog niet 
te veel schokken aan te bieden alvorens het eigenlijke experiment van start zou 
gaan. In de daaropvolgende fase werden proefpersonen de CS’en herhaaldelijk 
getoond. Gedurende deze fase werd slechts één van de twee CS+’en gevolgd 
door de schok. Na deze fase werden proefpersonen verteld dat nu beide CS+’en 
gevolgd zouden worden door de schok. In de volgende cruciale fase van het 
experiment observeerden we dat angstreacties iets meer uitgesproken waren 
voor de CS+ die in de voorgaande fase gepaard was geweest met de schok dan 
voor de CS+ die niet gepaard was geweest met de schok. Specifiek werd dit 
effect geobserveerd voor zelf-gerapporteerde angst en verwachting van de 
schok. Eenzelfde tendens werd geobserveerd voor de schrikreflex, maar dit 
effect was niet statistisch significant. Tenslotte was dit effect afwezig voor 
huidgeleidingsreacties. We concluderen dat ervaring van CS-US paringen kan 
bijdragen aan het effect van verbale instructies, maar dat dit effect mogelijks kan 
afhangen van de specifieke angstreactie die onderzocht wordt. 
In hoofdstuk 3 onderzochten we of leren via verbale instructies en via het 
paren van stimuli additieve kunnen hebben op vroege sensorische verwerking 
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zoals gemeten door evenement-gerelateerde potentialen (ERPs). Eerdere studies 
hebben reeds aangetoond dat zowel verbale instructies als stimulusparingen ERP 
componenten kunnen versterken die gerelateerd zijn aan vroege sensorische 
verwerking. Tot nu toe heeft echter nog geen enkele studie onderzocht of deze 
twee wegen van angstleren additieve effecten kunnen hebben op vroege 
sensorische verwerking. Om dit te onderzoeken hebben we proefpersonen 
geïnstrueerd over een reeks blokken over de contingentie tussen twee CS+’en en 
een elektrische schok (de US). Een derde CS (CS-) werd geïnstrueerd om niet 
gevolgd te worden door de US. Nieuwe CS’en werden geselecteerd in ieder van 
deze blokken en slechts de helft van de CS+’en werden daadwerkelijk gevolgd 
door de US. Met deze procedure vonden we een grotere P3 component (een 
component die gerelateerd is aan aandachtstoewijding) voor de CS-. We vonden 
echter geen effect van stimulusparingen voor deze component. Op de andere 
componenten die gerelateerd zijn aan vroege sensorische verwerking (C1, P1 en 
N1) vonden we geen evidentie voor een effect van de contingentie instructies of 
van de stimulusparingen. We besluiten dat de CS- waarschijnlijk meer aandacht 
trok omdat deze een belangrijke stimulus was voor de proefpersonen doordat 
deze stimulus de afwezigheid van een schok perfect kon voorspellen. 
In hoofdstuk 4 hebben we onderzocht of we evidentie konden vinden voor 
het bestaan van voorbereid angstleren via verbale instructies. Voorbereid 
angstleren verwijst naar de observaties dat angstleren soms makkelijker verloopt 
voor angst-relevante stimuli zoals foto’s van spinnen en slangen dan voor angst-
irrelevante stimuli zoals foto’s van vogels en vlinders (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). 
Om dit te onderzoeken werden proefpersonen in een eerste experiment 
geïnstrueerd over de contingentie tussen angst-relevante en angst-irrelevante 
CS’en en een elektrische schok (US). In dit eerste experiment vonden we geen 
evidentie dat angstleren via verbale instructies gemoduleerd werd door de 
angst-relevantie van de CS’en. Angstleren via verbale instructies voor angst-
relevante en angst-irrelevante CS’en in dit experiment. In een tweede 
experiment manipuleerde we of de geïnstrueerde contingenties tussen angst-
relevant en irrelevante stimuli daadwerkelijk ervaard werden. In dit tweede 
experiment vonden we suggestieve evidentie dat angstleren via verbale 
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instructies kan gemoduleerd worden door de angst-relevantie van de CS’en. Dit 
effect hing echter niet af van het feit of deze CS’en daadwerkelijk werden 
gepaard met de US aangezien dit voorbereid leren effect enkel werd 
geobserveerd voor de CS die niet gepaard was geweest met de US. Een mogelijke 
verklaring voor deze resultaten die we voorstellen in dit hoofdstuk is dat 
voorbereid angstleren afhangt van onzekerheid, met meer voorbereid leren 
wanneer er veel onzekerheid is over de exacte contingentie tussen de CS’en en 
de US. 
In hoofdstuk 5 onderzochten we of verbale instructies geconditioneerde 
angstreacties kunnen beïnvloeden. Als stimulusparingen angstreacties installeren 
via impliciete associatieve connecties kan er voorspeld worden dat verbale 
instructies niet voldoende kunnen zijn om deze angstreacties te beïnvloeden. Dit 
zou specifiek het geval moeten zijn voor maten van angst die deze impliciet 
associatieve connecties reflecteren, zoals de schrikreflex (Hamm & Weike, 2005). 
Om dit te onderzoeken gingen proefpersonen door een eerste angstleerfase 
waarbij angstreacties voor sommige CS’en geïnstalleerd werden via verbale 
instructies en voor andere CS’en via de combinatie van verbale instructies en 
stimulusparingen. Na deze fase werden proefpersonen verteld dat de 
contingenties omgedraaid zouden worden. Deze instructies beïnvloedde de 
angstreacties sterk, ook voor angstmaten waarvan geloofd worden dat deze de 
impliciete associatieve connecties met de amygdala reflecteren. Deze resultaten 
van deze studie zijn meer in lijn met een propositionele leertheorie dan een 
leertheorie met verschillende leerprocessen. 
Tenslotte, in hoofdstuk 6 hebben we onderzocht of uitgedoofde 
angstreacties geïnstalleerd via verbale instructies gevoelig zijn aan context 
veranderingen. Voor uitgedoofde angstreacties die zijn geïnstalleerd via 
stimulusparingen zorgt een dergelijke contextverandering er vaak voor dat de 
originele angst-herinnering terug wordt opgeroepen en dus dat de angstreacties 
terugkeren (Alvarez, Johnson, & Grillon, 2007; Vansteenwegen et al., 2005). Om 
te onderzoeken of dit ook het geval is voor angstreacties geïnstalleerd via 
verbale instructies werden proefpersonen eerst verteld dat een CS gevolgd zou 
worden door een elektrische schok en een andere CS niet gevolgd zou worden 
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door een elektrische schok. Hierna werden proefpersonen de twee CS’en 
herhaaldelijk getoond zonder dat een elektrische schok werd aangeboden. Deze 
procedure leidde tot een graduele uitdoving van de verbaal geïnstalleerde 
angstreacties. Na deze fase werd de achtergrondkleur van het computerscherm 
veranderd en werden de CS’en opnieuw aangeboden. Deze manipulatie leidde 
ertoe dat er een terugkeer was van angstreacties, voornamelijk zoals gemeten 
door gerapporteerde verwachting van de elektrische schok. 
Verder werden de helft van de proefpersonen ook verteld dat de 
aanwezigheid van de elektrische prikkel zou afhangen van de achtergrondkleur 
van het computerscherm. Deze groep toonde veel zwakkere angstreacties in de 
eerste fase en een grotere terugkeer van angstreacties in de tweede fase van het 
experiment. Dit laatste resultaat toont dat de contextuele controle van 
uitgedoofde angstreacties versterkt kan worden via verbale instructies. 
IMPLICATIES VAN HET ONDERZOEK EN CONCLUSIES  
Samengenomen toont het onderzoek in dit doctoraatsproefwerk dat 
angstleren via verbale instructies en via stimulusparingen een aantal belangrijke 
kenmerken delen. Zo zullen angstreacties uitgedoofd worden wanneer CS’en 
herhaaldelijk aangeboden zonder de US en kunnen bepaalde manipulaties 
ervoor zorgen dat deze uitgedoofde angstreacties snel terugkeren zoals het 
aanbieden van een ongepaarde US of het veranderen van de context. Ook lijkt 
het zo dat zowel angstleren via verbale instructies en angstleren via 
stimulusparingen beïnvloed worden door de angst-relevantie van de CS’en. Zulke 
gemeenschappelijke kenmerken suggereren dat eenzelfde proces aan de 
grondslag ligt van deze twee verschillende manieren van angstleren. Verder werd 
er ook in hoofdstuk 5 aangetoond dat angstreacties die geïnstalleerd zijn via de 
combinatie van stimulusparingen en instructies sterk beïnvloed kunnen worden 
door instructies. Deze bevinding toont aan dat wat geleerd wordt via 
stimulusparingen en via verbale instructies elkaar sterk kunnen beïnvloeden.  
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Samengenomen tonen deze resultaten dus dat angstleren via 
stimulusparingen en angstleren via instructies sterke gelijkaardige kenmerken 
vertonen en dat het leren via de twee wegen elkaar sterk beïnvloed. Deze 
resultaten sluiten beter aan bij een leertheorie waarbij beide manieren van leren 
een gemeenschappelijke representatie creëren dan bij een leertheorie waarbij 
de manieren van leren worden onderscheiden. Indien angstleren via deze twee 
wegen inderdaad deels onafhankelijk zou zijn zou onderzoek moeten kunnen 
tonen dat deze twee manieren van angstleren verschillende kenmerken hebben 
en dat zij onafhankelijke effecten hebben op angst. Het is echter zo dat deze 
resultaten geen finaal antwoord kunnen bieden op de vraag of één of meerdere 
leerprocessen nodig zijn om angstleren te verklaren. Het steeds mogelijk dat een 
experiment onder bepaalde condities evidentie kan bieden voor de 
onafhankelijkheid van deze twee verschillende manieren van leren (Olsson & 
Phelps, 2004). Onze resultaten dragen wel bij aan de empirische bevindingen 
over angstleren via stimulusparingen en via verbale instructies die moeten 
kunnen verklaard worden door theorieën van angstleren. Dus, onze bevindingen 
zullen toelaten om theorieën van angstleren verder te verfijnen en te testen. 
Onze resultaten in dit doctoraatsproefwerk hebben ook een aantal 
implicaties voor het begrijpen en behandelen van pathologische angst. We 
hebben bijvoorbeeld gevonden dat angstleren via verbale instructies meer 
uitgesproken kan zijn voor angst-relevante stimuli. Dit kan betekenen dat 
schijnbaar irrationele of pathologische angst kan geïnstalleerd worden via 
verbale instructies (Hugdahl & Öhman, 1977; Hugdahl, 1978). Deze bevinding 
dient echter nog verder te worden onderzocht omdat het momenteel niet 
helemaal duidelijk is onder welke condities deze effecten gevonden kunnen 
worden. Verder hebben we ook gezien dat bepaalde manipulaties uitgedoofde 
angst geïnstalleerd via verbale instructies opnieuw kunnen installeren. Deze 
manipulaties worden vaak gezien als de laboratorium-analogen van hoe herval 
kan plaatsvinden na therapie (Bouton, 2002; Haaker, Golkar, Hermans, & 
Lonsdorf, 2014). Dit kan betekenen dat gelijkaardige voorzorgsmaatregelen om 
herval te voorkomen voor angst geïnstalleerd via stimulusparingen ook van 
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toepassing kunnen zijn om herval te voorkomen van angst aangeleerd via verbale 
instructies. 
Een aantal interessante vervolgonderzoeken gebaseerd op het onderzoek 
in dit doctoraatsproefwerk kunnen zijn om de contingentie-omkering studie uit 
hoofdstuk 5 verder te gebruiken om evidentie te vinden voor associatieve 
leerprocessen, om te onderzoeken hoe verbale instructies effecten van 
conditioneringservaringen kunnen versterken of verzwakken en om meer 
onderzoek te doen naar de geheugenprocessen die betrokken zijn bij het 
opslagen en terug ophalen van angstrepresentaties geïnstalleerd via verbale 
instructies. Dit zijn slechts enkele van de mogelijke vervolgonderzoeken. Veel 
onderzoek is duidelijk nog mogelijk en nodig om tot een beter begrip te komen 
over hoe verbale instructies bijdragen aan het aanleren van angst. 
Ter conclusie dan, het onderzoek in dit doctoraatsproefwerk heeft een 
aantal principes van angstleren via verbale instructies aangetoond. Het 
onderzoek in dit proefwerk biedt een eerste stap voor een volledig begrip van 
angstleren via verbale instructies en stimulusparingen. Verder onderzoek is 
echter nodig om bestaande theorieën over angstleren te blijven verder verfijnen 
en specifiëren.   
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* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  -[X] research group file server: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2013_5 Startle project 
Hamburg\02RawData\instrfear.zip 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [x] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [X] other (specify): Responsable for data management from our research group (Maarten De 
Schryver; see above); Co-author of the study: Manuel Kuhn (see above) 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [ ] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: ... 
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: FPS2_RESCORED.sav, expectancy.sav, 
FearRatings.sav, SCR.sav (Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2013_5 Startle project 
Hamburg\03Analysis\Data) 
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2013_5 Startle project 
Hamburg\ReadMe_GM_2013_5 startle Hamburg.txt 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [x] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2013_5 Startle project 
Hamburg\ReadMe_GM_2013_5 startle Hamburg.txt 
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [x] research group file server: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2013_5 Startle project Hamburg 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [x] all members of UGent 
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  - [X] other (specify): Responsable for data management from our research group (Maarten De 
Schryver; see above) 
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [X] YES / [ ] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name: Robert Scharfenort 
   - address: Martinistraße 52, D-20246 Hamburg, Germany 
   - affiliation: Department of Systems Neuroscience, University Medical Center Hamburg-
Eppendorf 
   - email: r.scharfenort@uke.de 
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet CHAPTER 3 
 
% Name/identifier study: Does confirmation of verbal threat modulate early visual processing? 
% Author: Gaëtan Mertens, Tom Everaert, Valentina Rossi, & Jan De Houwer 
% Date: 25/02/2015 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Gaëtan Mertens 
- address: Department of Experimental-Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Henri 
Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: gaetan.mertens@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Jan De Houwer 
- address: Department of Experimental-Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Henri 
Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: jan.dehouwer@ugent.be 
 
1c. Lab data management responsable  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Maarten de Schryver 
- address: Department of Experimental-Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Henri 
Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: Maarten.DeSchryver@UGent.be  
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to 
data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational 
Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
 
Mertens, G., Everaert, T., Rossi, V., & De Houwer, J. (Unpublished thesis chapter). Does 
confirmation of verbal threat modulate early visual processing? 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?:  
 
All data 
 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
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* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2015_1 EEG_FC 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [X] other (specify): Responsable for data management from our research group (Maarten De 
Schryver; see above) 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [ ] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results.  
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: C1_ST_80_120.xlsx, N1_ST_180_240.xlsx, 
P1_ST_140_180.xlsx, P3_ST_350_700.xlsx, USexpectancy_ratings.sav 
  - [ ] file(s) containing analyses. Specify:  
  - [X] files(s) containing information about informed consent: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2015_1 
EEG_FC\01Background\IC_FC.docx 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2015_1 
EEG_FC\ReadMe_GM_2015_1_EEG_FC.txt 
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2014_2 Reversal 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [X] other (specify): Responsable for data management from our research group (Maarten De 
Schryver; see above) 
   
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
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   - e-mail:  
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet CHAPTER 4 
 
% Name/identifier study: Can prepared fear conditioning result from verbal instructions? 
% Author: Gaëtan Mertens 
% Date: 02/11/2015 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Gaëtan Mertens 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: gaetan.mertens@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Jan De Houwer 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: jan.dehouwer@ugent.be 
 
1c. Lab data management responsable  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Maarten de Schryver 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: Maarten.DeSchryver@UGent.be  
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to 
data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational 
Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Mertens, G., Raes, A. K., & De 
Houwer, J. (In press). Can prepared fear conditioning result from verbal instructions? 
Learning and Motivation. doi:10.1016/j.lmot.2015.11.001 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: All experiments (Experiment 1 and 
2) 
 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2013_2 Prepared Learning 
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  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [X] other (specify): Responsable for data management from our research group (see above) 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
SCR_rescored_syntax.sps (Experiment 1) and SyntaxFysio.sps (Experiment 2) 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: ExpectancySPSS.sav and SCR_rescored.sav 
(Experiment 1) and RatingdataSPSS.sav and SelecCond_AR_SCR_1.sav (Experiment 2) 
  - [ ] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: ... 
  - [X] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2013_2 Prepared Learning\README.txt 
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2013_2 Prepared Learning 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [X] other (specify): Responsable for data management from our research group (see above) 
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet CHAPTER 5 
 
% Name/identifier study: Potentiation of the startle reflex is in line with contingency reversal 
instructions rather than the conditioning history 
% Author: Gaëtan Mertens, Jan De Houwer 
% Date: 30/11/2015 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Gaëtan Mertens 
- address: Department of Experimental-Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Henri 
Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: gaetan.mertens@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Jan De Houwer 
- address: Department of Experimental-Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Henri 
Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: jan.dehouwer@ugent.be 
 
1c. Lab data management responsable  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Maarten de Schryver 
- address: Department of Experimental-Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Henri 
Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: Maarten.DeSchryver@UGent.be  
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to 
data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational 
Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported:  
 
Mertens, G., & De Houwer, J. (In press). Potentiation of the startle reflex is in line with 
contingency reversal instructions rather than the conditioning history. Biological 
Psychology. doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2015.11.014 
 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?:  
 
All datasets (only one experiment 
 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
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3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2014_2 Reversal 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [X] other (specify): Responsable for data management from our research group (Maarten De 
Schryver; see above) 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
syntax_EXPECTANCY_ContingencyReversal.sps, syntax_FPS_ContingencyReversal.sps, 
syntax_SCR_ContingencyReversal.sps 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: Expectancy_ContingencyReversal.sav, 
FPS_ContingencyReversal.sav, SCR_ContingencyReversal.sav 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2014_2 
Reversal\ReadMe_GM_2014_2_Reversal.txt 
  - [X] files(s) containing information about informed consent: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2014_2 
Reversal\01Background\IC_FC.docx 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2014_2 
Reversal\ReadMe_GM_2014_2_Reversal.txt 
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2014_2 Reversal 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [X] other (specify): Responsable for data management from our research group (Maarten De 
Schryver; see above) 
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
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* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet CHAPTER 6 
 
% The impact of a context switch and context instructions on the return of verbally conditioned 
fear 
% Author: Gaëtan Mertens, Jan De Houwer 
% Date: 12/11/2015 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Gaëtan Mertens 
- address: Department of Experimental-Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Henri 
Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: gaetan.mertens@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Jan De Houwer 
- address: Department of Experimental-Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Henri 
Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: jan.dehouwer@ugent.be 
 
1c. Lab data management responsable  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Maarten de Schryver 
- address: Department of Experimental-Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Henri 
Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: Maarten.DeSchryver@UGent.be  
 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to 
data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational 
Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
 
Mertens, G. and De Houwer, J. (In press). The impact of a context switch and context instructions 
on the return of verbally conditioned fear. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental 
Psychiatry. doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2015.11.001  
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
 
All datasets. 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
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* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2014_1 Renewal 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [X] other (specify): Responsable for data management from our research group (Maarten De 
Schryver; see above) 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
syntax_FPS_renewal.sps; syntax_SCR_renewal.sps 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: Renewal_FPS.sav, Renewal_SCR.sav, 
Renewal_USexpectancty.sav 
  - [ ] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: Information about the analyses steps taken in SPSS are 
provided in Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2014_1 Renewal\ReadMe_GM_2014_1 Renewal.txt 
  - [X] files(s) containing information about informed consent: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2014_1 
Renewal\01Background\Materials\Questionnaires_renewal\IC_FC.docx 
  - [X] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2014_1 
Renewal\01Background\Materials\Questionnaires_renewal\EthicalApplication_RenewalSt
udy.pdf 
  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2014_1 Renewal\ReadMe_GM_2014_1 
Renewal.txt 
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server: Z:\GaetanMertens\GM_2014_1 Renewal 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [X] other (specify): Responsable for data management from our research group (Maarten De 
Schryver; see above) 
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
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   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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